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STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaint(ff/ Respondent 
vs. 
ALBERT A CICCONE 
Defendant I Appel'ant 
s.c. #43075 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appealed from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Elmore. 
Lawrence G. Wasden, 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
Sara Thomas, 
State Appellate Public Defender 
Attorney for Appellant 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
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) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 43075 
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District, Elmore County, Idaho 
HONORABLE LYNN G. NORTON, presiding, 
Sara Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender, P.O. Box 2816, Boise, Idaho 83701 
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
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ALBERT A CICCONE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District, Elmore 
County, Idaho 
HONORABLE LYNN G. NORTON, presiding, 
Sara Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender, P.O. 
Box 2816, Boise, Idaho 83701 
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, 
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Fourth Judicial District Court - Elmore County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0000059 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
Albert A Ciccone, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: HEATHER 
Albert A Ciccone, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
1/17/2014 NCPC HEATHER New Case Filed - Post Conviction Relief Lynn G Norton 
MOTN HEATHER Motion for Leave of Court to File Verified Lynn G Norton 
Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
PETN HEATHER Verified Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Lynn G Norton 
Relief 
MOTN HEATHER Motion for An Order Taking Judicial Notice of the Lynn G Norton 
Record, Transcript, PSI Report and Appellate 
Proceedings 
MOTN HEATHER Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Lynn G Norton 
Counsel 
MOTN HEATHER Motion and Affidavit to Proceed in Forma Lynn G Norton 
Pauperis and For Waiver of Fees or Costs 
(Prisoner) 
1/21/2014 APER HEATHER Other party: State of Idaho Appearance Elmore Lynn G Norton 
County Prosecuting Atty 
1/22/2014 ORDR HEATHER Order Appointing Counsel Order Extending Time Lynn G Norton 
to Answer 
ORDR HEATHER Order Re: In Forma Pauperis Petitioner and Lynn G Norton 
Waiver of Fees or Costs 
HRSC HEATHER Hearing Scheduled (Status 03/03/2014 01:30 Lynn G Norton 
PM) 
2/10/2014 ORDR HEATHER Order Appointing Conflict Public Defender Lynn G Norton 
ORPD HEATHER Subject: Ciccone, Albert A Order Appointing Lynn G Norton 
Public Defender Public defender Chris J Berglund 
2/12/2014 STIP HEATHER Stipulation for Access to Presentence Lynn G Norton 
Investigation Report 
2/14/2014 ORDR HEATHER Order Granting Access to Presentence Lynn G Norton 
Investigation Report 
3/3/2014 DCHH HEATHER Hearing result for Status scheduled on Lynn G Norton 
03/03/2014 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: P. Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing 
estimated: 6 
HRSC HEATHER Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference Lynn G Norton 
04/07/2014 01 :30 PM) 
4/7/2014 DCHH HEATHER Hearing result for Scheduling Conference Lynn G Norton 
scheduled on 04/07/2014 01 :30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Tiffany Fisher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing 
estimated: 18 
HRSC HEATHER Hearing Scheduled (Status 07/07/2014 01 :30 Lynn G Norton 
PM) 
SCHE HEATHER Scheduling Order Lynn G Norton 
4/28/2014 MOTN HEATHER Motion to Take Judicial Notice Lynn G Norton 
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Fourt Judicial District Court - Elmore County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0000059 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
Albert A Ciccone, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: HEATHER 
Albert A Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
4/30/2014 MOTN HEATHER Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record Lynn G Norton 
5/2/2014 ORDR HEATHER Order Granting Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Lynn G Norton 
Record 
APER HEATHER Subject: Ciccone, Albert A Appearance Elmore Lynn G Norton 
County Public Defender 
5/27/2014 APER HEATHER Subject: Ciccone, Albert A Appearance John R Lynn G Norton 
Kormanik 
NOAP HEATHER Notice Of Appearance Lynn G Norton 
AFFD HEATHER Affidavit of John R. Kormanik Lynn G Norton 
MOTN HEATHER Motion to Vacate Scheduling Order and for the Lynn G Norton 
Scheduling of Status Conference 
ORPD HEATHER Subject: Ciccone, Albert A Order Appointing Lynn G Norton 
Public Defender Public defender John R 
Kormanik 
5/30/2014 CONT HEATHER Continued (Status 08/04/2014 01 :30 PM) Lynn G Norton 
NOTH HEATHER Notice Of Hearing Lynn G Norton 
8/4/2014 DCHH HEATHER Hearing result for Status scheduled on George D. Carey 
08/04/2014 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: P. Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing 
estimated: 5 
HRSC HEATHER Hearing Scheduled (Evidentiary 11/17/2014 Lynn G Norton 
01:30 PM) 
8/22/2014 AMEN HEATHER Amended Scheduling Order Lynn G Norton 
11/3/2014 STIP HEATHER Stipulation to Vacate and Reset November 17, Lynn G Norton 
2014 Hearing 
11/4/2014 AMEN HEATHER Second Amended Scheduling Order Lynn G Norton 
11/17/2014 DCHH HEATHER Hearing result for Scheduling Conference Lynn G Norton 
scheduled on 11/17/2014 01 :30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Tauna Tonks 
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing 
estimated: 4 
HRSC HEATHER Hearing Scheduled (Evidentiary 12/12/2014 Lynn G Norton 
01:00 PM) 
11/19/2014 OTT HEATHER Order To Transport Lynn G Norton 
12/12/2014 DCHH HEATHER Hearing result for Evidentiary scheduled on Lynn G Norton 
12/12/2014 01 :00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Fran Casey 
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing 
estimated: 125 * Approximately 2 hours* 
OTT HEATHER Order To Transport Lynn G Norton 
12/15/2014 MOTN HEATHER Motion for Preparation of Transcript at County Lynn G Norton 
Expense 
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Fourth Judicial District Court - Elmore County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0000059 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
Albert A Ciccone, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: HEATHER 
Albert A Ciccone, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User 
12/16/2014 AMEN HEATHER Amended Scheduling Order Lynn G Norton 
12/17/2014 ORDR HEATHER Order Denying Preparation of Transcript at Lynn G Norton 
County Expense 
1/8/2015 MISC HEATHER Plaintiffs Written Closing Argument Following Lynn G Norton 
Evidentiary Hearing on His Verified Successive 
Petititon for Post-Conviction Relief 
1/30/2015 STIP HEATHER Stipulation to Extend Briefing Schedule Lynn G Norton 
ORDR HEP,THER Order to Extend Briefin~ Schedule Lynn G Norton 
2/6/2015 MISC HEATHER Closing Argument and Memorandum of Points Lynn G Norton 
and Authorities in Support 
2/13/2015 REPL HEATHER Plaintiffs Written Reply Argument Following Lynn G Norton 
Evidentiary Hearin gon His Verified Successive 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
2/27/2015 ORDR HEATHER Order Dismissing After Evidentiary Hearing Lynn G Norton 
JDMT HEATHER Final Judgment Lynn G Norton 
CDIS HEATHER Civil Disposition Entered entered for: State of Lynn G Norton 
Idaho, Other Party; Ciccone, Albert A, Subject. 
Filing date: 2/27/2015 
STAT HEATHER STATUS CHANGED: Closed Lynn G Norton 
3/16/2015 NTOA HEATHER Notice Of Appeal Lynn G Norton 
APSC HEATHER Appealed To The Supreme Court Lynn G Norton 
APDC HEATHER Appeal Filed In District Court Lynn G Norton 
STAT HEATHER STATUS CHANGED: Reopened Lynn G Norton 
MOTN HEATHER Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public Lynn G Norton 
Defender 
3/24/2015 ORDR HEATHER Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender Lynn G Norton 
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DO NOT DETACH PAPERS FROM THIS FCl.OOt 
• O.Q-4 . 
,, 
Albert A. Ciccone 
77377 ICC/ H 107 B 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 \ \~ 09 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Petitioner, Case No. CV K dDl~-59 
v. District Court No. CR-2003-4441 
STATE OF IDAHO, MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE VERIFIED SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR Respondent. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Albert A. Ciccone, who hereby moves this 
honorable Court pursuant to r. C. § 19-4908, for leave of court to expressly 
authorize and permit the filing of the Verified Successive Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief, contemporaneously submitted and by this reference is 
incorporated herein. 
BACKGROUND 
The initial case from which the Petitioner seeks relief came on for jury 
trial before this Court January 4, 2005. At trial the state presented 
argument that on October 16, 2003, the Petitioner had intentionally struck his 
wife with his vehicle as she walked along a rural country road. As a result 
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of the collision, the Petitioner was charged with two counts of first degree 
murder for the killing of wife, r.c. §§ 18-4001, 4002, 4003, and, 
murder of a human embryo or fetus, I.e. §§ 18-4001, 4002, 4003, 
4016. 
The defense argued that Mrs. Ciccone's death was the result of a tragic, 
but unintentional accident. Furthermore~ the defense proffered that at the 
time of the collision the Petitioner harbored no homicidal ideation, nor was 
the accident attributable to conduct that was willful, deliberate, 
premeditated or involve malice aforethought, thus, under Idaho law the facts 
of this case demonstrate the appropriate charging information called for 
vehicular manslaughter, I.e. § 18-4006{3), and not first degree murder as the 
State alleged. 
At the conclusion of the trial the jury found the Petitioner guilty of 
first degree murder of Mrs. Ciccone and second degree murder of their unborn 
fetus. Thereafter this Court imposed a determinate-·:life -sentence for-·t.l:le 
first degree murder conviction and a concurrent determinate fifteen-year 
sentence for the second degree murder conviction. 
The sentencing hearing was held on June 7, 2005, and the district court 
judge signed the judgment the same day. The register of actions indicates 
that the judgment also was filed on June 7. However, the judgment was affixed 
a file stamp with a handwritten date indicating the date it was filed as May 
7 I 2005. The district court subsequently issued an amended judgment, which 
was file-stamped June 21 and signed by the district court judge on the same 
day. The only change between the original and amended judgment concerns the 
date of the file stamp. On August 2, 2005, exactly forty-two days after the 
amended judgment was entered, trail defense counsel Mr. Terry S. Ratliff, 
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Elmore County Public Defender, filed a notice of appeal on behalf of the 
Petitioner. 
The Court of Appeals ultimately dismissed Petitioner's appeal on the 
the of Appeal was untimely and, therefore, the Court lacked 
jurisdiction to consider Mr. Ciccone's substantive claims. State v. Ciccone, 
No. 32179-2005, Opinion No. 40, filed May 26, 2009. Next, the Idaho Supreme 
Court granted discretionary review of the Opinion because it involved special 
and important reasons that presented an issue of first impression. 
Dkt. 36877-2009; Remittitur issued December 22, 2010) 
(S.Ct. 
On or about September 22, 2009, while the above-referenced appeal was 
pending a final determination before the Idaho Supreme Court, Petitioner 
returned to state district court where he filed his Initial Application for 
Post-Conviction Relief. Ciccone v. State, Elmore County Case No. 
CV-2009-1196. The parties entered into a Stipulation to Vacate and Reenter 
Judgment of Conviction (entered June 7, 2005). Essentially the parties agreed 
that the Petitioner had timely requested his trial counsel to file a notice of 
appeal in the underlying . criminal Case No. CR-2003-4441; and that "trial 
counsel inadvertently failed to file said notice of appeal in a timely fashion 
and such failure has substantially affected Petitioner's appeal rights leading 
to the dismissal of his appeal". See Stipulation, p.2, ,r2, attached hereto as 
Appendix A, and by this reference is incorporated herein. See also Appendix 
B, Order Vacating and Re-Entering Judgment of June 7, 2005, dated April 18, 
2011, Honorable Richard Greenwood, District Judge presiding, and by this 
reference is incorporated herein. 
Thereafter, court appointed post-conviction counsel filed a timely 
Notice of Appeal initiating Petitioner's direct appeal. Direct review 
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resulted in the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of conviction and 
sentence, Opinion No. 66, filed December 11 2012; 
2013 (S.Ct. Dkt. 38817-2011) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
April 9, 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Relief Act provides that: '' [A] 11 grounds for 
relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his 
original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated 
or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the 
proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other 
proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief may not be the basis for a 
subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted 
which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the 
original, supplemental, or amended application." r.c. § 19-4908 (emphasis 
added). 
However, there is an exception for situations in which there is "a 
ground for relief asserted ( in a successive petition) that for sufficient 
reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, 
supplemental, or amended application." supra. Failing to provide a 
post-conviction applicant with a meaningful opportunity to have his or her 
claims presented may be a violation of due process. Schwartz v. State, 145 
Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400 (Ct. App. 2008), citing Hernandez v. State, 133 
Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789, 794 (Ct. App. 1999); see also, Abbott v. State, 
129 Idaho 381, 385, 924 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ct. App. 1996); Mellinger v. State, 
113 Idaho 31, 35, 740 P.2d 73, 77 (Ct. App. 1987)(Burnett, J. concurring). 
Idaho's Appellate Courts have consistently held that deficient 
representation, in certain circumstances, constitutes just such a "sufficient 
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reason" to allow a petitioner to raise or re-raise claims the form of 
subsequent or successive See Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 
595-96, 635 P.2d 955, 959-60 (1981): Baker v. 142 Idaho 411, 420, 128 
.3d 948, 957 (Ct. App. 2005); and, Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 
P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2006). 
In sum, successive post-conviction applications are permitted when a 
district court finds "sufficient reason" that a ground for relief could not 
have been presented in an initial petition, or, where such substantive claims 
were inadequately raised in an initial application. 
ARGUMENT 
In Idaho, the post-conviction setting is the "preferred forum for 
bringing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel," although in limited 
instances such claims may be brought on direct appeal "on purported errors 
that arose during the trial, as shown on the record" (as opposed to matters 
arising outside the record). Matthews v. State, 839 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Idaho 
1992). 
Petitioner's successive application for post-conviction relief is not 
prohibited because Mr. Ciccone did not knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently 
waive any grounds for which he now seeks relief; and, has presented compelling 
reasons for the delay in presenting such claims are due entirely to trial 
counsel's failure to timely file the Notice of Appeal. I.e. § 19-4908. 
Moreover, the issues now before the court involved circumstances and 
medical records which were outside the trial court record thereby requiring 
development of these facts through discovery, assistance of counsel, rendering 
advancement of such claims (prior to direct appeal) premature. 
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cause 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, the Court should find sufficient reason does good 
been established precluding the doctrine of waiver by reason of 
proceedings. 
In an exercise of the Court's discretion permission to advance the 
Verified Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief should be granted, and 
the Petitioner respectfully requests the Court instruct the Clerk to advance 
this case on the Court's calendar for further proceedings thereof. 
DATED this 14th day of January, 2014. 
.. 
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HEREBY CERTIFY 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
/J.fh on the~ day of January, 2014, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the above and 
person: 
to be delivered to the following 
* 
Kristine Schindele 
Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney 
190 South Fourth East 
P.O. Box 607 
Mountain Home, ID. 83647 
By depositing a copy of the same within the 
institutional mail system, U.S. Mail, first class 
postage prepaid. 
----~~:.-
Albert A. Ciccone 
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JOSEPH T. H9RRAS, ISB. 6982 
SMITH HORRAS, P.A. 
5561 N. GLENWOOD ST. SUITE B P.O. Box 140857 
BOISE, ID 83714 
TELEPHONE: (208).697-5555 
FACSIMILE: (800) 881-6219 
ioe@smithhorras.com 
Attorney for Petitioner 
L., ! iB 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CR-2003-4441 
STIPULATION TO VACATE AND REENTER JUDGMENT OF CONVI~JION ENTERED ON JUNE 7 , 2005 IN CR-2003-4441 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through his attorney. of record, Joseph T. 
Horras and the State of Idaho, by and through Kristina M. Schindele, and hereby stipulate as 
follows: 
The Petitioner was found guilty of 1st Degree Murder (Count I) and znd Degree Murder 
(Amended Count II) in Elmore County Case CR-2003-4441. Petitioner was sentenced on 
both counts on June 7th, 2005. The judgment was mistakenly stamped as May ih, 2005. The 
clerical error was corrected on June 21st, 2005, however the date of judgment and 
commitment remained June 7'11, 2005. 
Prior to the expiration of forty-two ( 42) days from June 7lh, 2005, the Petitioner asked 
his appointed counsel to file an appeal of his, conviction on counts I and II; to which counsel 
STIPULATION TO VACATE AND REl::"'NTER JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION, Page I 
" 1 2 COPY 
PPEN 
agreed. Counsel however mistakenly filed the notice of appeal on August 21 2005, 
approximately two (2) weeks after the expiration of the time to file a notice of appeal with the 
district court under Idaho Criminal Rule 14 (a). The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed 
Petitioner's appeal as his notice of appeal was untimely. Petitioner filed a Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief (CV 2009-1196) under Idaho Code§ 19-4901 on September 24, 2009 in the 
above entitled matter alleging, in part, the failure of his counsel to timely file the notice of 
appeal constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The parties stipulate that the Petitioner timely requested his trial counsel to file a 
notice of appeal in EJmore Cowity Case CR-2003-4441. The parties further stipulate that trial 
counsel inadvertently failed to file said notice of appeal in a timely fashion and such failure 
has substantially affected Petitioner's appeal rights leading to the dismissal of his appeal. 
The parties are filing contemporaneously herewith a stipulation for summary 
disposition in Case No. CV-2009-1196. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, judgment in this 
matter must be vacated and reentered, making said judgment again effective as of its date of 
execution and entry and permitting the Petitioner to effectuate his appeal. 
The parties hereby stipulate and agree that the Court should vacate and reenter 
judgment in this matter on the same tenns and language as the Judgment previously entered 
on June ih, 2005. 
The parties further stipulate and agree that this Order has no effect on any other basis 
Petitioner may have for Post Conviction Relief at a later time including his stated causes of 
action B, C and D. 
STIPULATION TO VACATE AND REENTER JUDGMENT Of CONV1CTfON, Page 2 
DATED this / 0 -H-:ay of March, 1. 
PHT.HORRAS 
tomey for Petitioner 
DA TED this 11-V" day of March, 2011. 
Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney 
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D1S1:Rp§;T,SF J:I:t2 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNT'5P~J~;l1¥f0R,E . 
- "JEr5~vJi; 'r 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) _____________ ) 
Case No. CR-2003-4441 
ORDER VACATING AND RE-ENTERING JUDGMENT OF JUNE 7, 2005 
Pursuant to the Stipulation of the Parties and the ORDER entered in Elmore County District Court Case CV-2009-1196 granting Post-Conviction relief, it is HEREBY ORDERED: 
The Judgment of Conviction entered on June 7, 2005 and re-filed June 21, 2005, and amended 
October 5, 2005 is hereby vacated. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, the Judgment is RE-ENTERED effective as of this date upon 
the same terms and conditions and with the same language as the judgment entered June 5, 2005, as 
amended October 5, 2005. 
Dated this _f{__ day of April 2011. 
ORDER VACATING AND RE-ENTERING JUDGMENT OF JUNE 7, 2005 - Page I 
COPY 
,. 
,.) ... 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this\ ~day of April, 2011, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of 
the within instrument to: 
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
Interdepartmental Mail 
L.Jfu;eph Horras 
SMITH HORRAS, P.A. 
P.O. Box 140857 
Boise, ID 83714 
U.S.MAIL 
ORDER - Page 2 
:.' l 6 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: \~J1oh.d Deptlty~urt Clerk 
Albert A. Ciccone 
77377 ICC/ H 107 B 
.o. Box 10 
Boise, Idaho 83 7 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV )9 ~ \4' 5q 
District Court No. CR-2003-4441 
VERIFIED SUCCESSIVE PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
COMES NCW, Albert A •. Ciccone, the Petitioner in the above-entitled 
cause, who pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-4908, et seq., alleges the following: 
BACKGROUND 
1. Petitioner is in the care, custody and control of the Idaho 
Department of Correction, confined within the Idaho Correctional Center, 
Boise, Idaho. 
2. Following a jury trial the Petitioner was convicted and adjudged 
guilty of the offense(s) COUNT I. 1st Degree Murder; and COUNT II. 2nd Degree 
Murder, Felony, I.e.§§ 18-4001, 18-4002 and 18-4003. 
VERIFIED SUCCESSIVE PETI ION FOR POST-CON.VICTION RELIEF 
3. The Fourth District Court, County of Elmore, located in Mountain 
Home, Idaho, the sentencing court Judgment and 
Commitment was entered June 7, 2005. See Case No. CR-2003-4441 and by 
herein. 
4. on June 7, 2005, the matter came before the Court, Honorable 
Michael E. Wetherell, District Judge presiding, for pronouncement of judgment 
and sentencing. The Court ascertained a desirability to impose sentence as 
follows: 
" ••• [T]he defendant is sentenced pursuant to Idaho 
Code Section 19-2513 to the custody of the Idaho State 
Board of Correction, to be held and incarcerated by 
said Board in a suitable place on the MURDER IN THE 
FIRST DEGREE to life in prison without the possibility 
of parole, credit for 600 days and sentence on the 
MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGEE [sic] charge is for a 
period of fifteen (15) years fixed, concurrent with 
Count I, with credit for 600 days." 
5. Thereafter an Amended Judgment and Commitment was re-filed on or 
about June 21, 2005, and subsequent thereto a further amended judgment was 
duly entered on or about October 5, 2005. 
6. Prior to the expiration of the forty-two days 1 from June 7, 2005, 
the Petitioner asked his appointed trial counsel, Terry s. Ratliff, to file an 
appeal from his convictions on counts I and II: to which counsel agreed to do 
so. However, counsel mistakenly filed the Notice of Appeal on August 2, 2005, 
approximately two weeks beyond the expiration of time to file a notice of 
appeal with the district court. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed 
1 Idaho Crlmlnal Rule l4(a) 
VERIFIED SUCCESSIVE PETiTiON FOR POST-CONVICTION RE IEF - 2 
18 
Petitioner's appeal because it was untimely. See s.ct. No. 32179-2005, 
Opinion No. 40, May 26, 2009: ands.ct. No. 36877-200~ ) Remittitur 
December 22, 2010. 
7. On or about September 22, 2009, while the Court of Appeals Opinion 
was being reviewed by the Idaho Supreme Court, the Petitioner returned to 
state distr±ct: court,, and filed the Initial Application for Post-Conviction 
Relief. Ciccone v. State, Elmore County Case No. CV-2009-1196. 
8. The initial post-conviction application served to restore Mr. 
Ciccone's constitutional right to a direct appeal due to court appointed trial 
counsel having failed to timely file the Notice of Appeal. The parties 
entered into the Stipulation to Vacate and Reenter Judgment of Conviction. 
This Court entered its Order Vacating and Re-Entering Judgment of June 7, 
2005, entered April 18, 2011, Honorable Richard Greenwood, District Judge 
presiding, and by this reference is incorporated herein. 
9. Thereafter, court appointed post-conviction counsel filed a timely 
Notice of Appeal initiating Petitioner's direct appeal. 
10. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction and 
sentence, issuing Opinion No. 66, filed December 11, 2012. 
11. The Idaho Supreme Court entered its Order Denying Petition For 
Review, Docket No. 38817-2011; Remittitur issued April 9, 2013. 
12. Petitioner asks the Court for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 
has submitted a motion and affidavit for waiver of fees or costs related to 
this action and by this reference is incorporated herein. 
13. Petitioner's successive application for relief raises substantial 
doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilty for first degree murder, 
and, Mr. Ciccone could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have presented 
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claims within the Initial Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. This 
is in accord I.C § 19-4901, et seq., states in pertinent 
(a) That the conviction and sentence is in 
violation of the constitution of the United 
States and the constitution and laws of the 
State of Idaho; 
(b) That there exists evidence of material 
facts, not previously presented and heard, 
that requires vacation of the conviction and 
sentence in the interest of justice; 
( c) That the conviction or sentence is 
otherwise subject to collateral attack upon 
any error heretofore available under any 
common law, statutory or other writ, motion, 
petition, proceeding, or remedy: may 
institute, without paying a filing fee, a 
proceeding under this act to secure relief. 
14. The applicants pro se verified successive petition sets forth 
2 grounds for relief, that when proven are contrary to, or involve an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by 
the Supreme Court of the United States. 
II 
II 
II 
II 
2 Providing that In doing so shall not preclude Petitioner from asserting other grounds tor rellet as codified tor In 1.c. S 19-4906(a), by means of supplementlng or augmentation through the assistance of court appointed counsel. 
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A. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL 
'l'RIAL OOIJNSEL 'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO MULTIPLE INSTANCF.s OF PROSECOTORIAL 
MISCDNDUCT - INDIVIDUALLY OR CUMULATIVELY - RISE TO THE LEVEL OF INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE; AND I ACCORDINGLY ABRIDGED PETITIONER'S RIGHTS UNDER THE FIF'm, 
SIX'.ffl AND FOURTEEN':m AMENDMENTS OF TBE U.S. CONSTITUTION, INCLUDING SIMILAR 
GUARANTEES PROVIDED BY ARTICLE I, §§ 6 AND 13, ALONG WI'l'H ARTICLE XXI, § 20 OF 
TBE IDAHO STATE CDNSTITUTION • 
15. Counsel's failure to object or move to strike continual use of the 
words "crime scene" by several prosecution witnesses, and/or having failed to 
lodge a proper pre-trial motion in limine to restrict foreseeable tactics 
involving the use of argumentative terminology; was beneath the level of 
performance a defendant has a right to expect; and more likely than not such 
instances served to prejudice the jury's ability to fairly determine the facts 
or to weigh the defenses proffered. 
16. Counsel's failure to object to both the number and the scope of 
the victim impact statements considered by the Court for purposes of 
fashioning an appropriate sentence herein; reflects a low standard 
of attorney performance and eliminated the issue from consideration during 
direct appeal. 
17. It is ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to move for a 
mistrial; or, at the very least to query the entire jury panel regarding the 
influence that juror( s) #168 Andrea Ross and #267 Paul Trueba had upon the 
balance of the remaining jurors, when they violated the Court's repeated 
instructions "not to discuss this case among yourselves, nor with anyone else, 
nor to form any opinion with regard to the merits of this case until it has 
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been fully submitted to you for your determination." (Tr. , p. 427, Ls. 9-15) ; 
and where juror #267 Mr. Trueba brought 
room that had not been introduced at trial. 
the 
Trial counsel s failure to object to the prosecutor I s closing 
argument comments referring to Mr. Ciccone's decision not to testify generated 
a fundamental error analysis on direct review before the Idaho Court of 
Appeals, a higher, more stringent standard of review had trial counsel 
objected to multiple inferences made by the prosecutor - would have preserved 
for the record an opportunity for analysis involving the cumulative error 
doctrine. 
B. 
WAS THE PETITIONER DENIED HIS RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE I, §§ 6 AND 13, ALONG WITH 
ARTICLE XXI, § 20 OF THE IDAHO STATE· CONSTIWTION, INCLUDING SIMILAR 
GUARANTEES PROVIDED BY FIFTH, SIX'l'El, AND FCXJRTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE U.S. 
CONSTITOTIW, WHEN· ca.JRT APPOINTED COUNSEL FAILED ro REXl2(JEST THAT THE JURY BE 
INSTRUCTED 'IBEY COULD NOT CONVICT ON EITHER COUNT, IF ANY ~ OF THEM 
CONCLUDED THAT THE DEATH OF MRS. CICCONE WAS THE RF.SULT OF AN ACCIDENT. 
19. The Petitioner was entitled to and there was sufficient evidence 
introduced at trial to warrant such an instruction, which likely would have 
resulted in an acgui ttal, or at the very least a conviction on a lessor 
included offense. 
20. Counsel's decision not to proffer such an instruction can not be 
said to be either strategic or tactical in its nature, and such inadvertence 
resulted in egregious prejudice to the Petitioner's substantive right to a 
fair trial. 
II 
II 
VERIFIED SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 6 
c. 
TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN A THOR.OUGH AND COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
EVALUATION, AS FUNDED BY THE CClJRT, AND saJGHT FOR PORPOSFS OF INTROIUCING 
RELEVAN.r MITIGATJB; CIRCUMSTANCES TO ASSIST THE COORT IN ITS OONSIDERATION OF 
SmrENCE, PREJUDICED THE PETITIONER DORING THE SENTENCING HEARING: 
PARTICIJLARLY WHERE C0UNSEt FALSELY REPORTED TO THE COURT AN EVALUATION WAS 
CONOOCTED: THAT THE DEFENSE WAS "NOT OBLIGATED TO INTRODUCE" WHAT IN TRUTH WAS 
A OONEXISTENT PSYCHQr.o:;ICAL EYAWATION: 'IBUS, VIOLATING PE'rITIONER' S 
CCESTI'l'UTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER THE F]FTH, SIXTH, AND Fa.JRTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE 
U .s. CONSTITO".f'ION, AND THOSE Cll1PARABLE RIGHTS ONDER THE IDAHO STATE 
CONSTITUTION. 
21. Following the jury's verdict trial counsel sought Court approval 
to initiate a psychiatric evaluation of Mr. Ciccone for purposes of 
introducing mitigating circumstances at sentencing. At issue was Mr. Ciccone's 
prior diagnosis of severe mental, emotional, and psychological disorders. 
22. The prosecution stipulated to defense counsel's request and 
further agreed to a postponement of the sentencing hearing to facilitate 
mental competency determinations. 
23. On March 21, 2005, in open court proceedings, defense counsel 
acknowledged his receipt of the PSI, his having reviewed the same in advance 
of that initially scheduled sentencing hearing. Mr. Ratliff advised the Court 
that "Dr. Beaver could not complete the report until the end of April" and 
requested a June sentencing date. 
24. Pursuant to defense counsel's representations the Court granted 
the parties' stipulation, re-scheduled the sentencing hearing in anticipation 
of Dr. Beaver's report,, and entered its ORDER RE: EVALUATION, dated March 31, 
2005. 
25. Prior to the sentencing hearing the Petitioner and his immediate 
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family made numerous attempts to contact defense counsel to discuss the 
of the psychological Counsel to inform the 
Petitioner he elected to forego preparation of Dr. Beaver s psychological 
assessment, or that he would not be submitting extensive mental health records 
documenting the Petitioner's involuntary psychiatric commitment to 
Interrnountain Hospital, Boise, Idaho, in September 2003. 
26. While at the Intermountain Hospital, the Petitioner's primary 
physician was Dr. Harry Silsby, who diagnosed Mr. Ciccone as suffering 
bi-polar mood disorder, hypertension anxiety and from acute post-traumatic 
stress disorder(s). 
27. At sentencing defense counsel presented no witnesses whatsoever. 
28. Counsel was ineffective for failing to develop a cogent defense 
strategy prior to the sentencing phase; to obtain the full insight and likely 
benefit from Dr. Beaver's psychological evaluation and to proffer that 
information in mitigation for a determinate sentence with the possibility of 
rehabilitation and the potential of a future parole. 
29. Counsel was ineffective for failing to present the Petitioner's 
extensive psychological disorder's; Dr. Silsby insight and expertise regarding 
Mr. Ciccone' s amenability for treatment and the prospect of meaningful 
improvement through medications and psychiatric counselling. 
30. Counsel was ineffective for failing to present expert testimony 
concerning the severe physical, emotional, and psychological abuse the 
Petitioner was subjected to (during adolescence) at the hands of a 
schizophrenic father. 
31. Counsel neglected to appraise the Court during sentencing that Mr. 
Ciccone had no prior criminal history or make any reference at all to 
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Mr. Ciccone' s distinguished service the United State Air Force, or the 
numerous he 
32. The has establ prejudice on issue for 
i veness, where counsel 's conduct for failing to put 
into evidence Mr. Ciccone's documented mental health records; or, to complete 
Dr. Beaver's psychological evaluation; and further to present Dr. Silsby's 
expert opinion as to the Petitioner's inability to form a deliberate and 
willful homicidal ideation due to mental disease or defect. Such inaction 
and/or omissions deprived the sentencing court from considering substantial 
and mitigating factors prior to fashioning the ultimate sentence of life 
without parole. 
33. Counsel's ineffectiveness cannot be attributed to sound or 
strategic reasoning where the lack of a defined strategy is further 
illustrated by the little cohesiveness between any of the above decisions -
coupled with counsel's advance knowledge of the damaging victim impact 
statements that were improperly calling for the harshest punishment available 
to the sentencing court. 
34. The significant mitigating circumstances, combined with a backdrop 
of severe psychological impairment, was completely ignored by defense counsel 
in preparation for sentencing hearing. Be it inadvertence, or a deliberate 
attempt to avoid such sensitive, yet uncomfortable truth, essentially 
abandoned Petitioner to the emotion al and vengeful demands of the state's 
prosecutor. 
35. Absent defense counsel's failure's and omissions the sentencing 
court would likely have gained a more accurate and informed assessment of the 
unfortunate, but tragic accident, and it would follow an understanding of such 
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mitigating factors would have resulted in a substantially more lenient 
sentence with the possibility for mental health treatment and the opportunity 
for parole consideration. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
D. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL 
APPELLATE CDUNSEL 'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY REVIEW TRIAL RECORD OR PRESENT ON APPEAL A CLAIM INVOLVING COUNT 'lWO OF THE INFORMATION, I.C. § 18-601, IS 
UNCONSTITOTIONAL AS WRITTEN AND APPLIED BY THE STATE LEGISLATURE, AND IN 
VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH, SIXTH' AND . FOURTEEN'l'H AMENI'.JilENTS·· 'l'O THE U.S. CONSTI'IUTION' AND··ARTICLE 1· § 13 OF,THE IDAHO STATE CONSTITUTION. 
36. On or about June 28, 2005, trial counsel filed a motion to dismiss 
count two of the information pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court holdings in 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 
(1976). 
37. Government appointed appellate counsel failed to discover or 
properly present the issue for determination on its merit at the Idaho Supreme 
Court. Such performance fell measurably below that of a competent 
professional. Petitioner was prejudiced by appellate counsel's oversight 
because the unconstitutional statute was a significant impediment to Count II 
of the Information and Mr. Ciccone was entitled to the full and fair 
presentation of all his claims before the Idaho Supreme Court. 
E. 
APPELi.ATE C0Cli1SEL FAILED TO BRIEF ISSUE INVOLVING IMPROPER AND PRF.JUDICIAL 
LANGUAGE WITHIN THE TRIAL COORT'S SPECIAL VENIRE JURY (JJESTIONNAIRE (NO. 50), 
OR 'l'HE AFFECT 'l'l:IAT EMOTIVE COMMENTARY . HAD UPON '!HE JURY SELECTED, IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFl'H, SIXTH :AND FaJRTEENTB AMENDMEN'l'S TO THE I U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I§ 13 OF THE IDAHO STATE CONSTITUTION. 
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38. Throughout the trial proceeding an important issue centered on the 
court permitting the prosecutor's use of specific terminology when referring 
the "embryo" or II as opposed to the emotive and prejudicial terms 
as "death of the child"; "fetal homicide": "pro-life"; and "pro-choice". 
39. Trial counsel properly filed several motions in lirnine seeking an 
order prohibiting the State and any of its witnesses from referring to the 
human embryo or fetus as a "child" or "baby", during any testimony, opening 
statement or closing argument. 
40. The defense based its motion ( s) on the fact that the charging 
documents, and the statutes of Idaho Code § 18-4001 and § 18-4016 refer to "a 
human embryo or fetus". 
41. Whereas the doctor who performed the autopsy had previously 
testified for the prosecution, "the second 'victim' of this accident was a 
non-viable fetus." Additionally, reference was drawn to the Court's use of 
the word "child" in its jury question No. 50 with appropriate objections 
having been preserved within the Record. 
42. Appellate counsel failed to brief the issue of improper and 
prejudicial comments made by the prosecutor in the presence of the jury. 
43. Improper commentary, in any form or variety, that served only to 
incite or inflame the passions and prejudice of the jury was highly improper. 
For the Court to perrni t such commentary to permeate Mr. Ciccone' s jury 
constitutes fundamental error. 
44. Petitioner was prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to 
present the issue for a determination on its merit at the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Appellate counsel's performance fell measurably below that of a competent 
professional. 
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F. 
'1'BERE EXISTS ADDITJDNAL FACTS ID SUPPORT TBE PE'fiTICR?.R I S APPLICATION FCR RELIEF. 
45. The Petitioner alleges there are certain facts and information to 
warrant relief herein which lie outside Mr. Ciccone's access and/or control. 
46. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4903 the Petitioner reserves the right to 
present such additional affidavits, records, and other supporting evidence at 
such time access and opportunity becomes available. 
47. In order satisfy preponderance of evidence standards, it will be 
necessary to obtain affidavits from individuals who can attest to the matters 
herein. Petitioner is currently unaware of the contact information for some 
individuals. Others have been non-responsive and/or uncooperative to the 
diligent efforts made by the Petitioner to secure essential documentation. 
48. For these reasons the Petitioner reserves the right to exercise 
compulsory process to secure crucial documentation, records, and or testimony. 
49. Accordingly, Mr. Ciccone will need the assistance of conflict free 
counsel to assist him in the proper presentation of his claims. 
II 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFCRE, the Petitioner asks the Court to grant the following relief: 
(a) ORDER the Respondent to answer the Petition in accord with 
r.c. § 19-4906(a); 
(b) FIND and DECLARE for the Petitioner on each of the foregoing 
claims; 
( c) ORDER an evidentiary be held to resolve issues of material fact 
pursuant to r.c. § 19-4907; 
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(d) VACATE the Judgment and Commitment of the underlying criminal 
case, and, ORDER a new trial in the interest of justice; 
Cl:U\NT such further and other relief as predicated by law. 
DATED 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Ada 
day of January, 2014. 
Albert A. Ciccone 
VERIFICATION 
I, Albert A. Ciccone, being duly sworn upon oath, depose and say that I 
subscribed to the foregoing VERIFIED SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, that I know the contents thereof, and attest that the matters and 
allegations therein are true. 
DATED this 14th day of January, 2014. 
Albert A. Ciccone 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWCRN to before me, the undersigned Notary Public in and for said State, this _l!i!J.. day of January, 2014. 
~ *** Seal *** 
otary 
Residing@ Boise, ID. 
Commission expires: j_ / / {) I 20 Jf). 
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· BARBARA SlEELET. 
CLERK Of TK~~~ OEPUT .. ~':J IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF . . ' 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Case No. CV-2014-59 Petitioner, 
vs. ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL 
ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO ANSWER STATE OF IDAHO, . 
Res ondent. 
This Court has reviewed the petition for post conviction relief and request for judicial 
notice of trial transcripts filed in this matter. The Defendant was appointed the public defender 
in the underlying case and is currently incarcerated in prison and is presumed indigent under 
Idaho Code§ 19-852. The Defendant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel is granted. The 
Elmore County Public Defender, or conflict counsel, is hereby appointed to represent said 
Petitioner in all proceedings involving the Post-Conviction Petition. The Defendant was 
represented by Terry Ratliff in the underlying case and the Petitioner is alleging ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel. 
Appointed counsel is to file a Notice of Appearance in this action. 
A status/scheduling conference in this matter is set for Uocc.b 3 , 2014 at 
\ 1. 3D ~ The Petitioner will not be transported for the status conference. 
The Respondent's deadline to Answer is extended due to appointment of counsel and a 
scheduling order will be issued after the scheduling conference. 
DATEDthis 2\styofJanuary,2014. ~ 
Distri • ge 
Lynn Norton 
ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL 
30 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the following: 
Elm.ore County Prosecutor's Office 
INTER DEPT MAIL 
Elm.ore County Public Defender's Office 
INTER DEPT MAIL 
Albert A. Ciccone #77377 
ICC/Hl07 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83 707 
U.S.MAIL 
Dated this 22°d day of January, 2014. 
"31 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
B<)A~1'1J 
Deputy tierf • 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
190 South 4th East 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-2144, ext. 503 
Facsimile: (208) 587-2147 
I.S.B. No. 6090 
4 31 4: 32 
J\Rt~ STEELE Ofmt~ OEP\ \..f 
' IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF ELMORE 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2014-0000059 
STATE'S ANSWER TO 
SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
COMES NOW, the State ofidaho, Respondent in the above-captioned matter, appearing 
through Kristina M. Schindele, Prosecuting Attorney, State of Idaho, and hereby files this 
Answer and shows the Court as follows: 
I. 
Respondent denies each and every allegation of fact alleged by the Petitioner except those 
facts specifically admitted and set out herein. 
IL 
Respondent denies the following paragraphs: 7, Petitioner's prayer for relief set forth in 
paragraph 12. 
STATE'S ANSWER TO PETITION 
FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 1 
ORIGINAL 
'32 
III. 
Respondent admits the following paragraphs: 3; 4; 5 (except the second amended 
judgment and commitment was entered October 4, 2005, rather than October 5, 2005); 6; 7 
( except the post-conviction petition was filed September 24, 2009); 8 ( except the order vacating 
and re-entering judgment was filed April 19, 2011 ); 9; 10; and 11 (noting the remittitur was filed 
in district court on April 12, 2013). 
IV. 
Respondent denies the following paragraphs as Respondent lacks sufficient information 
and belief with which to answer: 1 (the Idaho Department of Correction offender search website 
identifies Petitioner's location as Idaho Correctional Center, Unit G); 12 (noting that the Court 
responded to Petitioner's motion by noting that post-conviction proceedings do not require filing 
fees so the request for in pauperis status was immaterial); 13; 14; First Cause of Action -
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel, section A, paragraphs 15-18 ( alleging failure to object to 
unidentified instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct; section B, paragraphs 19-20 (alleging 
failure to request an unidentified jury instruction regarding accident); and section C, paragraphs 
21-35 (alleging failure to obtain a psychological evaluation and present mitigation at sentencing); 
Second Cause of Action - Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel, section D, paragraphs 
36-37 (alleging failure to challenge Petitioner's conviction for murder of a fetus); section E, 
paragraphs 38-44 (alleging failure to challenge the Court's use of the word "child" in jury 
question no. 50 over objection by the defense); section F, paragraphs 45-49 (reservation of right 
to file additional claims with assistance of counsel); and the prayer for relief set forth on pages 12 
STATE'S ANSWER TO PETITION 
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'33 
and 13. 
V. 
Respondent further asserts the following affirmative defenses: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Petition, and each and every allegation contained therein, fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted under LC, § 19-4901. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
The Petitioner has failed to include any admissible evidence supporting his allegations, 
and therefore the Petition is subject to dismissal under I.C. § 19-4903. 
WHEREFORE, the State ofldaho respectfully requests the following relief: 
I. That the Petition for Post Conviction Relief be dismissed as Petitioner has failed 
to provide admissible evidence and documentation under I.C. § 19-4903. 
2. In the alternative, that the Petition for Post Conviction Relief be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim upon which post conviction relief can be granted. 
3. In the alternative, that the Petition be denied after a hearing on the merits. 
DATED this t1 c..f;:aay of January 2014. 
M. SCHINDELE 
COUNTY PROSECUTING A TORNEY 
STATE'S ANSWER TO PETITION 
FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on today's date, I served a copy of the attached document to the following parties by the following means: 
Chris J. Berglund 
500 West Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Facsimile No. 342-6553 
STATE'S ANSWER TO PETITION 
FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 4 
and Delivery 
irst Class Mail 
acsimile 
EY 
' IP 
"' 
TERRY S. RATLIFF, ISB No.: 3598 
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
290 South Second East 10 7 Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-0900 
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940 
RAS En.E 
OF Hitff?.!lRT DEPUT~ 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
iN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
ALBERT A. CICC01'..Jt, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2014-0059 
ORDER APPOINTING 
CONFLICT PUBLIC DEFENDER 
THE COURT having considered the matter herein and good cause being shown; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that CHRIS BERGLUND is hereby 
appointed as Conflict Public Defender in the above entitled matter on behalf of the Petitioner, at 
county expense, at the hourly rate of$ 65.00. 
DATED this 1!!iay of February, 2014. 
Lynn~ 
District Judge 
ORDER APPOINTING CONFLICT PUBLIC DEFENDER - 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I 
and foregoing documents to: 
Kristina Schindele 
Elmore County 
Prosecuting Attorney 
190 South 4th East 
P.O. Box607 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Fax No. (208)587-2147 
Terry S. Ratliff 
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
290 South 2nd East Street 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Fax No. (208)587-6940 
Barbara Steele 
C/0 Elmore County Courthouse 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Appointed Conflict Counsel: 
Chris Berglund 
Albert A. Ciccone #77377 
Idaho Correctional Center Unit G 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83 707 
~ 
on this 1(1 day of February, 2014, served a copy of the 
By: _j!/__ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
Certified Mail 
By: 
--
__ U.S.Mail 
Facsimile Transmission --
XJ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
Certified Mail 
--
__ U.S.Mail 
Facsimile Transmission --
By: A_ Hand delivery 
__ Federal Express 
Certified Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
By: __ Hand delivery 
__ Federal Express 
Certified Mail 
U.S. Mail 
/)() Facsimile (208) 392-1395 
By: Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
Certified Mail 
--
-=x __ U.S. Mail ., : BARBARA STEELE . 
C,lerk Ot ~' ' 
~puJ 
ORDER APPOINTING CONFLICT PUBLIC DEFENDER- 2 
CHRJS J. BERGLUND, ISB #6952 
BERGLUND LAW, PLLC 
500 West Bannock Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 342-7600 
Facsimile: (208) 342-6553 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
--------------) 
Case No. CV-2014-0000059 
ORDER GRANTING ACCESS 
TO PRESENTENCE 
INVESTIGATION REPORT 
THIS MATTER Having come before the Court on the parties' Stipulation for Access to 
Presentence Investigation Report and good cause appearing therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER That counsel are granted access 
to the post-conviction Presentence Investigation Report of the Plaintiff, ALBERT A. CICCONE. ~ DATED This 13 day of February, 2014. 
JUDG~TON 
ORDER GRANTING ACCESS TO PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT-P. 1 
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BARB ARA STEELE CLERK Of THE COURT DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 4~ AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Case No. CV-2014-59 Petitioner, 
vs. SCHEDULING ORDER 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
This matter is before the Court following Petitioner's filing of a Successive Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief pursuant to LC. §19-4901, et seq. (Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
(UPCPA)). The Petitioner's verified petition was filed prose on January 17, 2014. An Order 
Granting Appointment of Counsel was entered on January 21, 2014. A conflict public defender 
was appointed February 7, 2014. Chris Berglund appeared as appointed counsel at the status 
conference. 
Amended Petition: At a status conference on April 7, 2014, Ms. Berglund stated she did 
not anticipate amending the petition filed in this case but requested 30 days to supplement the 
record. The Petitioner has until May 6, 2014 to supplement the record. 
Exhibits: Pursuant to Esquivel v. State, 149 Idaho 255, 259 n.3, 233 P.3d 186, 190 n.3 
(Ct. App. 2009), "no part of the record from the criminal case becomes part of the record in the 
post-conviction proceeding unless it is entered as an exhibit." Id. The content of the entire 
footnote in Esquivel is provided below. 
The post-conviction record on appeal does not automatically include the record of the underlying criminal case. A post-conviction proceeding is not an extension of the criminal case from which it arises. Rather, it is a separate civil action in which 
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the applicant bears the burden of proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 536. 716 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1986). No part of the record from the criminal case becomes part of the record in the post-conviction proceeding unless it is entered as an exhibit. Exhibits, as well as transcripts of the pre-trial proceedings, the trial, and sentencing hearing in the criminal case, even if previously prepared as a result of a direct appeal or otherwise, are not before the trial court in the post-conviction proceeding and do not become part of the record on appeal unless presented to the trial court as exhibits, Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 648, 873 P.2d 898, 902 (Ct.App.1994), or unless the trial court takes judicial notice of such records from the criminal case. Idaho Rule of Evidence 201. Although the district court may have reviewed portions of the record from the underlying criminal action on its own initiative, if the petitioner does not include such material in the record on appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the appellate court will not consider it. LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 119, 937 P.2d 427, 431 (Ct.App.1997). If either party intends to include any part of the 
underlying criminal record considered in the post-conviction proceedings, as part of the record on appeal, it must do so by designation in accordance with Idaho Appellate Rule 28 or by moving to augment the record pursuant to IA.R. 30. 
Answer: The State of Idaho, through the Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, 
answered on January 31, 2014. 
Motions for summary dismissal: Either party may, at any time, move for summary 
dismissal. However, motions, affidavits and supporting briefs for summary disposition of the 
application must be filed by June 6, 2014. 
If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavit(s) and a response brief, it must do 
so by June 20, 2014. 
The moving party may thereafter serve a reply brief by June 27, 2014. 
If no motions, affidavits, or supporting briefs for summary disposition are filed by 
July 3, 2014, the Court will consider this matter submitted to the Court for decision 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4901, et seq. 
This matter is also set for a scheduling/status conference on July 7, 2014 at I ~:?:I:) 
p.m. where further scheduling will be discussed. 
Any motions filed by the parties must be noticed for hearing by that party and the 
party can obtain a hearing date by calling the clerk of court. 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
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ANY OBJECTION TO TIDS SCHEDULING ORDER MUST BE FILED AND SERVED WITIDN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF SERVICE OF THIS ORDER. IF THERE IS A TIMELY OBJECTION, THEN THE OBJECTING PARTY MUST NOTICE A SCHEDULING CONFERENCE FOR HEARING IN ELMORE COUNTY. FAILURE TO TIMELY OBJECT WILL WAIVE ANY OBJECTION TO TIDS SCHEDULING ORDER. 
rr IS HEREBY ORDERED and dated this ih day of April, 2014. 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
L~ 
District Judge 
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500 West Bannock Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
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Albert A. Ciccone #773 77 
Idaho Correctional Center, Unit G 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
U.S. MAIL 
Dated this i 11 day of April, 2014. 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
By~ 
Deputy Clerk 
CHRIS J. BERGLUND, ISB No. 6952 
BERGLUND LAW, PLLC 
13601 WEST McMillan Road 
Ste 102 - Box No 159 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
ALBERT CICCONE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
--------------) 
' < 
Case No. CV-2014-59 
Criminal Case CR-2003-4441 
MOTION TO TAKE 
JUDICIAL NOTICE 
., 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Albert Ciccone, by and through his counsel of 
record, and hereby requests that this Court take judicial notice of the following: 
' . 
1.) Jury Trial Transcript Page 463, Line 12 for the use of the word "crime scene" 
as it relates to Petitioner's allegation at Paragraph 15 of the Petition. This page is 
attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "1." 
4 
2.) Jury Trial Transcript Page 694, Line 24 for the use of the word "crime scene" 
as it relates to Petitioner's allegation at Paragraph 15 of the Petition. This page is 
attached hereto and is marked as Exhibit "2." 
3.) Jury Trial Transcript Page 779, Lines 15 and 22 and Page 780. Line 5, for the 
use of the word "crime scene" as it relates to Petitioner's allegation at Paragraph 15 
of the Petition. This page is attached hereto and is marked as Exhibit "3." 
4.) Jury Trial Transcript Page 1002, Lines 5 and 6 for the use of the word "crime 
scene" ·as it relates to Petitioner's allegation at Paragraph 15 of the Petition. This 
page is attached hereto and is marked as Exhibit "4." 
5.) Jury Trial Transcript Pages 1870-1954 as it relates to the scope and number 
of Victim Impact Statements and lack of defense witnesses introduced at the 
sentencing as it relates to Petitioner's claims at Paragraphs 16, 25, and 27-31 of the 
' Petition. These pages are attached hereto and are marked as Exhibit "5." 
6.) PSI Pages 6-11 and all Victim Impact Statements submitted as part of an 
Addendum Presentence Report These pages and letters are readily available to the 
Court and are not attached. 
7.) Jury Trial Transcript Page 1853, Lines 21-23, as they relate to Petitioner's 
allegation contained within Paragraph 18. This page is attached hereto and is 
marked as Exhibit "6." 
8.) Reporter's Supplemental Transcript on Appeal covering the hearing 
regarding juror misconduct in the underlying criminal case, relating to Petitioner's 
claim at Paragraph 17 of the Petition. The transcript is attached hereto and marked 
as Exhibit "7." 
9.) The decision of the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Ciccone, 154 Idaho 330 
(Idaho App. 2012), Review denied December 11, 2012. This decision is attached 
hereto and marked as Exhibit "8." 
DATED This 2.{_ day of April, 2014. 
BERGLUND LAW, PLLC 
By:~' 
C IS J. BERGLUND 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That a true and complete copy of the foregoing document was: 
[ >( mailed, postage prepaid; 
[ ] hand delivered; 
[ ] facsimile transmission 
on this d' cf day of April, 2014 to: 
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
190 S. 4th East 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
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4 
ldahov~~Albert A. ·cicctine • Ja~uary.7, 2005·· 461 '' 463 
·1 coaster rid~, if you wiil. ·.1t was a relationship 
2 like any other: . 
h~me. Drove out Ditto C,reekRo~dithe pavedar~a 
that veers off and you keep going ~traigllt down a ' 
dirt road for a number of mil~s. So to their 
driveway:. Al<>ngdrfvewayfo hermother's house . . , 
5 A gate right there so tJ::ie cows do;n't get .out. 
, 6 There th~y parked fora petioci <>{time.' . 
.· 3 · ' After th.eir marriage ab<mtJwo wee.ks 
·,.· 4 after, Alhert Ciccorle:call$ I<athleen's fa.mily . .. 
· s They are excitE?ct; they are happy. He ~~ excited; 
7 
. 8 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
·. Somethiilg ensued in, that time frame 
whjle they were pa~:t<.eci ttiere;. Food w.a,s found 
outside the ca~ thrown atoun'd, broken lidto .. a 
ctip; he;,,purse, her ~eate~.Jasfound on ~e: 
ground/ The pills .she had just received t~t day . 
at the pharmacy were fotind ontl}e ground . . 
. Ka_thleen Ckcone beg~i:{ walking away 
from a brightyellovrDodge SR'f:N~on;sportracing· 
team Neon,.only driven l?y_her husband, Albert 
Ciccone, 
· 
$he didn't walk to her mother's house . 
. 
. from t):le gate. , Sh~ began walking back to another 
. 6 .he is happy; Kathleen is pr~gn;:mt. ~e ~ni¥1: she 
, 1 was pregnant arthe time his vehicle hit k:atlileen 
8 . Ciccone.:,That;s:thefactsof this case{ And'the · 
9 State -Wilt~~~vethrough th~ wHn~sses called;· the . 10 people;wh9reconstr).f¢tecl,whathappened on that 
·1 f roild thatd~y, frqnJ the physical evideni::e located 
12 at the sceniof the crime, from the pifople that 
13 knew K"1thleenandAllieitbest,'. theiiffi~nds and J4 .. family, what happ:eileci'.that driy. . •' . . 
15 , At the end.of this 'case, the.end.of · · 
16. January; af the end ofthe month) r'o1.1 will be left , 
17 with the unabiding convictioit beyond a reasonable 
18 doubt, thatthe defendant wilfully,, intentionally, 19. house along Ditto Creek Road. lt was light 19 deliberately; 'with inalice aforethought and with 20 outside •. No breeze. No wind. She walked alone 20 premeditation, he had time to think. about his 21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
' 22 
, 23 
.124 
25 
down a dusty road. · 
The next thing that anybody sees is' her 
body flying through the air; crashing through a 
fence, flipping over, slammingher face in to a 
brick sidewalk; somersa1,1lt:irt and landin in a 
21 actions, this was no accident He willfully:, 
22 interiti0nally with premeditation ran down an9 
23 killed his wife and the fetus that she was 
24 carrying: That's murder in the first degree. 
25 Kathleen Ciccone was
 
 462 464 tree which was her final resting place. 
. 1 
. TI1is was seen by the Shaws. Thirteen 2 · THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. year old girl ·at that time Darlene Shaw or Megan 3 Mr. Ratliff, do you wish to give Shaw wa~ watching out her window. Watching the 4 · opening statement or do you wish to reserve? girl that she had ridden the school bus with for 5 MR. RATLIFF: I would give it now, Judge. six years flying across her driveway. 6 1HE COURT: Very well. Darlene Shaw her mother runs out to her 7 MR. RATLIFF: May it please the Court, neighbor,'kneels down by her, on the phone with 8 · ladies·and gentlemen of.the jury. · Today, January 911 the entire time t~U<ing. She hears her last 9 7th, 2005, Albert Ciccone has been waiting since gasping breath with a blood~soaked mouth. She 10 October 16th, 2003 to tell his story. So far the sees the defendant getting out of the Dodge Neon 11 State has· got part of it right. They went to the which at that time had hit the mailbox in front of 12 hospital. They went to marriage counseling. They · her house crushing the front of it spinning around 13 were going to have a baby. 11,ey were going to in a donut, so to speak She yells for him to 14 have a child. find out what happened and he walks away. 15 So Albert took her to the hospital The fetus inside, growing inside, of 16 because she had morning sick1iess. They went to her uterus died that day, too. 17 · counseling that day. They were separated; She That's the general facts of this case. 18 was living at mom's house out on Ditto Creek Road. But this case doesn't start there. It starts back 19 He cared for her. He brought her back. He in April of 2003 when 22-year-old Kathleen 'Terry 20 stopped at Burger King Texaco station out there by met the defendant at Charlies Bar where he was a 21 the freeway. Got on Ditto Creek Road. Went and DJ. Their relationship was one of many 22 passed the Shaw residence. relationships, they wer~ smitten With each other. 23 Megan Shaw will tell you that in fact They got married four months after being together. 24 he went by at a quick rate of speed. Got to the It was an u . -and-do:Wn relationshi , a roller 25 KR Ranch Road. The had a disagreement. Kathleen Nicole Omsberg/ Officlal Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 9 of 57 sheets 
1 Q. Did anyone else arrive later? 
o vs. Albert A. Ciccone - January 101 693 
2 A. Later Detective Wolfe had arrived. 
1 bit. Well, let's go forward. What is State's 
2 Exhibit No. 10? 
695 
3 Q, Okay. Did any ISP arrive on scene? 3 MR. RATLIFF: Judge, if we can have a side 4 A. Yes, they did. 
5 Q. Do you recall who that was? 
6 A. I believe Trooper Olaso and then I 
7 don't know his status with Trooper Rice. There 8 was a third Trooper there. I do not know his 
9 name. 
1 o Q. Did you show .anyone these tracks that 
11 you followed.? 
12 A. Yes, l did. 
13 Q. Who did you show those to? 
4 bar first please. 5 THE COURT: Very well. 
6 (Discussion off the record with Court 
7 and Counsel.) 
8 Q. BY ME,. BAZZOLI: Can you look at 
9 State's Exhibit no. 10. Can you tell me what this 
10 is for the record? 
11 A. This photo is ti,:e tracks leading 
12 through the.driveway at 510 Ditto Creek. 
13 Q. Okay. What else can you see in there? 14 A. I showed Detective Wolfe when she got 14 A. You can also see the yellow Dodge Neon 15 thel'e. 15 and a body that is covered by a white sheet. 16 Q. What were the weather conditions like 16 Q. Okay. What is State's Exhibit No. 11? 17 when you first got there? 17 A. State'S. Exhibit No. 11 is tire tracks 18 A. It was a clear partially sunny day. It 
19 wasn't windy. 
· 
18 and the southernmost comer of Kand R Ranch Road. 
19 Q. Okay. So in your -- in your opinion or 20 Q. Okay. How long after you first arrived 21 there did you begin taking photos? . 
22 A. I would S!:lY no more than 15 minutes. 
23 Q. Okay. So it took you about a half hour 
24 to get out there trom the time of dispatch? 
25 A .. Yes; it did. 
694 
20 from what you followed is this where the tracks 21 started or ended? 
22 A. This is where I believe the tracks · 
23 started. It had appeared to me that this was a 
24 turnaround spot. 
25 Q. Oka . So ou are sayin as far as the 
696 . Q. So it had been.about 45 minutes after 1 tire tracks go this is wh~re you took the first you had been dispatched thatyou started taking 2 picture of? photos; would that be a fair statement? 3 A. Yes:.· A. It would be fair. 4 Q. Okay. Whatis State's.Exhibit No.12?. Q. Okay. Mo~te, handed you:what has been 5 A. These are-- this is a picture showing 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8. 
9 
pre marked as State's Exhibits 10 through 21. 6 the tire tracks further south from Kand R Ranch 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
24 
25 
THE BAILIFF: (Complying.) . . 7 Road. MR. BAZZOLI: Show Mr. Ratliff fot purposes· 8 Q. Okay. S0-in tl~e ~rder of how you were of identification. 9 taking these photos of the tire tracks this would THE COURT: Mr. Bailiff, may I see those 10 be which number? before they are given to the witness?. 11 A. This would be number t~o. TIIB BAILIFF: (Complying.) 1.2 . Q. Okay,. What is State's Exhibit 13? Q. BY MR. BAZZOLI: Deputy Banks, you are 13 A. State's Exhibit 13 is closer to the being handed what is marked asState's Exhibits 14 crash scene where the tire tracks are leading to 10 through 21. Can you look at these just to 15 it. 
orient yourself real quickly. 16 Q. So again as you were taking these which A. Okay. 17 one would this be? Q. rm sorry. Are you done? 18 A. The third picture. A. Yes. 19 Q. Okay; State's ExhibitNo. 14. . Q. Do you recognize these? 20 A. Number 14 would be my fourth picture A. Yes, I do recognize these. 21 still showing the tire tracks leading up to the Q. How do you recognize these? 22 crash scene. J\ TL ---- - ....... -- -J-t, .... _,.._ ,1 ..... ff ..... -1~ ,.. I'... . Aft r'\ ,....,.11 
•• crime scene. . .. ,.' .. .,. . . . r- .. l ;~ pidure:: ;;;;\o~· ~-fu;s: ~i~~;~;~;~: ;;h:ve Q. Okay. Let's kind of walk back a little 25 been talkin about so far, do. ou have an flashes Nicole Omsberg, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 
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Idaho vs. Albert A. Ciccone - January 10, 
777 779 pair of shoes that's been submitted. 1 And then when I started going through the Q. Okay. Is it always possible to go 2 photographs, I found a colored photograph of an through all four stages? 3 impression, and l called it impression number one, A. No. Frequently I am able to look at 4 that I determined to be the same as the cast. out sole design only. For whatever reason I am 5 That the photograph had been taken and then the unable to make a size comparison and it could be 6 dental stone cast had been poured. So they were because the camera was tilted at an angle against 7 the same impression number one. And then there the impression, so I can't make a size comparison, 8 were other--
or there may not be a scale in the photograph. In 9 Q. In looking at, you had about how many order to make a proper size comparison, there has 10 impressions, or how many photographs of to be a scale properly placed in. the photograph·. 11 impressions did you have total? And there may be other reasons why I can't. 12 A. In packet number A, I had 12 colored Insufficient detail is a very common factor. 13 photographs, but only three of those were of foot Q. Okay. Do you operate off of castings 14 wear impressions. And I labeled them one, two and at all? 15 three. The others were general crime screen A. Yes, I do. 16 photographs. And then the packet also contained Q. And how do those work? 17 the negaHves for those photographs. A. After the impression has been 18 In envelope B, there were three colored photographed then hopefully it is a dental stone 19 photographs of a partial impression number 48. I mixture that's poured on to the imptession and 20 have an actual crime scene marker in it, number allowed to harden. And it is a way of lifting the 21 48. It did not have a scale in it. And then impression away :from the ground. And then that is: 22 there were four general crime scene photographs. submitted to me once it is fully dried and I will 23 MR RATLIFF: Judge; I am going to object: actually dean itat the lab. 24 I didn't understand we have crash scene here. No Q. I.s it always best to have a casting or 25 deter:rrunation has been made .. 778 780 what's the best evidence that you can have? 1 THE COURT: Well, I will sustain the A.· It isa good backup with photographs. 2 objection. 3 There are:many things that can go wrong with a 35 3 Q. BY MR. BAZZOLI: If you reference it as 4 millimeter photograph, films destroyed; pictures 4 a crash scene from the photograph? don't tum out. So it is a good backup. But 5 A. No, I said crime scene. 5 6 
7. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
I 23 
1
24 
25·· 
there is also things that can go wrong with casts. 6 Q. I know. If you can reference'it as a They can break, for instance, when they are being 7 crash scene, I would appreciate it. lifted or in transport or being stored. 8 A. Oh, okay. I am just reading what I Q, Okay. Ms. Meade, have you done any 9 have written in my notes. 
analysis on behalf of Elmore County Sheriff's 10 Q. That's fine. 
office of this in July of 2004, late June? 11 A. Okay. A. Yes; 12 Q. And then you had other envelopes; is Q. Okay. And what was submitted to you 13 that correct? for analysis? 14 A. Yes, envelope C, 11 photographs; A. What was submitted was our Exhibit No. 15 Envelope D contained one photograph of a shoe 1, was a pair of black Danner high top lace up 16 impression number four, two photographs of shoe boots. 17 impression number five, one photograph of a shoe Q. Okay. And did you receive any other 18 impression number six, one of shoe impression photographs or castings or anything at that time? 19 number seven, one of shoe impression number eight, A. Yes. Our item number two was a cas.t 20 one of shoe impression number nine, one of shoe that had broken into three pieces. It wa$ a 21 impression number ten~ and then four general dental stone cast. Number three was an envelope 22 photographs. 
or five envelopes that had numerous photO"graphs. · 23 Q. Okay. And I labeled the photo envelopes A, B, C, D and E 24 A. Envelope E contained 12 general just so I could keep track of what was in them. 25 photographs. 
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daho vs. Albert A. Ciccone - January 11, 005 .---------·····----------.....-.,-:::-:::-=----r----.,-------'-----------:-=-,:-::----. 1000 1002 1 Q. Okay. So did you leave your vehicle 1 A. We had a number of tire marks further 2 parked there at .6 miles away? 
3 A. I don't recall, sir. I can't remember 
4 if we drove up or not. 
5 Q. Okay. When you got to the crash scene, 
6 what were the conditions like outside? 
7 
8 
A. It was ~lear. Early dusk. Q. Okay. Did you have a flashlight or 
2 soµth at junction ... I believe it is KR Ranch 
3 Road, number of tire tracks there. The primary 
4 deputy U1at arrived did not close the road, had 
5 other vehicles that had crossed through our crime · 
6 scene. The tire tracks from KR Ranch Road did not 
7 lead unbroken. all the way to our crash scene. So 
8 we verified that the tire tracks there were the 9 anything to help you visually see? 9 same tread design as involved in this incident. 10 
11 
A. At that time one wasn't necessary. I 10 Q. Okay. Now, it is time for you to draw. did have a flashlight in the car, but I didn't use 11 A. Okay. 12 it at that time. 12 Q. Can you flip over the piece of paper 13 Q. So about how long after you arrived· 13 there. 14 about the .6 mile mark did it take for you to 14 A. (Complying) 15 finally get to the crash scene? 15 Q. Can you draw for me a big diagram from 16 A. I would say less than an hour. I don't 16 KR Ranch Road down past Ditto Creek Road or the 17 know the exact time. By the time we walked out in 17 510 Ditto Creek address? 18 the desert, spoke with Mr. Ciccone, escorted him 18 A. This is approximately north. This 19 back, anywhete·between half hour and an hour. I 19 would be KR Ranch Road. This would be the 20 don't know; 
21 Q. Okay. When you got up there, what did 
. 22 you observe? · 
23 A. there was a yelfow Dodge Neon out in 
24 the roadway.· Skid·and tire marks leading away 
20 driveway to /510 Ditto Creek. Do you want the 
21 vehicle and that stuff in: there? 
Q. Are you sure that direction is correct? A. I am sorry. lhiive got it backwards. 
24 This is south. Thank you, sir. 
22 
23 
25 from the north on to the· road across the driveway, · 25 Q. Okay. So that's 510 Ditto Creek? 
1 
2 
3 
1001 
510 Ditto <;reek. We· also had a female bo:dy lying 
in the yard or in the boundary of the yard of 510 
Ditto Creek. 
4 Q. Okay. What did you do when you got 
5 there? 
6 A. One of the first things we noticed was 
7 the blood on the outside of the vehicle.' It was 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
splattered across the wind screen and across the A 
post, the primary support post for the roof, to 
the front of the car and across the closed 
passenger side window which caused concern. Q. Why? 
A. It would indicate that she was 
struck.from outside of the vehicle. Previously 
Mr; Ciccone had stated that she was trying to exit 
16 the vehicle while he was driving. And that was a 
contradictory statemeut from what our evidence 
indicated. 
14 
15 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Q. So from what you saw at that time, that 
was different? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. Did you look atthe tire tread 
23 pattern? 
I 24 • A. I did. I 2s. Q. Why? 
1003 
1 A. Yes, sir. 
2 Q. Where did you see the tire tracks up by 
3 Kand R Ranch Road? What did you see? 
4 A. We had a number of tire tracks that 
5 came around. Basically we had all kinds of tire 
6 tracks. We had what appeared is that a vehicle 
7 come up, stopped here, back into KR Ranch Road, 
8 and then sped out traveling south on Ditto Creek 
9 Road. 
Q. Okay. Did you match the tire print up 10 
11 with anything that you had seen at the <:rash scene 
12 that night? 
13 A. Yeah, the tire tread design was 
14 identical to the tfre treads on the vehicle 
15 involved in the crash. 
16 Q. Okay. Did you make any field notes 
17 when you were there? 
18 A. I didn't. 
19 Q. Do you recall what the tire tread 
20 design was? 
21 A. I do. Basically down the center of the 
22 tire, there are two lines running parallel with a 
23 -- I don'f know how you would describe the 
24 pattern, running striations sideways. 
25 Q. So were you able to find those down Nicole Omsberg, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 
.. 1181T 23 df 57 sheets 
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1 MOUNTAIN HOME, IDAHO 1872 1 addendum? 2 June 7, 2005, 8:58 a.m. 2 MR. RATLIFF: Yes,Judge. 3 3 THE COURT: Counsel, are there any 4 THE COURT: This is the matter of State 
5 versus Albert A. Ciccone, CR-2003-00441. This 
4 corrections, clarifications, or rebuttals to 
5 anything contained in the pre-sentence report? 
· 6 matter is here for sentencing today. 6 And°I have received by fax this morning 1 . Mr. Ciccone, in your case, you were 7 the respons, to the pre-sentence investigation 8 charged with the felony offense of two counts of 
9 murder in the first degree. The maximum penalty 
8 . which the defense has filed, and I have reviewed 
9 that document. 10 prescribed by law is up to life in prison on each 
11 count. You were found guilty by a jury verdict 
12 returned on january 26 of 2005 of first-degree 
13 murder with regard to Count No. I and 
10 MR. RATLIFF: Judge, I do have some-
11 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Ratliff. 
12 MR; RATLIFF: -- some objections to some of 
13 the stuff that I need to put on the record. 14 second-degree murder with regard to Count No. II. 14 . Your Honor, we faxed over essentially 15 At that time the court ordered a 15 one major objection as to the pre-sentence · 
16 investigation that I would bring your attenUon 
16 pre-sentence report, which I have now received and · 
17 had the·opportunity to review. 17 to, the statement made by Ms. Kathy Figueredo in 
18 the addendum. And there are certain items 
18 I would ask defense counsel and 
19 defendant Have you received a copy of that 19 regarding just her typed statement, Judge, the 20 report, and· have you had adequate time to review 
21 it? 
20 third pagdrom the last. 
21 THE COURT: All right. 22 MR. RATLIFF: Yes, Your Honor; 22 MR. RATLIFF: Now, Idaho Code Section 23 THE COUI<T: Mr. Ciccone, have you had 23 19-5306 talks about restitution and loss and those 
24 items. Starting with the second full paragraph 
25 through the,rest of that page, Judge, and then in 
24 adequate time to review it? 
. 25 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
1" 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
1871 1873 THE COURT: Has the State received a copy of 1 the next page, one, two, three, at the top four that report, Mr. Bazzoli, and hav~ryou had 2 . paragraphs there. Under the statute, we will make adequate time to review it? 3 record of an objection to those being improper MR BAZZOLI: I have, Your Hohor. And the 4 types of restitution not contemplated by the Court has a report from March 9th, and there was 5 statute and/or the case law. 
an addendum to the report on March 15th. Did the 6 More importantly, Your Honor, I want Court receive and review both of them? 7 you to take a look at the second to last page of THE COURT: I have the report delivered 8 that statement and the last two pages. March 15th together with all of the attached 9 Now, Booth v. Maryland does argue or materials. Let me be sure that what I have 10 state that in a capital case, the types of. includes the addendum. 11 statements made in the victim impact statement MR. BAZZOLI: The addendum, we received it 12 should not contain characterizations and opinions on March 17th, 2005, and it contained a 13 about the crime or the defendant's appropriate pre-sentence or persistent investigator and 14 sentence in the victim impact statement. And it victim-impact statement from Kathy Figueredo of 15 is prohibited in capital cases by!daho Code about ten pages or so and a faxed statement from 16 19-2515. 
17 JanetHolcoJ:ru>. This was an addendum arid received 17 We think by allowing those last two 18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
a couple days later. 18. paragraphs, the court consider those last two THE COURT: Well, I would like to see the 19 paragraphs as a violation of Albert's 
addendum to be sure .that I have everything. 20 constitutional rights. It does specifically in The court has seen the March 11, 2005; 21 this letter, Judge, the second to the last 
statement. I had not seen Kathleen Terry's 22 paragraph talks about a mental health diagnosis as statement, but have now reviewed that statement. 23 made by the declarant as to her opinion as to · Return this to the State. 24 Albert. 
Has the defense received a copy of the 25 Although Idaho Code Section 19-5306 Nicole Omsberg, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 1 of 22 sheets 
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1 does not make that limitation, we think it is a 
2 violation of due process and violates Albert's 
3 rights. 
4 As to the very last paragraph, it talks 
5 about penalty provisions, And <!-gain, we would 
6 object. We think it is violative of Booth v. 
7 Maryland in a non-capital way. We would make that 
8 objection and ask the court to, one, not consider 
9 it and, two, to redact these provisions, that 
10 portion of the statement as a violation of 
11 · Albert's constitutional rights. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
13 MR. RATLIFF: I would, Judge, refer you --
14 and it is probably a countervailing case currently 
15 on point as to my objection. I have a duty to 
16 disclose to tne court and state the case of~ 
17 v. Chapman, 816 P.2d 1023, 120 Idaho 466, decided 
18 in 1991. It talks about Booth y. Maryland and. 
19 talks about, at paragraph 8 in the opinion, Judge, 
20 as to death penalty cases but no,t as to 
21 noh:·capital cases. 
22 THE COURT:. Thank you, Counsel. Can you· 
23 give me that cite one more time?. 
24 MR. RATLIFF: State v. Chapman, 816 P .2d 
25 1023, 120 Idaho 466. And robabl , Jud e, it is a 
: \. ,', : 1875 · 
1 countervailing cast! as tq my objections as to this . 
2 addendum and this statement by Kathy Figueredo. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
4 Mr. Bazzoli, response. 
5 MR. BAZZOLI: Briefly, Your Honor. I did 
8 receive the response to the pre-sentence · 
7 investigation. Sometime this morning, at 7:53, it 
8 came through our fax machine. 
9 .And I did notfook at Chapman, 
10 .necessarily, but I did find the argument to lack 
11 certain legal foundation that this is not a 
12 capital.case, p}ain simple. · He is not -- the 
13 death penalty, as the court kriows, was never 
14 filed, was not even take off the table because it . 
15 wa~ never initially filed. 
18 That's something that the state is 
17 authorized t-0 do within 30 days from the date of 
18 the filing of the Information. That was not done 
19 in this matter. 
20 So when you look at Idaho Code.' 
21 19-2515(5a), it specifically says: "If a person 
22 is adjudicated guilty of murder in the first 
1876 
1 to seek the death penalty was. filed and served as 
2 provided in Section 18-4004(A) Idaho Code, then 
3 you get into the special sentencing proceeding," 
4 which is not applicable here because it was never 
· 5 · filed. This is not a capital case. 
6 So then it takes to -- and that's 
7 consistent with, if you look under Idaho Code, 
8 18-4004, which is punishment for murder, and then 
9 it talks about the consideration the court can 
10 make. 
11 And in there, under State y, Waddell, 
12 119 Idaho 238, the court in that case, a Court of. 
13 Appeals case from 1991, stated it was not improper 
14 for the District Judge to consider letters from 
15 the victim's family and testimony from the 
18 victim's mother prior to sentencing defendant upon 
17 his conviction for murder in the second degree, 
18 even though he was originally charged with a 
19 · capital offense. 
20 In that case, he was charged with a 
21 capital offense. The jury found he was only 
22: guUty of murder in the second degree, and the 
23 victim impact statements were proper in.that case. 
24 And when you look at Idaho Code 
25 19-5306, which is the ri hts of victl.m$ duri'n the 
1877 
1 investigation, prosecution, and disposition of a 
2 crime, then the right of the victim of a criminal 
3 offense as stated in Sub.section E, the victim . ·. · 
4, should be heard, uponrequest,at all criminal 
5 justice proceedings considering a plea of guilty, 
. 6 sentencing, incarceration, placing on probation~ 
7 or release of the defendant unless a manifest 
a injustice would result. 
9 I don't think there is any manifest 
1 O injustice here by aliowing the direct victims - · 
11 and I would note on there that the victim in this· 
12 . case is defined by the- under Subsection3: The 
13 provisions of this section shall apply equally to 
14 the immediate families of homicide victims or 
15 victims of youthful age. 
16 So I believe that the victims have an 
17 . opportunity to be present in this court, that the 
18. subsection that Mr. Ratliff refers to and has 
19 noted in the contrary case law indicates that this 
20 not a capitalcase. And even if it had been 
21 filed, it was never adjudicated as such. And 
22 therefore, the victims should have the right to 
Nicole Omsberg, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
Page 1874 to .1877 bf 1954 
2 of 22 sheets ( 
<' 5 l 
·, 
! 
1 
2 
3 
4· 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Sta Idaho vs~ Albert A. Ciccone - June 71 2 
1878 
Response, Mr. Ratliff. 
MR. RATLIFF: Judge, finally, for the 
record, specifically as to our objection, we 
believe that the conclusion of those matters 
within the PSI and the addendum violate Articles 
13 and 17 of the Idaho Constitution, due process 
rights guaranteed to defendant under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
And finally, Judge, it is our objection 
that Section 22 to the Idaho Constitution and. one . 
. . 
that addressE:!s victim rights is violative of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of due process and Sixth 
Amendment right against cross-examination of being· 
able to cross-examin~ the victim, alleged victim 
. during the sentencing hearing. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
Well, the court will find that with 
regard to the victim impact statement, that Idaho 
law, specifically pursuant to Section 22 of the 
Idaho Constitution, as well as the statutory 
provisions applying to the same, does allow victim·· 
impact statements. 
1 
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diagnosis, that the court will take into account 
the opinions of the parties, that they are not, 
indeed, medical doctors, psychiatrists, or 
psychologists, and will give those opinions such 
weight as they deserve in those circumstances; 
that the court believes it goes to the weight that 
the court would give the statement as to whether 
or not - as opposed to whether or not the 
statement should be allowed to be made at all. 
And I will allow the statements to be made, and 
they will be considered. 
The other issue that the court has 
before proceeding to sentencing today is that this 
matter was continued from sentencing for a 
psychological evalua:tion. And the court orderi,,d a 
psychological evaluation pursuant to the agreement 
of the parties on March 31s~ of 2005. 
At this point, the court does·not have 
in its file the psychological evaluation which 
this court authorized and which was ordered 
pursuant to agreement between the parties. 
24 · .• The court's understanding of that law: 24 
Mr. Ratliff, can you tell me where the 
psychological evaluation is, or was it determined 
that the defendant did not want to obtain or take 25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1-1 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
anci·o:f the United,States Su reme Court rule~with · · 25 
·cat evaluation rior to 1879 1881 
regard to this matter is that those statements · 1 sentencing? 
are, in £act, allowed; except that in capital 2 MR. RATLIFF: Judge, an evaluation was• cases, those statements may not be made which 3 conducted. But after due consideration and advocate for any specific penalty, in particular, 4 conference with the evaluator and my client, it the death penalty, where a capital case is 5 was elected not to have the report prepared for involved. And the Idaho State statute compif~s 6 sentencing. 
with that requirement of the United States 7 The order does not require us- to Constitution. 8 prepare a report or to bring forth the evaluator The Idaho Supreme Court has held in 9 for purposes of testimony. Essentially that order State y. Matteson, M-A-T~T-E~S-0-N, at 123 Idaho 10 was for purposes of securing the evaluation at 622, a 1993 case, that this section - that being 11 county expense, but I was not required, under Rule Idaho Code Section 19-5306 - does not contain any · 12 702 or otherwise, to disclose the.contents or the limitation which would prevent a victim of a crime 13 findings of that evaluation, and no written report at sentencing from sharing the victim's opinion of 14 has been prepared. 
the defendant or making a sentencing 15 THE COURT: Mr. Bazzoli. 
recommendation. 16 MR. BAZZOLI: I have never received That is the law in this state. Those 17 anything, Your Honor. Mr. Ratliff advised me that sentencing statutes have been upheld by the United 18 they were not going to be submitting a report. States Supreme Court except insofar as capital 19 THE COURT.: The court will note for the 20 · cases are concerned. Therefore, the court will 20 record, then, that the court authorized 21 allow the victi:l:n impact statements, and they will 21 preparation of a psychological evaluation and 
' 22 
23 
be included in the pre-sentence report. 22 statement at public expense; that the The court notes that with regard to 23 psychological evaluation was, in fact, conducted 24 weight to be given to opinions with regard to any 24 at public expense; and that the defense has chosen 25 s cholo ical dia nosis or lack of· sycholo · c:al 25 not to tnake use of the evaluation in this 
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1 sentencing hearing. 1 ever has to be put in this positionT I spent most 2 Very well, Counsel. Do you have any 2 of my adult life, from the age of fifteen on, 
3 additional corrections, clarifications, or 3 safeguarding and pro~ecting my family, doing wrtat 4 rebuttals with regard to the pre-sentence report 4 I can to keep them together. Al took that away 
5 not contained in the written response to the 5 from me. He destroyed my family, and the~·s.not 6 pre-sentence investigation filed by the defense 6 a damn thing I can do to repair that. 
7 earlier? 7 Every time I have conversations with s MR. RATI.IFF: No, Your Honor. 8 any member of my family, there's not any part of 9 THE COURT: Mr. Ciccone, is there anyth~ng 9 that conversation that isn't affected by what you· 
10 in the report upon which you wish to comment which 10 have done. I am sure you read my statement. My . 11 you believe may be inaccurate that your attorney 11 victim impact statement said that one of my 
12 has not called to my attention? 12 · highest qualities was compassi.on for others. And 13 · THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 13 now I have a lack of for a lot of people. 
14 THE COURT: Does the State believe that 14 '(ou caused a lot of pain, AL You. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
. 24 
25 
there is anything contained in the report that is 
inaccurate.that it wishes to call to the cqurt's 
attention? 
MR. BAZZOLI: No, Your Honor. 
· THE COURT: Do we have any testjmony today 
with regard to sentence? 
MR. BAZZOLI: Your Honor, the State intends 
to call four witnesse$ - not witnesses, but four · 
of the immediate family members to present victim 
impact testimony. That would be - as the court 
has alread . met them; throu trj.al, would be 
. 1883 
1 Christopher Terry, her brother; Jessica Herr, her 
2 sister; Bill Terry, .who did not testify at trial, 
3 who is her father; and then Kathy Figueredo:, who 
4 is her mother. 
5 THE COURT: Very well. The State may. call 
6 the witnesses with regard to victim impact. , 
7 . statements. The .court does find that they qualify 
8 as immediate family members under the statute .. 
9 MR. BAZZOLI: Thank you, Your Honor. The. 
10 State:w.ould call Christopher Terry to present.his 
11 . victim impactstatement. 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Terry, simply sit down and 
13 pull the microphone up to you. And you may . 
14 proceed to give your victim impact statement to 
15 the Court. I'd just ask that you speak so that 
16 the reporter can he1;tr everything and get it down. 
17 
18 CHRISTOPHER RYAN TERRY, 
19 appeared and gave the following statement: 
20 
21 MR. TERRY: All right. First off, I-~ 
22 THE COURT: Give your name for the record. 
15 caused me a lot of pain. You caused a lot of ~y 
16 family pain. In a way, I take that as defeat to 
17 myself, broke me down as a person, broke my family 
18 down as people and anybody that was ever affected 
19 by Kathleen. 
20 I only hope that, in some way or 
21 another, in your mind you realize what you have 
22 · done. The act is done. If you don't feel remorse. 
23 for the act, that's fine; I have no problem with . 
· 24 that. :But show some respect and $Ome remorse for 
25 what ou have done and the effects of the .eo le , ... 
18 
1 that are still living on .this earth; .. 
2 And one question l have is: Who. do you 
3 blame for I<atbleen's death? That's what I 
4 thought. So, I will make this short. No matter 
5 what your·sentence is,justke will not truly be· 
6 served until your soul passes through the gates of 
7 hell. Enjoy the pain. . 
8 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Terry. 
9 MR. BAZzOLI: State would call Jessica Herr 
1 O to the stand. 
11 THE COURT: Ms. Herr, I'd ask that.you do .· 
12 the same thing. Simply pull the microphone up so · 
13 that everything can be recorded, and attempt to ·· 
14 speak as loudly as you can so.that the reporter . 
15 can get everything. 
16 
17 JESSICA HERR, 
18· appeared and gave the following statement: 
19 
20 MS. HERR: My name is Jessica Herr. You 
21 will have to forgive me because I don't know how 
22 to put into words my pain and tremendous impact 
'Ii KT'> .,-,...,.,-,n,, .. r"'L..,..:1""~-~t....,- r>"~"""'!"'o rr .... ......,...,. ,,., t:f-."- l- - r-- 1,.. ... .J ... ~- ~ ........ u.r .. 124 •« .~ « '" .... , .f ~ "'. "", "" . , ... ' ' . J First off, I never thought I would be 24 Al, you know how much my family loved 
25 ut in this osition. I ho e to God that nobo.d , 25 Kathleen. You know her · o· .. You know her heart. 
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1886. 1888 1 And all of our lives, we showed Kathleen love. . 1 at her across that DJ room and shewas sucking·on 2 Kathieen loved life. 2 that lollypop ·- and you used to call her lollypop 3 . And the last five and a half months of 3 girl -- I hope you remember those moments, Al, . 4 my sister's life, all she saw was your anger and 4 when she was smiling and happy, when she wasn't 5 your hate. 'f ou didn't show her love because you 5 trying to. run because you were hurting her. 6 don't know how to love. 6 And ·1 just want to let you know that 
7 All she wanted to be was a wife and a 7 even thciugl} my sister, your wife, Kathleen, and 8 mother. How can she bea wife when you're 8 your daughter are in a grave, that we still 9 pounding on her, telling her she is fat, telling 9 celebrate their lives. 
10 her she is ugly? How? 10 And I do want to thank you formy 11 You're an evil man. · And you're lucky 11 niece. Because without you, I wouldn't have had 12 that you're going to the prison that you're going ·12 my niece. And I will never meet my niece. I will 13 to. Because if you were going to a prison that I 13 never smell my niece. But I do thank you that you 14 wanted to send you to, there would be no such 14. gave that gift of one thing that my sister truly 
15 thing as inhumane, no such thing. 15 wanted, was to be a inother. And you made her a 16 You made a statement that you were 16 mother. 
17 deeply sorry for the pain you caused your family. 17 And I forgot what I brought over there. 
18 What about Kathleen? What about her family, Al? 18 I just wanted to show you, Your Honor, the type of 19 What about us? We are the ories that have to go to 19 heart that my sister has, just to explain the type 20 my mother's house, all of us, and stare at crosses 20 of person she was. She was not this awful, evil 21 on the side of the road and see a broken fence and 21 person that Al portrayed her to be. 
22 kriow that my sister flew through the air, landed 22 But four days before Al murdered my 23 on the ground, ancl. died; Because you put her 23 sister, it was my husband's 30th birthday; She 24 there .. ' 24 · was so sick that she couldn't make it to the is. Whe!l I s.t<)nd. over m sister's rave, I 25 
1887 
!· 1 don't see her beauty anymore, All I can think is 1 put this blue teddy bear arid this blue hat. That 2 my beautiful Kathleen is in a box in the dirt 2 was hers. She had it for her. And because she 
3 decaying because you put her·there. · 3 couldn't make it to the store, things that she 
4 Father's Day is coming, Al. You have a 4 cherished she gave to my husband as a birthday 5 daughter. She would have been about one year and 5 present. 
6 one month old right now. She would have been 
 6 That shows her heart. That even though 
7 
 Her name is 
. 7 she couldn't make it to the store, she still went 
8 That's the name of your daughter, Al. When 8 through her stuff and wanted to make a nice gift 9 Father's Day comes, I hope you know that you are a 9 for him. 
l 10 father and that you murdered your daughter. 10 And she didn't have a card, so she made 11 I know that seeing our pain is giving 11 this card. It says: "Happy birthday to you." 
12 you satisfaction. And I know you have no remorse, 12 This explains who she is. She didn't have money · 
13 and I don't expect you to, because I know you, AL 13 to go to the store. She was too sick. But she 
14 I know the type of person you are. From the vefy 14 made a card. "Dear Gregory: I hope what's in 15 · first time I met you, I knew something wasn't 15 this bag keeps your head warm during these 
16 right, that you were not a good man. 16 freezing cold days," because he is bald. ·:1 hope 
17 And you can blame it on your father, 17 this day brings you a barrel of laughs and, lots of 18 but you are an adult. You function. You're a 18 smiles." 
' 19 man. You know what you did was wrong. You made 19 Every year we cut down our Christmas 20 the decision. 20 tree, my husband wears this hat so that my sister 21 And I hope that one day you don't 21 can be with me. It is my favorite holiday, and I 
22 remember how much you hate Kathleen, you remember 22 don't have her anymore. She is not there but in 
23 her giggle and her laugh and how beautiful she was 23 my heart. So we cut down our Christmas tree, and 24 and her gorgeous smile. And the moments that when 24 he wears this hat. It is not very thick, but 
25 ou -- before you met her, when· ou were !ookin 25 he'll freeze to cut down our tree so she can be 
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1 with us. 
2 That was my sister. No matter what, 
3 she did what she could. · 
4 This is her wallet she left in my car. 
5 You may wonder why it is in a !Jag. It is in a bag 
a so that every now and then when I feel like this, . 
7 I can open this bag and smell her. It. trapped the 
8 scent of my sister in there. At least! can 
9 remember the smell of my sister: I am so afraid 
10 of forgetting her. And I kept her empty bottle Qf 
11 perfume, so I can smell her, because that's all I 
12 have left is right here. in this bag. 
13 And this teddy bear may look gross to 
14 you, but I am 26 years old. And at 26 years old, 
15 I sleep with a teddy bear because I have 
16 nightmares.· All I see is my sister's bloody body. 
17 In my dream, l go up to her,. and I say, "I love 
18 you." She just starts to cry. 
19 I can't sleep. I can't hardly eat. 
20 And I pray for Al. I think he is an evil man, but 
21 I pray for him. 
22 But I just want you to know, Al, that 
23 what you get hE:re today, of course, it impacts us. 
24 We want him to haveJUe without parole. I want 
25 him to, J can't o throu h this of ettm u 
189.1 ··· 
1 here every day. ldon't want him to walk free. I 
2 don't want him to ever walk (ree again, ever. 
3 .• But ypu know what, Al? I believe in 
4 God. And: I.know that when I die, Al, I know where 
5 I am going. And I am going to see Kathleen again, 
6 and I'm going to see
 But when you die 
7 and you stand :before.the Lord, you won't see them, 
8 because you are going to hell for what you did. 
9 You made that choice. You sat in that 
10 car, and you watched her and had·the choice. And 
11 instead of turning to God, you t.umed to the 
12 devil. And that was .the choice you made .. 
13 But I know I am going to see them 
14 again, and I know lam going to hear her laugh. 
15 And I know I am going to hold your little girl .. 
16 And when I hold your little girl, I am going to 
17 think of you,. that you will never see her. 
18 You could be holding your one-year-old 
19 daughter right now, Instead, you are sitting in a. 
20 courtroom behind a defendant's sign listening to 
21 my family pour .their pain at you. And you can 
22 look at me in my eye with no remorse'. It doesn't 
1892 · 
1 away from me, She is here. She loves me, and she 
2 loved you, and that was her fault. B.ecause she 
3 did love you. 
4 I d,on't ·~ I never •• I don't know ,what . 
5 else to say. I just want -- please take into 
6 consideration the pain and agony he has caused and 
7 the way that he did it. 
8 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Herr. 
9 MS. HERR: Thank you. 
10 MR. BAZZOLI: The State calls William Terry 
11 to present his victim impact statement. 
12 THE COURT: Mr .. Terry, once again, as I've 
13 advised everyone else, pU:11 the microphone up to 
14 you and speak up so the reporter can get 
15 everything. 
16 
17 WILLIAMS. TERRY, · 
18 appeared and gave the following statement: 
19 
20 .MR. TERRY: Thank you. My name is. 
21 William$.. Terry. I am.Kathleen's father. I am 
22 · the grandfather of.Kathleen's daughter,
 
23 · This is a picture of Kathleen. This is in.my 
24 memory. And my memories are all I have I,eft ... 
· 25 There isa hole. that.c.µ:i.neverJ:,e filled. . 
1893 ,. 
1 You tooktteraway. You tookmy , ,, 
2 grandchild away who I will never ever get to know 
3 or have the pleasure of playing :with. I will. 
4 never be aQl!i! to hold my daughter, to see her 
5 · smile, to hear her laugh, to hear her be mad at 
6 .me,even. Even that would be a joy. 
7 · You took that. You thought about it, 
8 and you.went ahead and you murdered her. ,I have 
9 asked God to help me forgive you for that, but I 
10 can't do it. I hope he will forgive me for not. 
11 being able to do it. 
12 . I keep looking at the picture of my 
13 daughter Kathleen, and the memories pop into my, 
14 mind: The day we picked her up at the hospjtal, · 
15 when she toddled around house, when she got into 
16 trouble, when she was being funny, all the 
17 memories I can have of her. An:d the final memory, 
18 because of you, is looking at her laying in a . 
19 coffin, and that ruin.s all my other memories. 
20 Your Honor, I ask of you that .you 
21 sentence him to life without parole. Because he 
22 shouldn't be able to walk out of that prison until ~ ' '!I 
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MR. BAZZOLI: State calls Kathy Figueredo, 
Your Honor. 
KATHLEEN FIGUEREDO, 
appeared and gave the following statement: 
MS. FIGUEREDO: Kathleen Figueredo. I've 
sat in this courtroom day in and day out, and I 
could not say anything. We have stood four feet 
from each other when we moved this courtroom 
around to figure out how to put thejurors in. 
And I have heard you joking around with the people 
in here, and I couldn't say a thing. 
Now I have the chance to say what I 
want to say, and I just pray to God that I can: say 
everything that I need to say that's in my heart. 
And I want you to listen, and I want you to look 
atme: 
The last time you spoke to me, you said 
to me, "One thing I got to say about you, Kathy, 
you're a good mother." Is that how you repay me 
back, by taking my daughter ·and my grandchild from 
me? 
Do you remember that, in the kitchen, 
you put your arm around me and you said that? And. 
oQ sald ou we:r;e oin to tr and make the 
1895 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13· 
14 
15 
16 
17. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1896 
couples counseling. I know, through my expertise 
from the Department of Corrections, that I have. 
been trained by the national best. I don't have 
to believe in that back to back, but I' have got 
twelve years of solid training from the national 
best, 
And we talked about that anger 
management was not the answer, that couples 
counseling was dangerot,1s, that you needed to get 
counseling to deal with domestic violence, and you 
agreed. And then you told me, no, you were going 
to anger management. And we talked about that 
again. And then I find out that wasn't even tr.ue, 
you weren't even going to anger management. 
You went to counseling for the one and 
first time with Kathleen, and she shut down in 
that counseling session, which is really, really 
normal and typical of domestic violence, because 
you were blaming her for not making the marriage 
work because she had friends that you didn't wa:,;1.t 
to have her have friends. That's typical of the 
control of domestic violence. 
So the counselor turns to Kathleen.and 
says: If you are not going to cooperate, then you 
mi ht as well not come back. However, there.is·a 
1897 1 marriage work. And if it didn't, you gave me a 1 counseling group with couples if you want to go. 2 commitment that you were going to leave her alone. 2 And we talked about that in the living room as ' 3 You couldn't do it; couid you? 3 well, about her shutting down, and that you needed 4 . You have a history of domestic 4 to also let her talk and be -- and tell the 5 violence. We sat in my living room after the 5 counselors what was really going on. 6 fi:r:sMime that you had battered her after 6 You made a commitment to me, and you 7 Jessica's engagement party.· You came back in my 7 didn't keep it. And you went ahead and you got 8 home and had dinner with me,·and it was difficult 8 married. And I scrambled in two days with my 9 to even have you in my house at that time, but not 9 daughter Jessica and I<athleen and got her a 10 to lose my daughter. The fear of isolation from 10 wedding dress. And I paid for the wedding, not 11 domestic violence feared me so badly, because I 11 you, like you said in the pre-sentence report. 12 knew she was in danger. And I said to Kathleen -- 12 My husband, James Figueredo, paid for 13 and I will never forget these words -- "Kathleen, 13 the wedding dinner. Because I wanted to give my 14 domestic violence gets worse, not better." 14 daughter a wedding. If she was going to go 15 Bt:tt she was with you, and we had a long 15 through with it, I was not going to let her have a 16 talk together, Al. Do you remember sitting in the 16 wedding without a gown. And you got married right 17 living room? At least two hours we talked to each 17 in this courtroom right here .. 18 other; and we talked about the domestic violence. 18 And you were angry at her then, because 19 . And you never said anything about the domestic 19 she· wasn't on time, because a zipper on her gown 20 violence that you had with your ex-wife, only that 20 broke. So you had clenched fists in the pictures. 21 she cheated on you. But you battered her, and you 21 Clenched fists. That wasn't a wedding day. You 22 almost killed her, too. And she got away with her 22 were always angry. It didn't take much. And you 23 life, thank God. 23 ruined your own wedding day. 24 We talked about the counseling that you 24 And then that night afterwards, you got 25 were.su osed to et. Yqu went wi~h Kathlee:q to. ;zs into another bi fi ht on our hone moon that you Nicole Omsberg, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 7 of 22 sheets 
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1 used my ranch that night before you went on the 
2 next night. 
3 Think of all the things that you have 
4 done that you 4id not get help. Your pre-sentence 
5 report said that you have no violent history. 
6 Read again. Read again about your ex-wife. Read 
7 again about our statements and the reality of the 
8 conversations that we had and the witnessing of 
9 your abuse. 
· 
10 You have a history of abuse. Your 
11 family shared they have a history. of abuse. Well, 
12 hear me clearly: In our same conversation, I come 
13 from a domestic. violence home. I was battered and 
14 . beaten. I remember laying in bed and wondering 
15 what it was like to hear my father call me by my 
16 first name, Kathy, instead of bitches or pigs or 
17 bastards. 
18 We shared that together, and I S<!.id to 
19 you: You can't blame your past for the choices. 
20 that you make. You come to an adultdecisiim 
21 where you know right and wrong. Youchose the 
22 wrong path. You chose to follow a family of 
23 generations. You could.have broke it. 
24 I could have been a batterer. I could 
25 have been all tl).ose things. But I had to take an 
1899 
1 adul.t responsibility to make a decision on the 
2 direction of mY ]#e. And I dedicated, my life to 
3 working With offender.s~ offenders and the 
4 rehabilitation ofoffenders. 
5 That career is gone. It is gone. I 
6 couldn't go back anymore. People would come up to 
7 me. They .couldn't face me. They didn't know what 
8 to say to me. What do you say to a m.other that. 
9 her daughter w.as run down viciously? What do you 
10 say to a mother that she lost her beautiful 
11 grandchild? 
· 12 Do you remember the picture in here of 
13 that baby, your child? Perfect in every way. }::[er 
14 little toes. Her knees were bent in just the 
15 right way. She was perfect. 
16 And every time I see a movie or show 
17 with a baby, an infant, or I go to the stores and 
18 . I see the little clothes, my arms ache, the 
19 emptiness of my grandchild. 
20 Kathleen was a dream come true. I 
21 prayed when I was little that I would be able to 
22 adopt or have children of my own. I took foster 
1900 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
5 And I remember getting out of the car 
6 at the hospital and going in the car. And I held 
1 
7 my baby in my arms. And I thankeq the Lord and 
8 praised him for the beautiful gift, the prayer 
9 that was answered. 
10 Kathleen looked most like me, and she 
11 was interracial. I remember after I moved, when 
12 she was four years old, to Idaho, and then she'd 
13 go back and visit her father and some family 
14 members. And they used to say! Kathleen is so 
15 much like you. She has the some actions. She's 
16 - and she wasn't my blood, l;lut she was my blood. 
17 Me and Kathleen were alone together 
18 after the others moved out, older, the last four 
19 years of her life. We shared the ranch together. 
20 And of all of my children, it was Kathleen that 
21 loved that ranch the .. most. 
22 And we had mother-and-daughter 
23 conversations, and we had mother-and-daughter 
24 disagree.qumts. And sometimes she could. be a ~eal 
25 pain, and I am stubborn .. ~ut one thing I<athleen 
1901 
1 did in her stubbo~ess was stood up for herself, 
2 and she stood up .for her family, and she stoop. up 
3 for her friends. And you know what, Al? She 
4 stood up for you. 
5 I remember when you first came to the 
6 house, and the two of you went outside sitting on 
7 .tlle deck to have a cigarette. And.I glanced 
8 outside, and r saw the twp of you just giggling 
9 and laughingtogetl)er. I've never seen Kathleen 
10. shine so bright. She really fell in love with 
11 you. She was captivated by you, just Hke your 
12 ex-wife was captivated by you. 
13 Just like Kathleen and just like your 
14 ex-wife, in such a short period of time, your 
15 control and your abuse accelerated and 
16 accelerated. And then the flowers and the gifts 
17 every fin:te, the phone calls that you left on my 
18 answering machine that you had to know I heard: I 
19 ·am sorry, Kathy. I know. Kathleen, I know we . 
20 shouldn't have done this. I love you. Well, can 
21 you call me? And then the flowers would come in, 
22 you'd come in. 
?~ i:-,;,t~ in T ~"='~"" "'"' "'~"'"*"',f'I~~ ;!".,_.. r~HA iMrr~+~ J\~,l "'~ "("'Tl,. .... ~~ .......... '-~ . ...,," 4,. ..... ¥<."' ';">,..,,..,,, 'fi"'·"p"'..., ~~:"::~!'f~ ~!:::;. ~ 
; j 24 in that fight for that child advocacy, a lawyer 24 we pulled together. What you took from me in a 25 was in that meetin . And he said: I have a child 25 marria e, ave :;ihort marria e that should have 
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1 been nothing but wedding bliss and happiness. 
2 Remember Jimmy? You liked him. You really did. 
3 He was a wonderful guy, wasn't he? 
4 We were planning to get married in 
5 December. We gave up our wedding plans because of 
6 the crime that you did. So we moved it up and 
7 quietly got married. And instead of going on a 
8 honeymoon, I was sitting in here in court; so was 
9 he. 
; 10 And you remember how what a great man 
11 of faith he was? We left this courtroom at the 
12 preliminary. hearing. We didn't even get out of 
13 the driveway area there, and Jimmy broke down. He 
14 cried. And he says: Kathy, out of all your 
1 ~ children, over the last two years - because it 
16 was just me and Kathleen -- I loved Kathleen, he 
17 said. And I sit in the courtroom, and I want to 
18 kill him. I want to kill him for what he did, 
19 that he took Kathleen from me. Jimmy, you took 
20 . her from - Kathleen from Jimmy. 
21 And it shook him. It shook him. · It 
22 shook his faith. And Jimmy got sick, seriously 
23· sick. And he went in the hospital to have 
24 surgery. And he got out on Kathleen's birthday. 
25 And instead ofus bein totally conunittedto ·ust 
1903 
1 getting him well, we held each other in each 
2 other's arms and cried because it was Kathleen's 
3 birthday. 
4 And then he went back in the hospital 
5 again. And on May 4th in middle of the night 
a after midnight, I reached up to him and crawled in 
7 next to him in the hospital bed, and we cried · 
8 again because it was
 day to be bom. 
9 '.!;he next day, Jimmy coded. We were married six 
1 o stinking months. And in that time, you stole some 
11 precious time because of what you have done. · 
12 Instead of being joyful, we cried in each other's · 
13 arms over the loss of Kathleen and 
 Bree.· 
14 I have not been able to go bad to my 
15 ranch. Passing the stone, the monument, the cross 
16 where you murdered her. I literally abandoned it. 
17 Pipes broken, more than a third of my trees are 
18 dead. 
1904 
1 · more. When I came from Africa, they had that 
2 place at least where I could move back in. I have 
3 been back there two weeks. And, you know, I have 
4 not gotten through ·a day in my life since 
5 Kathleen's.death that I have not cried. 
6 I am living in that house. And even 
7 with all the joy and. the people trying to help me, 
8 I go into Kathleen's room. And just like Jessica, 
9 I have a bag.of the clothes that she had in the 
10 hamper and put it in this plastic bag so I could 
11 still smell the scent of my daughter. 
12 I have a little rocking chair that she 
13 had since she was a child. I have every one of 
14 her toys and stuffed toys since she was an infant. 
15 She was going to give that to
 Bree. 
16 · You need to tell your parents the 
17 fruth, that you do have a problem. They don't 
1 B even know the extent of your violence. And once 
19 again, it is not an excuse to do what you did .. Do 
20 not use it as a crutch. You made an adult 
21 decision'. 
22 And you tried it once before when you 
23 were going to the base. You kicked her out of the 
24 car, and you tried to run her down. Kathleen says 
25 to me, "Mom, I am really afraid of him. I reall 
1905 
think he meant it." 1 
2 And you know what I did? "Well, maybe 
3 he was just trying to scare you." I didn't know 
· 4 the monster that you were. And I regret that I 
5 didn't protect my daughter more than I should 
6 have, and I have to.live with that, because I 
7 didn't see the monster. 
8 I am on disability from work. Because 
9 after the trial started up again, I was losing so 
10 much weight, and I have so many medical problems 
11 and stress-related disorders because I could not 
12 deal with this. 
13 I don't know if I can go back to the 
14 Department of Corrections. I don't know if I' can. 
15 I have all kinds of awards. I have 
16 acknowledgements from the Governor's office. I 
17 loved to get up in the morning and go to work. I 
18 have a passion for it. You knew that. You saw it 19 You loved it out there, too, Al. If · 19 in me. I have talked to you about it. 
20 you saw it, you would see it now as the wreckage 20 Where is my life going to go from here? 21 
22 
of the life that I have and myfamily has now. ·21 I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. Each 
It was only two weeks ago, bx the grace 22 day is a survival. Each day is painful. Will it 
23 of my family, my church family and friends, where · 23 ever go away? I don't think it is goir1g to go . 
24 I was in Africa doing God's work-- because I 24 away. Is there closure? What does closure mean? 
25 didri't lose my faith; sur rise, it stren thened me 25 I have no idea what that means. 
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1 I look at my children and how much I 
2 love them and how proud I am of thel'Xl and how proud 
3 I am of their father. that he came through at the 
4 · end to help her get on her feet because we all' 
5 loved Kathleen so much. · · 
8 And I am so proud of the Mountain Home 
· 7 Police and the sherif£'s office for their 
8 compassion ;md the. work they have done. · God bless . 
9 you, Mike. God blt?Ss you, Cathy. Clint, the 
10 secretarial staff, everybody; Go~ bless you alt 
11 I love you all for the help, my church. 
12 
13. 
I hav:e been truiy l;)lessed. The Lord 
has shown a tremendous .amount of grace on me. He 
14 has gotten me through each day. I just d~n't know 
15 if the pain is going to go away. I will continue 
18 to do his work in ministry. I will go .back to 
17 Africa. 
.. 
18 Butlpraythathetakesmesoon. I 
19 pray he takes me soon. I want to be with my 
daughter. J want to be with my granddaughter. I 
want to hold her in my arms; I want to feel 
20 
21 
22 Kathleen's thick black shiny hair, I want to see 
23 h~ big smile. I want to hear her.)aughter. . 
24 Yeah, I want to fight with her, too. 
25 You hurt me for takin m dau hter. 
1907 
1 But, Al, you hurt me personally. That night when 
2 yqu.said J was a good mother, you put your arm 
3 around, me, and you promised you would leave her 
4 alone if it d~dn't w~rk. 
5 I pr?ty that you never see the light of. 
6 day .outside of prison. And you know I worked at 
the prison. You will survive: It's not as bad as 7 
a you thi~k it is, Yqu get conq.itioned to it. rve 
9 had offenders I'm working with that they 
1 O deijb,erately told me that they were committing a 
crime to go back in there. It became family to 
them. 
11 
12 
13 )'ou will create your own little family 
14 in there. You won't even think. You get up. You 
15 have breakfast. You don't even have to work if 
16 you don't want to. It is too good for you. 
17 Oh, there's some program, too, you 
18 might get into. But they don't have the programs, 
19 the domestic violence. They have anger 
20 management. Your risk based on theoretical 
21 practices~ best practices, that you're always at · . 
22 risk to reoffend if you are in the right situation 
21 1Arith tA.romPn T tP?r th"'~ if un11 .,,,,,.,. :"'• ,-,.11+ .f-1,.,,t 
· 1908 
1 witl be with my daughter again. I.will be with my 
2 granddaughter, and I will t,e with Jimmy. And 
3 we're all going to dance before the Lord; But ·. 
4 you're·goingto gq in front of t{jnton jUdgment 
5 day, and your sins are going to be shown before 
6 you. Alld vengeance is mine1 says th~ Lord: l:{is, . 
7 wrathi$ horrible. You will burn in.hell. You · 
. a • will feij the'pajn\ 
,9 
.. 10 
11 
But as a Christian;l pray for }'.()U .each 
day. Maybe you will give y~ntrself to th~ Lord; 
Maybe you willhave that peace I d~n't kn,ow. 
12 That's between you and Himi· But He'wilfnevet 
13 _take the consequen~e of.your chqi~s a.way~. Yo;u 
14 pay foryotlt cho'ices; Yo1,1:may have peace in your 
15 heart, and maybeJ have seen you have·it · Idon;t 
16 ki;tow. I dotft know. · ·· · · 
17 Butif yo,u read th.e sc.ripture or{David, . 
18 who is a m~n after God's own heart, had an affair 
and had her husband inurdered,· He asked for God's 19 
20 forgiveness, and he repented. And God took hilµ 
21 into his arms~ But David still lived with the' · 
22 consequences·of those choices. For generations it 
23 affected his family; · 
24 . What you hav\';! done wiU affect . 
25 eneratfons ohn famil and ours. Yous~tin 
1909 
1 your cell, and you thi~ <\b.out that. You pick.tJ.P 
2 a Bible and start readingit. · B~use that's the · · 
3 only thing that's going to hold. you together Ill. 
4 there and give you any kind of peace or any .kind 
5 of freedom. 
6 To forgive you, that's going to ~ave to 
7 be grace from God. I am tryin& but my . 
8 forgiveness does not mean that r' don't .want you to 
· 9 pay for the crime you have done. 
1 O Once again, I ask that he not be. 
11 released from prison ever, without parole. And 
12 what I did put in my statement is the Lacey. 
13 Peterson case in California. Same crime. Very 
14 similar characteristics of everything. He got the 
15 death penalty. 
16 For you to be in prison with life 
17 without chance of parole is a gift from the State. 
18 of Idaho. You ruined this community. You have 
19 hurt this community. People knew Kathleen, and 
20 they loved her. 
21 I can't even go to.Wal-Mart without the 
22 photo lady knowing it. I can't go to Home Depot 
. ?1: h,-, ~!"l"'f' T~~h<f'l ,u;i.h~n+ r-r~~~ft·H·ia ;-n-4-n 'h!""',.. 
... . 24 you will kill or hurt another woman. 24 schoolmates. And you know, he broke down crying 2S And the last thin I want to sa is~ 25 at Home De ot when he saw me. Ever where I o Nicole Omsberg, Official .Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho Page 1906 to 1909 of 1954 
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1 there is a reminder of my daughter, of the pain, 
2 and the pain I see in others. God forgive yolL 
3 TIIE COURT: Thank you. 
4 · MR. BAZZOLI: State has no further 
. 5 witnesses, Your Honor. 
6 · TIIE COURT: Very well. Mr. Ratliff, 
7 witnesses for the defendant. 
8 MR. RATLIFF: None, Judge. 
9 THE COURT: Very well. Then the State may 
10 make its argument with regard to sentence. 
11 MR. BAZZOLI: Thank you, Your Honor. 
12 Usually after the victim itnpact 
13 statements; Your Honor, there is not much I can 
14 add to this court's considerations in these 
15 matters, because they say it better than I ever 
16 could. 
17 I never had the oppottui'lity to meet 
; 18 Kathleen outside or the investigation in this 
19 courtroom; But over the last two years, I 
20 certainly got to know her through her family arid 
21 through the facts and circumstances that 
22 surrounded her death. 
23 Arid this court has sat in here for 
24 thtee weeks, a month and listened to ·the attorneys 
25 ' ar e back and forth and listened to the evidence 
1911 
1912 
1 a case of the ultimate outcome of domestic 
· 2 violence. There can be no higher crime against 
3 society and against a person in our system of 
4 legal justice and our morality. than the death of a 
5 person. It is the ultimate violation. 
6 This was not an instantaneous 
7 situation. This was not a heat of passion. This 
8 was not, at least in the State's experience and in 
9 the jury's deliberations, an accident. This.was 
10 willful and with purpose. 
11 This idea that Mr. Ciccone brings up in 
12 his PSI that he left in a huff and lost control of 
13 the vehicle was not played out or borne out by the 
14 facts. 
15 The more he continues to try and say it 
16 is so doesn't make it any more true. The.physical 
17 evidence was the physical evidence. Mr. Occone 
18 had a very able attorney who argued at length 
19 against the evidence and presented his own 
20 evidence in support of his position and hill 
21 defense, and the jury didn't buy it. 
22 What we have is a very beautiful, very 
23 young woman who grew up in this community, who was 
24 an activ.e member of it, who had friends and family 
·25 here. The court got to meet her friends, got to 
1913 1 as well and heard things that the jury didn't get 1 hear what they said about her. 2 to hear, and you kept out evidence of things. 2 I think it is without debate that 3 · The jury decided, twelve people, beyond 3 Kathleen was a very lively young person. She 4 all reasonable doubt. Despite what's in the 4 loved life. She went out and danced. She loved 5 pre-sentence investigation, the system did work. 5 her family, and she loved her friends and would do 6 Twelve people of Albert's Ciccone's peers from 6 anything for them, 
7 · this community sat in here through countless hours 7 And in March or April of 2003, she met 8 and heard legally admissible evidence and decided, 8 Albert Ciccone, a very charismatic young military 9 based on the facts, in a very expeditious manner, 9 man, Air Force man working his way up the ranks. 10 unanimously decided that Albert Ciccone 10 He was a DJ at the local bar playing music. There 11 intentionally, unlawfully, with malice 11 was an instant attraction. Everybody said that 12 aforethought, premeditatiofir murdered his wife. 12 she went out to the house to bring her new 13 Arid also believed that intentionally 13 boyfriend out there a week or two weeks after they 14 · arid unlawfully with malice aforethought and 14· met. 
15 without premeditation murdered his unborn 15 Kathy Figueredo also talked about· 16 daughter, his unbom child. We call it a fetus in 16 seeing her, how happy she was, how head over heels 17 court That's fine. I think we all see the 17 and giggly. She had never brought out a boyfriend 18 picture. · We all know it is a fetus by statute, 18 to meet her parents. It was a woman who fell head 19 and the statute covers.her death. 19 over heels in love with Albert Ciccone very 20 This is a case of domestic violence. 20 quickly .. 21 Everybody knew that. We had numerous debates and 21 Yeah, like most couples, I think all of 22 arguments. And what was purple? Why was the 22 us have experienced, and both defense and 23 color purple so significant? Because the family 23 prosecution brought up, this was a turbulent 24 had been present here today and other members of 24 relationship of ups and downs. If you look at -25 this communit have reco ized that this is trul 25 this court I know has seen man , many cases in the Nicole Omsberg, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 11 of 22 sheets 
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1914 . 1916 1 last three years of sentencing of domestic 1 They find out they're pregnant a week 2 violence and domestic battery, the common traits 2 to two weeks after they are married. After ~ey 
.3 amongst them, Isolation is one of them, making 3 have decided to get married again, everybody 4 them not have a job, controlling the money, 4 scrambles around to give her a wed.ding. Two weeks 5 controlling the phone, controlling the cars, 5 after, they find out they are pregnant, and 
( 
( 
' ( 
( 
( 
( 
(J controlling where they live and how they live, 6 everybody is happy. ( 7 making sure that person is not able to network 7 Within two weeks after that, we have a out,. isoiating them away from what they know. 8 . the situation where he kicked her out of the home. ( 9 He's mad at her because she is with her friends. 9 But ~e says she left three or four times. Her ( 1 o When that doesn't work, .then it eventually turns 10 friends say he kicked her out. He makes comment ( 11 more physical. It doesn't have to be--we are 11 on how I wish she would die. I wish she would get 12 not sitting here saying that Mr. Ciccone beat her 12 an abortion. Again, I guess you have to believe ( 13 into a hospital. Noting that family members . 13 her friends over him because he said that never ( 14 observed on the night of Jessica's engagement 14 happened. ( 15 party, Chris Terry got up and testified. he 1~ He kicks her out. She has to leave her_ ( 16 observed him punching her and pushing her in_ the 16 home while she is pregnant. They reconcile agail\. 17 chest, putting his finger in her chest. 17 He comes over --.he kicks her out again, comes ( 18 . He also observed bruises on her arms 18 over, and then we have this little seizure they . . · ( 19 which Albert admitted to her family and to her 19 mention with his diabetes. He calls·it I think a ( 20 friends that that's where he grabbed her and shook 20 · panic attack or something. The ambulance is 21 her. He may have denied it in the PSI, but that's 21 called. They take him to the hospitat nothing is ( 22 what he told .. her friends. 22 wrong. Now she goes back to him. Reconciliation. ( 23 Maybe everybody - when you look at.the 23 A few weeks later, things get bad ( 24 response to the pre-sentence investigationr 24 again. He kicks her out, and then he says he is 25 eve bod who has an thin ne alive to_ sa is 25 oin. to tr and commit suicide. He sa s he tried · ( 
.___.:........;,_..;......._ __ __,,____, ___ ........,...19!',-.,1,...,,,5-. --+---'"---_.,.-"-_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 .._,._......,.1..,,...91=7=------I ( 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
making it up. It's all lies. 1 to hang himself, but' the rope didn't work. It is About this three-way phone 2 inter.esting that I think in Mr. Parker's conversation, he never had one. He didn't know. 3 statement, his roommates' statements, that they Michael - I am trying to remember - there's two 4 never found a rope in the house. very close names together-. Her and Jessica -- her 5 He says he drank a half bottle of and Kathleen were on the phone, and they did a 6 acetone .. He goes to the hospital, yet th~re is no litt}e three-way calling, and she never told her 7 medical problems with him. I find it amazing you 8 · or told him th.at the other person was on the 8 can drin~ a half bottle of nail polish and not 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
j24 
25 
phone. Kathleen knew about it. They were talking 9 even ha.ve a stomach ache. about it. · · 10 He's then taken over to Intennountai:l;l, This is -- this shaking and bruising, · 11 and eventually he decides that he i~ better afte~ , .. as he tells Chris, welL h,e did .a roll-down 12 two or three weeks there. He tried to kill . maneuver ori her, which is what he was taught ih 13 himself. Reconciliation. the military in· cases of controlling people in a 14 The family talked about meeting him ~d,. riot. He did a little roll-down maneuver, and 15 talking to him durlng that time: And initially he. that's how she must have got bruised. 16 blamed her. And then he says, well, nobody else's , Chris is, you know, confused as 17 fault but mine. He wants to get a divorce during anybody. He do_esn't like it, but they have to 18 that time. He's planning on divorcing her. He respect what Kathleen does. They break up that 19 gets out less than two weeks before she is dead. night, and he tears off in his bright yellow Dodge 20 His family has come out and supported Neori, abandoning her down there. Everybody has to 21 him during that time fra~e. Then you have this · give her rides home. And sometime in the middle 22 reconciliation. You have the conversations that 
.,.. 
.. 
,I Fight, argue reconcile. Flowers, candy, calls, I where he talked about coming out to her house and love you, come back to me. 25 s en.din hours tr in to work it out. Sta in Nicole Omsberg, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 
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1918 1920 1 away, coming back. They talked on the phone. 1 What did he say in his PSI? I think 
:2 They start working on it. 2 that she became really sensitive to smells, and 3 But. they still go through this period 3 his roommate had bad body odor. That's what was 4 during that ·time, remember, after he has gotten 4 making her sick, so they had to move out. I don't 5 out of lntermountain Hospital that he finds out 5 know if that's true or not,.but ifs an · 6 he's got chlamydia. Immediately/ of course, he 6 interesting proposal, I guess, that she continued 7 blames her •. She also has it. I. don't know who 7 to be sick, then went out and lived with her mom 8 had it or who gotit or how: they g<;>qt. I.don't 8 at her mom's ~ouse: . . · 9 particularly care. But we do know. that he is 9 He came and picked her'up after work 10 blamingher,.·He goes t~ ~he hospital. He's 10 happy as a clam that day. I think this turbul~nce 11 screaming mad. They have to pµt him in a separate· 1.1 and this,up and down is not only from Kathleen, . 12 room'. He.wants to get tested. He is blaming her. 12 but also from Albert Ciccone. One moment he hated 13 This where he is screaming at her, calllng her 
14 fat~ calling her a bitch, calling her a slut, 
15 driving out to the Air Force base and then leaves 
16 her at the hospital. His pregnant wife, he leaves 
17 her and drives off. 
Well, anybody in that situation would 
be mad enough to leave him. And according to 
20 her -- while the court had heard it and it didn't 
I 18 
19 
21 come m in front of the jury, but this is the 
l 22 sentencing; I don't have to worry about those 
23 · cypes ofthings -'" he tries to run her down, 
24 . supposedly. That's what she tells one of her 
25 . . frieriq~ .twen or thir minutes later; and her 
1919 
13 her; the next minute he loved her:. He couldn't 
.14 decide which, Even his ownfriend from years s.it 
15 up :- Ch~rles Boardwine said h~ seemed really 
16 happy thatday that he talked to him, that they 
17 · were going to go to family counseling .. 
18 Even Albert, in his three-and-half or 
19 four-hour interview with Detective Wolfe, talked 
20 al;>out the counseling and how great it was because, 
21 as I recall, for purposes of the conversation 
22 there, the doctor told her that she was spending 
23 too much time with her friends, that she needed to 
24 focus. Remember in the thing, he's like, yeah, I 
25 final! felt like here is somebo.d ·. tellin per 
1921 1 mother. 1 what I felt already. That's not me that's screwed 2 . She had .to get off of the ~ide ofthe 2 up. She is the one who is screwed up. She is the 3 road because he would have hit her, and she was 3 one out ruining this relationship because she is·. 4 afraid. This was within seven cir nine days before 4 spending too much time with her friends. 5 she is dead. He kicked her out of the car. That 5 Dr. Neff said he did advise her that 8 · isolation, that control of every move. That's 6 she probably needed to spend less time with her 7 domestic battery. That's domestic violence. 7 friends and focus on the relatfonship. And then 8 And then: the reconciliation~ taking her 8 he spun up Albert, as he says. He got real angry 9 around, showing her how much he cares. He takes 9 and real mad to where he stomped out of the room. 1 o her to the hospital now. The staff there, as they 10 Kathleen says: See, that's what he does. He gets 11 testified, are in shock, amazed. They see them 11 mad, yells, and leaves the room: Eventually he· 12 together now interacting where just a few days 12 comes back in and everything seems to be happy 13 before he was screaming that he wanted a divorce, 13 again. 
14 he wanted to get rid of her. 14 Going back in this thing, we also get 15 She goes in to try and get counseling. 15 the base housing thing, where he has got the base 16 We saw this. Was there a history of domestic · 16 housing for them. This high and low, these peaks 17 abuse? Yes. She check-marked it. That was taken 17 and his inabilicy to decide on a course of action, 18 out for the jury's consideration. She told them 18 this love and hate. 
19 there was a history of domestic; abuse. 19 He is telling Charles Boardwine how 20 The reports come back in that she .is at 20 happy he is. At. the same time, within a period of 21 a high risk. Somehow they still go to -- a couple 21 time, he says he doesn't think the baby is his. 22 days later, go to family counseling. She is the 22 He wants to have a DNA test done. The highs and 23 one who set it up. She's the one who went there. I 23 lows, the peaks of this domestic violence. 24 He came and picked her up. She had been sick as a 24 We go through the PSI, and we finally 25 do durin this entire situatio11. 
. 25 et a little bit of the sto I because remember it Nicole Omsberg, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 13 of 22 sheets 
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· 1 took to the second day before he admitted to Kathy 
2 Wolfe that there was something other than a snit. 
3 We had a little argument because I fishtailed 
4 around the corner in the dirt. I don't know why 
5 she got out of the car and walked to per friend's 
6 house'. I don't know why she would have been that 
7 angry. It was just a little snit we had, a jiff. 
8 . The second day, when we had aci;ually 
9 gone out and completed some of the investigation, 
1 O we find this string of food and -- because we 
11 couldn't figure out - I r~member going out there 
12 . the night of the investigation. Somebody was 
13 trying to put together the time frame. Somebody 
14 said: Oh, well, Albert said they had gone to 
15 Burger King that night. I remember watching the 
16 interview that night with Detective Wolfl;! an,d 
17 going: If they went to Burger King, where is the 
18 food? Where is the bag of food? We didn't know 
19 where it was October 16th, ·2003. 
20 . The next day Captain Barclay goes out 
21 and calls and comes b.ack to Detectiye Wolfe and 
22 said: We found the food. It is thrown all over 
23 their driveway. And here is her sweater. And 
24 here is her purse. And here's all of her 
25 medicatiqn -- here's her ills and m~dication 
1923 
1 pills. And there is scuff marks, and there is· 
2 marks in the dirt where it looks like she has been 
3 on the ground. 
4 You look at the PSI, and Albert says 
5 she got pissed because they were talking about 
6 child eare. She got so mad, she started throwing 
7 everything. She is the one who threw all the 
8 food. I had to wipe the food off of me and get 
9 . out of the car .. 
10 · Istill find it surprising that 
11 Kathleen, after being pregnant and sick so long, 
12 that she had to go get an IV, was so upset or so 
13 angry or so calm, however you want to look at it, 
14 that she's going to throw all the food, drop her 
15 purse, leave her sweater. Maybe she threw a fit 
16 and laid on the ground. I don't know. 
17 But _instead of walking to the nearest 
18 point, which was her mother's home where her 
19 mother was not, she got up or stood there -- I 
20 don't care which-- and walked all the way from 
21 the driveway back to the main road, then back 
22 towards Darlene Shaw's residence, back towards the 
1924 
1 Kathleen was very friendly. She had gone over and 
2 got her dogs out of the yard. It's not like this 
3 is a family that they are social with. 
4 She goes back to that house and walks 
5 back down that street. Now, we timed it. Captain 
6 Barclay testified and did a presentation for the 
7 jury. About a minute and 47 seconds, which Albert 
8 Ciccone says he sat in the front seat of his car, 
9 lit a cigarette, smoked a cigarette, put his seat 
10 belt back on, got all this iituff out and watch.ed 
11. his wife walk down the road. It is an eternity. 
12 It is a long time. 
13 One thing that I think Kathy Figueredo 
14 -- many things she said was there was a choice . 
15 th~t was made at that time. He had. many times 
16 where he loved.her and many times w;hen he hated 
17 her. At that moment -- there's only one person in 
18 this room who knows what that fight was about, 
19 what really happened there, what was reaUy said. 
20 But during that time, he made a choice. The 
21 choice was not between love and hate or life and 
22 death. The choice he made was to hate her with 
23 such a passion and such a fury and such an ariger 
24 that he ran her down with his car. He used his 
25 car as a deadl wea on. It would be no differe:tit 
: 1925 
1 if he pointed a gun at her and pulled the trigger 
2 and the bullet found its mark. 
3 Al:i the officer - as the accident 
4 reconstructionist said, he was doing about fifty 
5 miles an hour, according to his best estimate, . 
6 when he hit her. However, that.number was awfully 
7 low because that didn't account for the fact that · 
8 she hit the fence. God knows how fast he·was 
9 . · actually gping. If she hadn't hit that fence, 
10 thatnumberwouldbehigher. 
.,, , 
11 That was the.ultimate decision in. 
12. domestic violence. The back and forth, the 
13 blaming, the fights, everything else, the controL 
14 No one is going to walk away again. 
15 The court has the investigation report 
16 from OSI and has the statements in the PSI from 
17 . his first wife who says that their relationship 
18 was a case of domestic battery. Mr. Ratliff 
1.9 rightly /lays, well, you've got to look at her. 
20 That's.the ex-wife. Of course, she is going to 
21 say bad things. All ex".'wives say bad things about 
22 them. Maybe that's true. Maybe she made up the ?1 hf"\HCiPr ~~,1,~r~ oh~ ,-u-:icn*t f..-;.on~o 'f,VH·h fh~ q~ .... ~-':TC Tl< ?.~ ~,H""' il,-.;~t'P ~..,,t- An""!~?"'~ ~~;;;·~i"' ~'!'"':"'!"' ~'!<'"!',....~ 
24 is not like Megan Shaw was her best little friend. j 24 .touched he'"'~. 
25 The had ridden the bus. The knew each other. 25 Let's also remember that Albert also 
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State of Idaho vs. Albert A. Ciccone= June 7, 2005 ---------------------:-=-=-::------,..--------..:._.---------..,,.....---1926 .- 1928 1 said that he never touched Kathleen. The PSI says 
2 I never touched her. 'Th,is isn't a domestic 
3 battery. This is an accident. I'd never do that. 
4 I'd never hurt her. That's not true. He did. He 
5. consistently hurt her. He grabbed her. He poked 
6 her in the chest. He shook her so hard and 
7 grabbed her hard enough to leave bruises on her 
8 arms. 
9 Domestic violence is a case of lies and 
1 O manipulation. And that's what we have from Albert 
11 Ciccone, lies and manipulations; The military 
12 people all play that out. That's what they all 
13 call it. 
14 The impact cannot be understated on this 
15 family and on this community of this crime .. 
16 Darlene and Megan Shaw are present in the 
17 courtroom today. They were the first two 
18 witnesses to testify at the preliminary hearing. 
19 They have been witnesses probably I think even the 
20 fitst to testify at the trial. 
21 Megan Shaw, while she is not a direct 
22 victim of this case, has been impacted by watching 
23 through her front window the death of he'r 
24 
25 
neighbor, the death of the girl that she used to 
ride.the school.bus withbecaus_e they were 
1927 
1 assigned the same seat 
2 This is not some stranger or car wreck 
3 that all of us drive by and do the looky-loo --
4 sorry, I shouldn't create words for the court 
5 reporter -- and we rubber-neck and look at on the 
6 side of the road and, ooh, I wonder who that is. 
7 This. was somebody they knew. This was 
8 their neighbor and a friend. And Darlene came out 
9 and was with her and said a prayer for her while 
10 she laid there and died alone because Albert 
11 Ciccone got up and walked away. And she knew she 
12 was pregnant. 
13 Megan has had nightmares. She has had 
14 trouble sleeplng. Her grades were affected.at 
15 school. She wound up having to get out of school 
16 and do home schooling. It is cause and effect. 
17 This crime that was committed by Albert 
18 Occone doesn't just impact him and his freedom. 
19 It has trapped and imprisoned all of her family, 
20 all of her friends. The people who watched this 
21 case have been affected by this, people in her 
22 c_hurch. 
23· !n a way, looking through this and in 
24 talking with the parents and the family and 
2& . getting to know them, each one of them has died, 
1 A part of them will never be able to be that happy 
2 again. 
3 They are not up here telling you this 
4 was a saint, this was an.angel. She was a girl. 
5 - She was sister, a daughter, an aunt, a niece. She 
6 fought with her sisters and brothers, as everyone 
7 does. They are not here saying that she couldn't 
8 stand up for herself and she _couldn't argue and 
9 swear and curse with the best of them, because she 
10 did. She was a human being. She was a life. She 
11 was a part of this community that we will never 
12 get back. 
13 I highlighted some of the statements in 
14 the written ones because I talked to the family, 
· 15 and we knew that their oral statentents would be 
16 different. 
17 From her dad, Bill: "This call came 
18 while the accident investigation was still going 
19 on. And when Jessica called me back a little 
20 later, she told me that Kathleen had been run over 
21 by Albert. The depression I felt deepened. She 
22 didn't die in an accident, which was bad enough. 
23 She was murdered by her husband, a man who was 
24 supposed to take care of her. 
25 "Full of heartache and pain. I will 
1929 
1 never again know· the joy of Kathleen. I will 
2 never even be able to know the joy of my fifth 
3 grandchild. That joy was taken away from me by 
4 Albert Ciccone. I never nor will I ever forgive 
5 him for that." 
.6 "My wish is that Albert go to prison for 
7 life without parole and does not get out of prison 
a until my daughter Kathleen and her baby are 
9 released from their prison of death." 
10 Jessica writes: "On October 16th, 2003, 
11 the family I love was destroyed. Her death caused 
12 more pain than I was able to process. For months 
13 I cried myself to sleep. I cried in my dreams. I 
14 cried when a memory passed through my head. There 
15 have been many memories I can share, but not near 
16 as many as there could have been. That area in my 
17 mind will forever be empty and incomplete. 
18 "I know we share the same pain, disgust, 
19 anger, and lack of understanding for such a 
20 repulsive act of violence out of all of their 
21 friends and family." 
22 "In closing, for the rest of my life 
23 when I visit my little sis~er" ·~ I am sorry. 
24 T'nis is Chris Terry: ''In dosing, for the rest of 
25 my life when I visit my little sister, I have to 
Nicole Otnsberg, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho · 15 of 22 sheets 
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1 stare at a small wall of stone with her name 
2 carved on it. If that is not chilling enough, I 
3 will be standing above a fancy metal box. 
4 containing her decomposing remains. And that's 
5 where I have to accept that's the closest I can 
6 physically be to her. 
7 "The reason she is there will never be 
8 understood on any level. Twenty-two years old 
9 should be the start of. an amazing adventure, not 
10 the end chosen by someone with less to live for. 
11 I love you, Kathleen, because without you, I 
12 couldn't have been me." 
13 This is from Jessica: 'The day Albert 
14 cruelly left my sister lying on the side of the 
15 rqad dead, I died as well. When somebody dies 
16 that is so dose to you that they are a piece of 
17 you as well as your life, losing them is losing 
18 yourself. It is almost like you are an infant 
19 learning how to walk again."· 
20 "Albert destroy~d our love and 
21 commitment to each other. We have all been 
22 cheated of the great happiness my sister brought 
23 us. Vve will miss how. the room glowed and filled 
24 with laughter whenever she was around. 
25 "A husband is someone who rotects and 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1931 
loves and would do .anything in their power to keep 
their wife and child safe. I am positive Albert 
knows this, and he willingly chose the opposite 
and murdered his wife and child." 
A letter from the defendant's sister, 
6 Anna, notes: "Frustratfon, anger, hurt, 
7 loneliness, depression, sorrow, pain, boredom, all 
1932 
1 their laughter. And for them to have to continue 
2 every time there could be the possibility of 
3 parole to relive this horror, over and over again 
4 and continue - because I think the court is well 
5 aware that this is not a family who is going to go 
6 . away and is not going to follow this case.:_ for 
7 them to have to go in front of the parole board 
8 and have to argue over and .over again for why 
9 Albert should be there is going to ~ontinue to 
10 devastate and continue to destroy. 
11 You have got Kathleen Figueredo, the 
12 mother of many children, a person who has 
13 dedicated her life to something greater than the 
14 service to just herself, saying that she prays 
15 that God will take her soon so she can go be with 
16 her daughter. I know that she has thought about 
17 that. And I know the idea that she has to -- she 
18 has other family and other kids w.ho are going to 
19 have to e2qntinue to keep on living. There is 
20 probably going to be other grandchildren in the . 
21 future. 
22 That's pain, and that's pain of somebody 
23 who will never be able to stop grieving. And to 
24 continue to force them to go through this and 
25 relive this b comin to sentendn s down the 
1933 
1 road, I don't think it can be justified in this . 
2 case. 
3 That would basically be a sentence 
4 without end, as WUHam Terry said. And I think 
5 it is appropriate in this case that Albert 
6 Ciccone's sentence can end when Kathleen's 
7 sentence ends. 8 of these emotions seem tp come out in fits of rage s You know, we come to these cases, an<i 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
in both Albert and his father and our family." 9 there are no winners; there is only losers. The. That pretty well sums up why we are here 10 fact that.a jury convicted him means that they. today. Your Honor, I am asking that the court 11 found beyond a reasonable doubt all the elem.ents impose a maximum sentence it can under both Count 12 of murder in the first degree and murder in.the,, I and Cou11t II, life without the possibility of 13 second degree, the dec1th of two human beings. · ·· parole. I think the facts of this case, the 14 And when you kill somebody, the native heinous nature of the crime, the complete 15 Americans and other religions believe that it disregard for hunian life, the life of Kathleen and 16 takes seven generations of life to go by to the life of
 Bree demand justice. I 17 replace what they would have contributed. think in this case, life without the possibility 18 We will never know what 
 Bree of parole is the only justice left in this case. 19 could have become. She could have become a It is the fact that if you offer 20 lawyer, a doctor, a judge, a mother, a wife, a something less than that, and Albert Ciccone will 21 garbage woman, a mail delivery person. rt doesn't be able to walk around a free man after this 22 matter. When you take a life, you take away ")"!a ,.......;......,,,, ~r-..,. rl,,..._ 1n 4,,J...- f,,,..,..n ,__ ,..:t,.,.~,.. t...,,...-.,:1.,,. <"\".) ..... ,,,,.,.....__., .. ._1,..,.;_,_,..,. A4=.,....,., ,..._.,...,_ i...-_. ..... -- ~ _.,. ..... _ .... +L.:_ ~ -.1 ... -"!" -1--Hl 24 The ~ourt has heard their impact. The I 2~ ever'becom~. ,, 
25 court has heard their cries and their tears and 25 There is no ability in this case to Nicole Omsberg, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho Page 1930 to 1933 of 1954 
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1936 1 replace these two lives. I think Albert Ciccone 
2 has destroyed the Terry family. He has destroyed 
3 this community. He took away from the world 
4 people who would make it better, and he destroyed 
5 his own family. 
6 I can't imagine what they go through 
7 when they think of the thought of their son having 
8 committed murder. I can't - I sympathize with 
9 them, as Kathy Figueredo has, as all the other 
1 o members have said. They don't blame his family. 
11 They don't hate him or hate his family. 
12 There are no winners in this case. 
13 There's nothing but shattered lives from 
14 everybody. And Albert Arnold Ciccone deserves to 
15 spend the rest of his life, day in, day out, in 
16 prison thinking about those consequences. Thank 
17 you. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bazzoli. 
19 Counsel, before we take up the defense 
20 arguments, I think it wotlld be appropriate to take 
21 a brief break. We will be in recess for 15 
' 22 minutes and come back in at five minutes to 11:00. 
23 (Recess.) 
24 MR. BAZZOLI: Your Honor, before the defense 
. 25 be ins; I have one other little brief thin 
1935 
1 insuranee policy on the victim herself where she 
2 was -- although his parents were named as 
3 beneficiaries. And that's an issue for a civil 
4 case to determine. But we would request the court 
5 order those fines. Thank you. 
6 THE COURT: And you do not have a 
7 restitution amount to sugg(\!st to the court at this · 
8 time? 
9 MR. BAZZOU: Your Honor, I did not recall 
10 seeing- I looked through the file and looked 
11 through the PSI pretty carefully. I don't recall 
12 seeing a separate restitution. 
13 I know the defense has basically 
14 . already objected to the amount set forth in Ms. 
15 Figueredo's written statement. There are also 
16 some an'lounts set forth in Jessica's statements, 
17 approximately $1400or about $1,600 - sorry-
18 Chris' statement of about 1625 for times he has 
19 appeared on his own in lost wages. 
20 So I think that with the defendant's 
21 objection, I already kind of stated at the 
22 beginning of court that restitution order or 
23 restitution investigation should be conducted and 
24 a report filed and a hearing scheduled. 
25 THE COURT: Th~k ou, Mr. Bazzoli . 
1937 1 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Bazzoli. 1 Mr. Ratliff .. 2· MR. BAZZOLI: Your Honor, I was focused on 2 MR. RATLIFF: Thank you, Judge. 3 sentencing, not focused on restitution. And if 3 As to restitution, Your Honor, we would 4 this court is so inclined, I just filed for 4 concur that if the court is going to or the 5 restitution, a full blown report. And a hearing 5 prosecutor is going to seek restitution, that an 6 would probably be appropriate. 6 investigation be conducted or a report issued and 7 The State is requesting under Idaho 7 myself and the defendant be allowed to have a 8 Code 19-5307, which authorizes the court to order 8 hearing as to that restitution. 9 fines in cases of crimes of violence. It says· 9 As to a fine, Judge -- well, I have got 10 irrespeclive of any penalties set forth under 10 some other argument first. 11 state law, in addition thereto, the Court, atthe 11 When we came into this case, I looked 12 time of sentencing or such later date as deemed 12 at the family and I looked at the jury, and I 13 necessary by the court, may impose a fine not to 13 said: We.were sorry. And I tbld them that Albert 14 exceed $5,000 against any defendant found guilty 14 accepts responsibility for the death of Kathleen 15 of any felony listed in subsection 2. 15 and the unborn fetus. We never denied 16 Under subsection 2, Section 18-4001, 16 responsibility. 17 murder is one of the listed fines contemplated as 17 Albert, in the tapes, the discussions 18 solely a punitive measure against the.defendant. 18 with Cathy Wolfe, claims and continues to claim 19 Shall not be based on any requirement or showing 1.9 and our defense in this case was that it was a 20 of need by the victim. The fine shall not be used 20 tragic accident. And we never wavered from that 21 as a substitute for an order of restitution. 21 position. We have never said no. We have always 22 And then the court authorizes that he 22 accepted responsibility. And so for the family, I 23 may appeal that section of the sentence as any 23 can understand and empathize that they have all I 24 other part of the sentence. I believe there are 24 said, all those people who testified today, life j 25 some assets, and there is actuall a life 25 in rison without the· ossibili of arole. Nicole Omsberg, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 17 of 22 sheets 
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1 I can't agree with that. There is a 
2 couple reasons why. The court is required by 
3 statute to look at more than the victim impacts. 
4 The court is required by statute to take Albert as , 
5 a person, as a defendant convicted, of firs~- and 
6 second-degree murder and look at what society has 
7 in store for Albert. 
8 Al.bert has no prior record .. · He has· no 
9 prior felony convictions. He has no prior · 
1 o misdemeanor convictions, as far ::i:s I can tell. He 
has been a productive member of society. He was 
in the United States Air Poree. He was a staff 
sergeant. He has been.able to contribute. 
11 
12 
13 
14 His EPR's -- and the court has seen 
1940 
1 will have no benefit to this family, it just 
2 doesn't ma.ke sense. It .is punttive, but it is 
3 stupid .. There .is goi:ttg to be restitution. The 
4 question will be how mu.ch and to whom~ That's 
5 where any money as far as a fine--, that's where 
6 that should go. . 
As far as the mention of a life · · ,. 7 
a insh,:~nce policy, I don't know· who the beneficiary 
9 is/if it is Albert's par~ts or ifit is · · 
Kathleen's parents. I really don't know. It's 
· the flri',ttime I have heard about'it - well, 
12 mayl:\;not the firsttime; But it wasn't an issue 
13 in the trial, Juc:lge. It wasn't a motivation like 
14 the. Seversori.'case. It wasn't.relevant, quite 15 those in the pre-sentence investigation -- putline 15 frankly. And the prosecutor and I l:\oth agreed on 16 Albert's al:\ilities, his contribution to society. 16 that. So whatever needs to be done there, we all 17 The statute prohibits the court from 17 know as a matter of law, Albert is not entitled to 18 
19 
imposing a sentence for revenge or vengt:?ance; 18 those proceeds, and he is not claiming those What loss this family has suffered, the pain, the 19 proceeds, never has, never will. · 20 agony, everything they have gone through can never 20 But what's. the chances of 21 
22 
be fixed. It can never replace Kathleen. It 21 rehabilitation? Whafs the chances? Well, the can't happen.. 22 court has been ~t this job long enough now, 23 · So the sentence that.has to be imposed 23 sentenced enough people that you know t~at the 24 
25 
can't be one of vengeance. We can't -- no. 24 history of a person as far as a criminal record is restitution re ort is oin to brin her ~ad<. No 25 a retty goo!,! indjcati<m of where they are gqin 1939 
·. 1941 1 sentence imposed is going to bring both of them 
2 back. 
3 Did Albert's actions destroy the 
4 community? I don't think so. I think the 
5 prosecutor is wrong; Did. it have a negative 
6 impact on the communityJ Absolutely. Did it 
7 destroy the Terry family?· I hope not. Albei;t . 
8 hopes not. Is it pai~ful? Yes. Are they 
9 · suffering? Yes. Do they continue to suffer? 
10 Yes. 
11 But the court is obligated by the 
12 statute to take a look at numerous.factors and 
13 fashion a sentence that will, if possible, be 
. 14 rehabilitative in nature. And that's why it is 
15 important that we hear the statements from these 
16 victims, when we read those statements, that the 
17 emotions that tug at the heart of everybody in the 
18 courtroom don't control what the court has to do. 
19 over the length of Albert's life. 
20 For that reason, Judge, a fine is not 
21 going to do anything but to be an act of 
22 vengeance. It is not going to help; it is going 
1 to be maybe twenty years from now, and you have 
2 l;>een able to judge and sentence accordingly. 
3 I am asking in this sentence that the 
4 cour~ impose a sent.ence that will be concurrent, 
5 that will fashion a. penalty to give Albert a 
6 chance to come back to society and· contribute to 
7 society and also to pay restitution. 
8 Now, th,e statute says life, fixed lif(t 
9 is a possibility, mirµmum of ten years. Where do 
10 you go on this? Do we say Kathleen was 22, Albert 
11 should have to serve 22 years fixed? Maybe. Do 
12 we say that the fetus, the grandchild, never got a 
13 chance to get there? Do we make it fixed life .. 
14 because of the loss of a grandchild? Possibly, •.. 
15 Does that comport or comply and go · 
16 along with Albert Ciccone and the statute? 
17 Because that's-: that's the obligation of the 
18 court. 
19 We understand -· we understand the 
20 pain. We understand the emotions. But we can't 
21 be here in a court of law persuaded to impos~ a 
22 sentence that is based on that emotion. ?~ tn 1--tn~t l.Af'h1,? R·pr~1,o.o 'l"oqtih,+inn iQ l"r~if"& f.(' h~ ?~ T ~'°'"1' 7 .... ~r--.... - .A~'l-r;~ ~hl~ rrh:,""!n~l ~!"'fr"-,.,~<' j 24 ordered, and instead of Albert having to ;,ork to ! 24 work over twenty years, o; this is my twentieth I 25 pay back the State of Idaho throu a fine, whic.11 25 ear, and I have seen more e re ious cases than NI cote bmsberg,, Official .Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho Page 1938 to 1941 of 1954 
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Idaho vs, Albert A. Ciccone - June 7, 
1942 
1 you have so far. And I remember one of the 
2 capital cases, we used to have to look at all of 
3 them and decide where the defendant fit in that 
4 scheme as to whether or not the court should 
5 impose the death penalty. 
6 · Unfortunately, in my twenty years, this 
7 is 11.ot the most egregious case I have seen. I 
8 have seen worse, defended worse. But I think a 
9 fixed life sentence based on Albert Ciccone's 
10 history and conduct in this case is nothing more 
11 than revenge and vengeance. I don't believe it 
12 would be appropriate. 
13 I think it would satisfy the family. I 
14 agree it would satisfy the family, but I don't 
15 think that's what the statute contemplates'. You 
16 have to look at Albert Ciccone based on the PSI, 
17 based on his history, what he has told you either 
18 through me or through the tapes or what he fa 
19 going to tell you through allocution. 
20 So I really don't- I know in my 
21 experience, I would - I do say that fixed life is 
22 not appropriate in this.case.· I can't agree with 
23 the family. I can't agree with the State that 
24 that's an appropriate remedy in this case, because 
25 I don't believe it is. 
1943 
1944 
1 would be fine. 
2 I don't want to -- I don't want to · 
3 cheapen anyone's life anymore. I don't want to 
4 make them sit through appeal after appeal. I just 
5 want to let them get the closure that Kathleen's 
6 mom is looking for and the rest of her family will 
7 be looking for for a long time probably. 
8 And myself, it doesn't matter if I get 
9 closure. What matters is that Kathleen and my 
10 baby are respected and honored by everybody around 
11 here and by this court. 
12 That's all 1 have to say. Thank you. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Ciccone. 
14 Does either counsel have any legal 15 cause to show why sentence should not be imposed 
16 at this time? 
17 MR. BAZZOLJ: No, Your Honor. 
18 MR. RATLIFF: None, Judge. 
19 IBE COURT: Coun:sel, I have reviewed the 
20 pre-sentenee report in this matter as well as the 
· 21 statements attached to that. I have reviewed the 
22 response to the pre-sentence investigation which 
23 was filed by Mr. Ratliff with regard to the · 
24 defense's clarifications concerning the 
25 re-sentence re ort, and th shall be made a art 
1945 1 So I don't have a recommendation as to 1 of the file in this matter. 2 what I think Albert should receive as a sentence, 2 
· I have also reviewed the addendum. I 3 but I don't believe it is fixed life. Thank you. 3 had reviewed it earlier, and I also reviewed it 4 1HE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Ratliff. 4 today in court to be sure that I had seen those 5 Mr; Ciccone, this is your opportunity 5 pieces of correspondence before we proceeded. 6 to address the court with regard to sentencing. 6 Obviously, I sat through the trial in 7 Do you wish to address the court? 7 this matter. I have listened to the arguments of 8 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 8 counsel, and I have listened to the statements of 9 THE COURT: Very well. Then you may do so. 9 the defendant. And the defendant and his counsel 10 1HE DEFENDANT: My attorney said a couple of 10 rnay be seated. 11 times that I never denied the fault of my wife's 11 1 do recognize that I have a great deal 12 death or my child's death, and that's true. But 12 of discretion in sentencing. And I'd note that I 13 hearing him say it and me say it are two totally 13 have considered the nature of the two offenses, 14 different things, On a videotape, it is still 14 and I have considered each of them separately, as 15 · another thing. 15 I am required to do. I have considered the 16 Here in person, hopefully you can see 16 background and character of the offender, and I 17 that I hurt over their deaths, but I can't never 17 have considered mitigating and aggravating 18 fix what went wrong. It still wasn't, even though 18 factors. I have considered the objectives of 19 I have been found guilty of it, a deliberate 19 protecting society and achieving deterrence, 20 action. I stand by that. 20 rehabilitation, or .retribution. 21 I am sorry to her family. People seem 21 In addition, I have reviewed, pursuant 22 to quote things that I said in the PSI, but they 22 to Idaho law, those criteria which 1 am required 23 didn't quote everything I said in the PSI. I'd 23 to review ih any sentencing determination. 24 trade my life in a heartbeat for them, and they 24 Clearly, this is not a case for probation, so I 25 . would be ha . As long as they were alive, that.. 25 . have reviewed the criteria for im risonment. ls Nicole Omsberg, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho. 19 of 22 sheets 
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1 there an undue risk the defendant will commit 
2 another crime? Is the defendant in need of 
3 correctional treatment in an institution? Would a 
4 lesser sentence depreciate the seriousness of the 
5 defendant's crime? Will imprisonment provide 
6 punishment and deterrence to the defendant? Will 
7 imprisonment be a deterrent to others in the 
8 community? And is the defendant a multiple 
9 offender or a professional criminal? 
1 O The court notes in this case that the 
11 statements of both families, both verbally before 
12 the court and in writing to the court, are 
13 emotional ones. Clearly, both families have 
14 suffered a great deal of pain. 
15 And Mr. Ratliff is correct; I must base 
16 my decision on the-facts and the law and not upon 
17 the emotions or the pain of either party when I 
18 declare sentence. · 
19 In this particuhu case, two lives have 
20 been lost, the life of a 22-year-old young woman 
21 as well as the. child she was carrying at the time 
22 she was killed. 
23 A•jUl'y has listened to the evidence in 
24 this case at length and reviewed the facts and the 
25 various th.eories of the arties. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
24 
25 
1947 
The court notes that with regard to .the 
pre-sentence report, that the defendant states 
that Kathleen had gotten out oHhe vehicle. She 
was angry, sl.:\mmed the car door, and said words to 
the effect that we will talk about this tomorrow. 
After she shut the ca.r door. and began walking 
towards-the Shaw residence, Ciccone said he 
removed his seat belt, took his pack of cigarettes 
out of his pants pocket, took a cigarette out a11d . 
lit it, rolled the window down and replaced the 
cigarette pack in his pocket and refastened his 
seat belt before driving off. 
The report of the accident 
reconstruction specialist from the Idaho State 
Police, who reviewed the scene shortly after the 
events happened, was as follows: "Albert Ciccone 
drove his vehicle to the right side of the road in 
a straight-ahead motion. The speed of his vehicle 
would have been at about 50 miles per hour when he 
struck Kathleen Ciccone, the pedestrian. 
"The lack of .any action on the driver's 
part until he saw that he was going to hit the 
pedestrian that was walking on the right side of 
the road. 
1948 
1 "The marks at the scene indicate .a 
2 deliberate running over of the pedestrian and then 
3 a reaction to attempt to miss the mallbox. The 
4 driver could not have seen the mailbox until his 
5 vehicle struck the pedestrian." 
6 The court will also note that in 
7 reviewing the photographs of the collision, it is 
8 clear that the blow occurred on the right side of 
9 the vehicle. And while it was at the side of the 
10 vehicle, it was a direct blow to the victim. 
11 Nearly everything is possible, but the 
12 jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
13 defendant had intentionally committed these acts 
14 · with premeditation and found the defendant guilty 
15 in Kathleen Ciccone's death of first-degree 
16 murder. 
17 The jury also found the defendant 
18 guilty of second-degree murder in the death of the 
19 fetus that Kathleen Ciccone was carrying at the 
20 · time she died .. The Court is left with the abiding 
21 belief that there was significant evidence before 
22 the jury justifying its finding that this WclS no 
23 · accident. 
24 There had been prior acts witnessed by 
25 others of verbal abuse; rior ads, the effects of 
1949 
1 which were seen by others, of battery by the 
2 defendant upon the decedent, Kathleen Ciccone. 
3 And perhaps most telling, alth01..-gh not revealed to 
4 the jury at the time of trial, a prior attempt to 
5 hit Kathleen Ciccone with a motor vehicle when she · 
6 left the hospital on one occasion at the Air Force 
7 base when the defendant was angry with her. 
8 TI1ere is no indication in this record 
9 with regard to the mental status of the defendant, 
10 that he was not capable of forming.a criminal 
11 intent. The defendant had had prior acts of 
12 explosive anger. 
13 There are issues with regard fo a 
14 sexually transmitted disease but no evidence as to 
15 who transmitted the disease to whom. And in any 
16 event, having a sexually transmitted disease is 
17 hardly a basis for a death penalty. 
18 In reviewing all oHhose factors that 
19 I am required to review and in considering the 
20 evidence that the court heard at trial, the court 
21 believes that this was an appropriate finding by 
22 the jury that this was first-degree murder, and 
41......,4 -- ------ ·-·- ___ .._,,,. .. ,,, ....... L'_,,. .......... ~ .J.-- .... .. . ,.,.. _;:·. r 
,J· ... 
24 murder with premeditation on Count I in this case 
25 is life in rison without the possibility of Nicole Omsberg, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho Page 1946 to 1949 of 1954 
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1 parole. 
2 With regard to Count II, the defendant 
3 knew that his wife was pregnant. The defendant 
4 knew that she was carrying a fetus. And the Court 
5 believes that the jury finding of second-degree 
6 murder was appropriate in this case. The Court, 
7 therefore, imposes with regard to Count II a· 
8. sentence of 15 years fixed to be served 
9 · concurrently with the sentence imposed by the 
1 O Court with regard to Count I. 
11 The Court will reserve issues with 
12 regard to imposition of a fine and with regard to 
13 imposition of restitution amounts until such time 
14 as a restitution hearing and hearing with regard 
15 to the defendant's financial resources can be 
16 heard by the Court. 
17 If, indeed, there are financial 
18 resources available, the Court does not feel that 
19 a fine is punitive and vengeful; it believes that 
20 a fine is provided by law and is reasonable if 
21 there are financial resources availal:ile to pay 
22 that fine. The same is true of restitution. 
23 This Court, however, has never taken 
24 the position that restitution should automatically 
25 be im osed where a 1011 -term rison sentence is 
1951 
1952 
1 an unlawful act. 
2 The jury, after hearing all of the 
3 admissible evidence in this case, found the 
4 defendant guilty of first-degree murder in the 
5 death of Kathleen Ciccon~ and second-degree murder 
6 in the death of the fetus that she was carryi11g at 
7 the time. The Court. b~lieves that the sentence 
8 imposed, based upon those facts and findings, is 
9. an appropriate se11tence. 
10 I will advise you, Mr. Ciccone, that 
11 you have a right to appeal any sentencing 
12 deterrn.mation of this Court with which you 
13 disagree. In the event that you wish to appeal . 
14 and cannot afford an attorney to do so, one would. 
15 be appointed at public expense. And i11 the event · 
16 that yo1..1 wish to appeal and cannot afford the 
17 actual costs of the appeal, the costs of the 
18 appeal would be paid at public expense as well. 
19 Do you understand your right to. appeal? 
20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
21 THE COURT: The parties ma.y return the 
22 pre-se11tence reports. TI1ey will be sealed or 
23 destroyed as is appropriate. 
24 MR. RATLIFF: Judge, I atli sorry. I would 
25 like to hold on to 1nil1e u:ntil we et done i.vith the 
1953 1 imposed unless there are, in fact, resources 1 restitution hearing or any further sentencing to 2 available. All that does is lead to an 2 any punitive damage or as to any fines. 3 expectation on the part of victims that 3 THE COURT: Okay. Very well. TI1e parties 4 realistically can in no way be fulfilled because 4 may retain the pre-sentence report, then, pending 5 the defendant has no financial resources to 5 restitution and fine hearing. 6 fulfill the obligation. 6 lvIR. BAZZOLI: Is the court goi~g to order a 7 Thus, I will reserve the issue with 7 restitution report be filed? 8 regard to the fine and with regard to restitution 8 IBE COURT: I guess we should order the 9 in this matter. 9 restitution report. So the court will order that 10 I want the parties to know that I have 10 a restitution report be prepared and that the 11 reviewed the letters of William S. Terry, of Chris 11 parties be prepared to argue that matter. 12 Terry, of Jessica Herr, of Steve Boils, of Lewis 12 With regard to the sentence imposed in 13 A. Ciccone, of June Ciccone, of Anna Dusseau, 13 this matter, the court does remand the defendant 14 D-U-S-S-E-A-U, of Tom Lalik, L-A-L-I-K, ofTom 14 to the custody of the sheriff of this co1.mty to be. 15 Deluke, D-E-L-U-K-E, of Jolm Parke, P-A-R-K-E, of 15 delivered to the proper agent of the State Board 16 the Branders, B-R-A-N-D-E-R·S, and of Terrill, 16 of Correction in execution of this sentence. 17 T-E-R-R-I-L-L, Johnson, as well as John Nemic, 17 Counsel, are you aware of the credit 18 N-E-M-I-C, and Lisa Austin. 18 for time served which the defendant should receive 19 The court notes that the jury was fully 19 in this case? 20 instructed in this matter with regard to both 20 MR. BAZZOLI: However many days from October 21 counts charged in this case. They were charged 21 16th, 2003, to today. 22 with regard to first-degree murder, second-degree 22 THE COURT: The court will give the 23 murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary 23 defendant credit for 600 days served. 24 manslaughter, vehicular manslaughter, and 24 MR. RATLIFF: I'm sorry, Judge. How many 25 involuntary manslaughter throu h e etuation of 25 days was that?· 
Nicole Omsberg,Official Court Reporter,.Ada County, Idaho 21 of 22 sheets 
Page 1950 to 1953 of 1954 
"70 
( 
St f.ldaho vs. Albert A. Ciccone - June 7, ..----------:-------'---....,1:--c,9:-:::5'""'4----,-"""' 
1 THE COURT: 600 days served in prejudgment 
2 incarceration against each of the imposed 
( 
r 
\ 
( 3 sentences. 
4 Is there. anything further1 Counsel? 
5 MR. ~.ATLIFF: No, Judge. 
6 THE COURT: How long does the State feel it 
( 
( 7 will need to prepare for the hearing? 
( 8 MR. BAZZOLI: Your Honor, I imagine we will 
9 probably get the report in about thirty days. So ( 10 we probably need another fifteen days after that. ( 11 THE COURT: Let's set it out about 60 days. 
12 Is that appropriate for the defense, Mr. Ratliff? 
13 MR. RATLIFF: That should be, Judge. I can 
( 
( 14 contact the clerk and get a hearing date set. I 
15 didn't bring my calendar. 
16 THE C:OURT: Why don't we go ahead and 
( 
( 17 tentatively set that date. We'll set it out about ( 18 two months. If we need to change it, we can 
19 chang~ it. August 16th at 1 :30. 
20 Is ~here anything further, Counsel? 
( 
( 
' 
21 MR. BAZZOLI: Nothing from the State, ( 22 Your Honor. 
23 MR. RATLIFF: No, Judge. ( THE COURT: Very well. We will be in r 
I 
' 
24 recess. 
. . (Proceedings .concluded 11:25 a.m.) ( 
25 
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1852 
1 recreate it, you have to believe everything he 
2 said. He was out there alone with a tape measure 
3 on a road that Darlene Shaw said wasn't in the 
4 same condition as it used to be. 
5 Brandt Freeman's testimony doesn't help 
6 you. 
7 MR.RAnIF.F: Objection,Judge. Thafsnot 
8 facts in evidence. Darlene Shaw did not testify 
9 again. 
1 O THE COURT: The jury will resolve issues as 
11 to wheth,er or not they remember the testimony as 
12 stated by counsel. You may continue. 
13 MR. BAZZOLI: Exactly. 
14 Mr. Ratliff made quite a display that 
15 Kathleen Ckcone never told the counselor that 
16 Albert Ciccone had grabbed her and touched her, 
17 there was any kind of abuse or anything else. 
18 Well, they came out with a high-needs 
19 case. When they went through and looked at and 
20 summarized what she had told them. High-needs 
21 case. This wasn't a simple case. I don't think 
22 it is any dispute because the defendant has · 
23 admitted it on more than one occasion. He even 
24 admitted it when he was interviewing with Cathy 
25. Wolfe. Yeah, one time I pushed her. That's it; 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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After he had already told Cathy: I'd never touch 
her. I never laid a hand on her. 
Let's talk about Mr. Ratliff talking 
about the scene on K & R Ranch Road. How this 
precious purse a woman would have carried, the bag 
of food she obviously had in her possession 
because that's what Albert said. 
So I guess she has got the purse in the· 
car, the bag of food in the car, U1e medicine, the 
sweater tied around her and everything. And she 
decided to get out with all of that stuff on K & R 
Ranch Road -- I am not even going to show the 
pictures -- on K & R Ranch Road and decided to 
walk however.many feet-- let's just say - it is 
on the chart -- walk up there with all the purse, 
sweatshirt tied around her waist, bottle of pills, 
and all the food bag, and had enough wherewithal 
to throw it all at him right- or left-handed. 
Maybe she let the purse down to get the McDonalds 
bag or the Burger King to throw at him. Maybe she just left it there. I don't know. There's only 
two people that know, and Kathleen Ciccone i:St1't 
here to tell us. 
Did the defendant try and hide this 
evidence, as the defense has talked to Cathy Wolfe 
1854 
1 about? He knew she was going to find it. Well, 
2 he sure as heck didn't walk back towards the 
3 driveway after he had run down his wife. As a 
4 matter of fact, they found him about as far away 
5 .as you could get in that time frame from the 
6 driveway. 
7 
_ Did he ever tell Cathy Wolfe, "I didn't . 
B tam around here. You're wrong. I tumed around 
9 at K & R Ranch Road. That's where we got to. 
10 That's where we stopped. That's where we had a 
11 fight. That's where I turned around"? 
12 He never once said, at least in my 
13 memory, that that's where he turned around. He 
14 bought on; "Oh, this is where I turned around. 
15 Why would I tum around here? It doesn't make 
16 sense. We just had a little tiff. We were just 
17 joking. She wanted to go see her friends. That 
18 was it." 
19 He didn't say, "Detective Wolfe, it 
20 has come back to me now. I turned around up 
21 here." 
22 As a matter of fact, he didn't even 
23 merilion throwing the food or anything else until 
24 Cathy Wolfe said, "Look, we found all the food.'' 
25 Oh, well, excuse tne·. I had a bad day. Pardon me 
1855 
1 for my omission. 
2 This wasn't a guy cooperating. 
3 Remember what Cathy Wolfe said. When you 
4 cooperate with somebody, it is not just answering 
5 questions; it is answering questions truthfully. 
6 If you are making .stuff up, you are not 
7 cooperating. , 
8 He didn't even put Kathy on the other 
9 side of the road. He put her by the mailbox. Oh, 
10 I must have hit her when I hit the mailbox. 
11 Boom, barn, right into her. Maybe even my car 
12 swung around and hit her. That might have been 
13 it. 
14 Remember, we already established this 
15 was an accident, Detective Wolfe, so now we're 
16 just trying to figure out what I did wrong. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
He wanted to believe and he wants you 
to believe and Cathy to believe that this was an 
accident from the get-go. There is no facts in 
~vidence to prove that this was an accident. 
The same question presents itself now 
that presented itself the first day, that 
23 presented it$elf in my dosing: How do you miss a 
24 person v,ralking down that road? There is nothing 
25 in any of these photographs to suggest that he Nicole Omsberg, Official' Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 33 of 37 sheets 
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Tlil!l COURT: The Court prior to oommencing 
this hearing has had a meeting with counsel in 
chambers. The reason for that meeting was to 
advise them of the matter, that I •m going to now 
put on the re<;<;rd, so that both counsel could hav<!I 
the opportunity to gather their thoughts with 
regard to how they wish to deal with this matter. 
No decisions were reached in chambers, 
nor were any determinations made by the Court as to 
what course of action to pursue in this matter. 
The Court: has received a note from the 
jury foreman, Patty Allen, stating that juror 
number six has solicited outside information about 
Albert. He brought it to the tabU and tried to 
discus$ it with tbs other jurors. I haV'e had 
s•weral jurors come to me about this. 
Attached to that note or delivered 
contemporaneously with it is a note unsigned by 
another juror that states • jurors wer.e instructed 
not to talk to anyone about this case. Information 
obtained outside the cou;;t:room is not to influence 
our decision, This should not be brought up in 
state of Idaho v. Alb&rt Ci.oeon.e 
planned out or what comment was made so we know 
exactly what we are dealing with. And then 
certainly the disi\1.l.ssal of the offending juror, 
juror number six, which r believe is substitute for 
one of the alternate jurors that was juror number 
six that was seated would be dismissed and another 
juror would be called l.n. 
The other issue, one that was just 
brought to my attention right before we came into 
court b:,, Oetecti ve Wolfe. ! wasn • t sure what this 
issue was about and wanted to make sure it didn I t 
overlap. Apparently this morning she was at a gas 
station talking to her colleague. Ha was asking 
how the trial went, She said fine. It was good. 
And hadn't asked -- she said it was at the jury's 
hands. i\n<i he said what do you think and she was 
talking about whether or not it was a tip or fight 
or something. !'el t somebody behind her. Turned 
around. And the person behind her in line that she 
had not seen before she believes to be was one of 
the jurOl:'$. We don't know which nurol;>er. I think 
he l.s sit ting in juror chair number seven. If you 
started at the top left and moved right. There was 
no conversation past that. And she didn't talk 
with the juror. 
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front of other jurors~ Paul's eotnments about the 
car parts guy at Dodge and his conversation with a 
guy that knows Albert h not appropriate." 
Clearly, baaed upon these matters, there 
ia a potential that juror misconduct has occurred 
in thb case. 'the Court believes that it would be 
appropriate to aithar call in the juror alluded to 
or the jury foreman to diecuse this matter. 
Counsel, I would like to hear co,mnants 
first from the state then from the Oefense as to 
how it feels we should proceed at th.is point. 
MR. Bl\ZZOLI: iour Honor, two matters. the 
first I will address the Court's comments. It 
appears that two jurors ~- it is unsure that 
Miss Allen knows what was said, It alJnOSt sounds 
like the second note, that person, seeros to have 
more l<llowledge about something about Paul's 
comments about the car parts at Dodge and his 
conversation with the guy that knows Albert is not 
appropriate. r don't know if Miss Allen knows what 
that conversation is, but I do believe she is in 
the courthouse at this time. 
state• s position is that I think the 
bast thing is to initially call her in and find out 
what waa said, what was understood, if it was 
S a.to of' Idaho v. Albert i 0 
Sha doesn't ~now if he overheard or what 
he overheard. But we weren't sure if that was 
necessarv and might be an issue to take up that 
matter or not. Wanted to bring to the court's 
attention and may have to talk to that juror as 
wall. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Ratliff. 
MR. AATL!FF: Well, Judge, I agree we ought 
to dismiss Mr. Truba outright as to number siK, lt 
is my understanding we'll then bring in, bring 
back, Mr. Drew Randall as to the jury. 
I would agree then that we do ha11e the 
jury foreman oome in. Let's talk to her. I guess 
we' re treading cloeie, Judge. Two cases. One of 
them is brand new. one just came out tha 16th. 
State v. Tinunons. It ie not even in the repoi;t. 
That deals more with polling after deliberations, 
but ! 'm not sure how close we ar.e getting there. 
THE COURT: r think I have read State v. 
TirnmoP!I· It apparently indicated that you couldn't 
use the poll results a£ tar the trial. 
MR. PJ\'l'LH'F, Right. Right. think quite 
frankly, Judge, because we are going to bring in 
the jury foreman probably we may want to do a 
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closed hearing so that tha foreman doaan' t think 
that thera is any undue pressure one way or the 
other to reveal at least to the parties what is 
going on. 
THE COURT: Well, there is also I suppose tha 
possibility that some of the discussions could make 
their way into the media and affect the jury if 
they deliberate over night, 
Mr, Bazzoli , 
MR. BAZZOLI: l would also sugga111t a closed 
hear1ng, one, r think just aa a matter of right 
for a fair trial; two, I think that jury 
delibe,;ation.s are typically not ope!\ to pUbll.c and 
what is said during deliberations, Obviously, we 
have these letten, but we still don't know what 
t.as said. So I think for the safety of a fair 
trial that we have the courtrocm closed for that 
hearing. 
THE COURT: court baUeves that tha issue to 
be brought before the court and has been properly 
placed and discussed in public, The1-e is a 
preference for public hearings in our system. 
How<aver, there is also a preference for a fair 
taial and the deliberations of the jury are 
sacrosanct under our law. 
State of ldl!lho v. Albert Ciccone 
1 
produced as a witness at the instance of the Court, 
having been first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
Q. Miss Allen, we have received your note 
as well as the note of a second juror regarding 
apparenUy comments made by juror number six 
relating to outside information, The parties do 
have a right to explore that further with you. And 
I have certainly granted to them that right. 
You will note that the jury room or that 
the courtroom, pa.roon ma, has been cleared of all 
but necessary personnel l;,ecause of the fact that 
the questions they ask you may relate to jury 
deliberations, And those are sacrosanct in our 
system. 
But both parties I think would agree 
with me that we appreciate that you have advised us 
that this has occurred so that wa can attempt to 
deal with it, 
The court will allow the State to 
examine the foreman with regard to this 
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of d.aho v. Alber Cl eone 
e 
It will be necessary for both parties to 
make inquiry of the jury foreman as to those 
discussions, And as a result, the Couxt will grant 
the request joined in by both the State and the 
Oafensa to close this hearing since those 
discussion,> will be occurring wl.ti\ juroi:s. 
So, the bailiff will clear the courtroom 
except for tile prosecutor, the defense attorney and 
their respective staff, 
(Co~ cl....,,&d.) 
THE COURT: Counsel, at this time then 
pursuant to the request of both counsel, the Court 
will request that the jury foreman, Mi.ss Allen, be 
brought into the courtroom and the Clerk will give 
har the oath, Wall, give her the standard oath. 
Miss Allen, if you can come forward and 
the Clerk will a®lio.l.$Ut to you the oath, 
(Jw:o,: sworn.) 
state 0£ Ida.ho v. Albert Cioo 
information. Mr. Bazzoli, 
l'.R. 8AZZOLI: Thank you. 
SY I/di!, SAZZOLl: 
Q. Mrs. Allen, you have identified the 
juror as juror number six; is that correct? 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
And that's not the person that was 
sitting in chair six? 
A. 
Q, 
A, 
Q. 
No, it is the replacement juror. 
That would be Mr. Trube? 
Paul. 
Okay. He has got kind of a gotae 
sitting up in this chair? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, number 14. 
Okay. Just so we make sure we are 
talking about the same person. Just tell us, 
without telling us anything that you guys were 
talking about or context or anything, wily don't you 
tell us what statement that you heard was made by 
Mr, 'l'ruba, if anything? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I can tall you what he said? 
we need to know what was said, 
Okay. We were discussing the case and 
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Sta.ta of Idaho v. 
said he waa up at 5:00 this morning and had gone 
down to work, which he has been doing during this 
time, and he was discussing the car with someone 
that he works with t.hat knew this car. l\nd was 
asking him specific questions about how the car 
handled anct this person informed h:lm -- h& Mid 
that he knew Al and that lU his words were his 
way o,;t thare is a little wacko. And at that point 
iS when said --
Q. Did he say any specifics about how the 
car handled or, you know, my friend said the car 
does this or does that? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. okay. What did he say about that? Oo 
you recall, 
A, He said that it was a very high-powered 
car and that it would be hard to control. And --
Q. And did he tall< about driving it on di.rt 
roads or 
A. And then he went on to talk about his 
experience about driving on dirt roads. 
Q. All right. Which is -- okay. He said 
this at 5:00 p.m. this morning, Where does he 
work? Do you recaU? 
A. He works at Co:< Auto Body. 
o v. Albi:u: Cic on 
Mr. Ratliff, 
Q. Mrs. Allen, thanks for your honesty 
here. It's a little tough, I know. So the 
statement was said so that the entire 11 other 
jurors heard the statement? 
A. 
Q, 
Correct. 
Did any deUberations tak,. place after 
the statement? 
A. Al:)out that? 
Q. Yes. 
A. 
spok,. up. 
Q. 
No, we moved on. We didn't -- no one 
Okay. Do you feel that you could ba 
st.ill fair and impartial after having l1eard that 
statement? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, sir. 
Do you feal that statement in any way 
affects your ability to render a just decision? 
1\. No. 
MP.. RATLIFF: No questions, JUdge. 
THE COURT, Thank you. 
11 
MR. BAZZOL!: ~our Honor, if I can follow-up. 
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10 
Cox P.uto Body, Okay. so he basically 
said he talked to a guy at Co>< Auto Bocty and -
A. You know, I need to take that back. I 
am not sure if he aal.d Co>< Auto Body or if he wEtnt 
somewh>1>re and talked to somebody about the car. 
Q. Okay. But that happened this morning 
whan ha made that statement. Was that in front of 
the entire jury panel? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, it was. 
Okay. And at that point what happened? 
I said we shouldn' t be talkin<J about 
this. And several ju~ors said I agree. And then 
' someone wrote me a note and brought it to my 
attention. And then we took a braal< and someona 
brought; it to my attention. 
Q. Okay. Two people brought it to your 
attention and you wrote a note and gave it to the 
bailiff? 
A. Yes. 
Q. was anything ,use said by Paul after 
that? J\bout his conversation or outside 
inf:oi:mation that took place outside this courtroom? 
A. No, 
MR. BAZZOLI: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bazzoli. 
state of Idaho v. Al.bar Ciocone 
l2 
THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Bauoli. 
BY MR, BAZZOLI, 
Q. Mrs. Allen, were these $tatements that 
came in, did it contradict or in your opinion was 
it contrary to what was presented to you at t,ial? 
MR. RATLIFF: I am going to object, Judge, 
because I think that goes to deliberation8. 
MR. 6AZZOL!: Your Honor, I think it gets to 
a little bit -- I know it's a weird question. It 
geta to little bit of -- we need to know if it was 
something that' a all brand new or something that 
nobody else heard in the courtroom before. We have 
a much bigger problem it: l.t iS something that• s --
I thit1k a different. way to say is it consistent 
with what you heard versus somebody bringing in all 
new information? '!'hat's the --
THE COURTt i'lall, lat me ask the question 
this way. 
MR, BAZZOL! t Okay. 
THE COURT, Was than anything there that you 
had not consid@:red. as a juror in tar.ms of the 
testimony that you heard in the courtroom? 
,JUROR~ No. 
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State of Idaho V 
13 
NR. BAZ20LI; Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE cooR·r, Any follow-up? 
MR. RATLIFF: Tl;at's fair, Judge. Thank you. 
TH!l: COURT: Thank you. And, Miss Allen, can 
you tell me which juror it was that ga va you the 
additional note? 
JUROR: Jason. 
TH£ COtlRT ! Jason? 
Jtll\OR: Juror -~ I don' t know their last 
names. 
MR. RATLIFF: Mr. Patrick, number eight. Sat 
down·· 
JUROR: In front of me. 
MR, RATLIFF, 
Jt!ROR: Yes. 
this ohair right here? 
THE COURT: U there anything else to ba 
asked of the foreman? 
MR. AATLlll'F: No, Judge. 
Ml\. BAZZOLI: No, Your Honor. Thank you, 
Miss Allen. 
THE COURT: Thank you very muoh. And I do 
want to admonish you that are not to say anything 
to the other jury members of the panel about what 
o,;;cuned in here. Thank you. 
(Juror excused. ) 
tut of Iduho v. lb9rt Cicco a 
MR. RATLIFF: r don't think so. think we 
have got to have a fully constituted panel, Judge. 
And that's why I am saying I think we ought to 
dismiss Mr. Truba before we have any more 
instructions to the entire panel and have the 
alternate here and address the entire panel as a 
whole. 
1S 
'l'HE COURT: And probably ~ should bring in 
the entire panel to ask them the standard question 
if they believe anything that was said would. impact 
their ability to be fair and impartial jurors in 
this matter. 
MR. RATLIFF: !tight. 
'!'HE COURT: And that would be with just the 
11. 
MR. RATLU'F: Right. 
THE COURT: All :right. Certainly appropriate 
to call in Mr. Lancaster who apparently felt strong 
enough about it that he wrote a note. 
}lR. RATLIFF: No, Mr. Lancaster is the one 
that may have overheard Oatecti ve Wol.fe. 
Mr. Patrick is the one that did the letter. 
TH£ COURT: Okay. well, certainly we ought 
to call Mr. Patrick in since he felt strong enough 
to write a note, 
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Cicco a 
THE COURT: Counsel, in light of that, is 
there anythlng further you wish to do? Do you wish 
to call the additional juror in, or do you wish to 
call the panel in? or, Mr. Ratliff, do you wish to 
make any motions at this point in time? 
Ml'\. AATLI .G'F, Judge, 1:he only thing think 
we ought to address at this time ·- well, there is 
two things. th.ink we ought to talk to 
Mr. Lancaater, number aevan, about the automotive 
incident. I think the Court ought to bring the 
>rhole panel in and ask them if there is anything 
they heard from outside the courtroom that is going 
to affect their ability to procaad. 
And then I think the Court prubably 
ought to .re1 nstruct them from that standard :)ury 
instruction as to they' re not to have contact again 
with vutside. ~1d th.in -- well, probably ought to 
-· probably ought to get rid of Mr. Truba after we 
nave talked to Mr. Lancaster. And then once we get 
the alternate here then re-instruct the juty as to 
contact outside the courtroom. 
THE COURT: Anet I assume that you would want 
the jury panel to •• the 11 members to be called in 
and givllln that additional instruction prior to the 
time that the alternate waa brought in? 
state of Idaho v. Albert Ciooone 
MR. BAZZOLit Do we need to put Detective 
Wolfe on the stand as to questions for counsel as 
to what she was saying QJ<actly t.o Mr. Holland. 
MR. RA'i'LIFF: I accept Mr. Bazzol.i 's 
represents ti on as to the nature of the discussion. 
I'd rather find out what Mr. Lancaster is going tc 
tell us. If he overheard anything, and if he 
didn't, then that issue goes away. 
THE COURT: Yes, I think that's appropriate. 
And I think J.t is appropriate, Detective 
Wolfe, that you raised this issue and brought it to 
the attention of court and counsel . 
DETECTIVE WOLFl1:: r am so embarrassed. 
MR. BAZZOLI: l.'our ilonor, I think I actually 
agree with Mr, Ratliff on a number of issues as far 
as I think that we do need to bring in at least the 
11 jurors and find out if there is anybody who 
believes -· I appreciate the Court• s rephrasing 
upon that partiottlar question, but with the same 
spirit in mind to see if the other jurors can put 
that as.I.de recognizing that they ara going to begin 
again. And I think it ls also appropriate to ask 
all 12, especially the alternate. You never know 
if the alternate went home and may have watched the 
news last night or what. We rteed to find out i! 
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-- some people 
l7 
listen to 
instructions as adamantly as perhaps 
But just mak<i! sur& that the alternat& 
i<m' t in som.. way, you know, already thinking and 
figuring this is a done deal. 
THE COOR'!': Well, I think that we bring the 
alternat& in aft,ar we talk to the l1 members. lie 
send them out. We bring the alternate in to 
explore that. '!'hen if th&re is no tainting of the 
altern .. te then we would bring all 12 back in and 
give the new deliberation instruction. And I would 
re-read the instruction related to no discussions 
outside of the courtroom. 
MR. 81\ZZOLI: I think -- were we going to 
bring Mr. Patrick in before or are we going to 
bring him in at all? 
THE CO!JRT: Mr. Patrick was the ona that 
wrole tha aeoond set of note. It .seems to me i! he 
felt strongly enough about it to write a note that 
Counsel may wish to ask him questions. 
MR. BAZZOLl: That's fine, Your Honor. 
MR. AATLIFF, I am okay just to have him com.. 
in with the panel. And then if he indicates tMt 
he neects to be further questioned that would be. 
fine, !lut given the basis of hi.(! note, I kind of 
State o:£ l:daho v. Albert Ci.oeone 
'l'HE COURT: Mr. Lancaster, please take a 
seat. Detective Wolfe has advised the Court and 
both counsel that apparently she was at Polly's and 
was having a discussion and turned around and 
realized that you were there. 
JUROR: Yes. 
THE COURT: As a result of this, Counsel want 
to have the opportunity to ask you some questions 
about that. And Detective Wolfe, to her cred;,t, 
raised that and advised the Court and both Counsel 
this morning that that had occurred, I guess I 
will let Mr. Ratliff ask the questions first since 
he is on his feet. Go ahead, Mr. P.atli !f. 
J1lROll. Ll\NCASTElil, 
produced as a witness at the instance of the Court, 
having been first duly sworn, was examined and 
te:stified as follows: 
Q. Mr. Lancaster, did you overhear any 
conversations she was having? 
I did not hear what she was talking 
about. 
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J.8 
think he understanrj$' that he wasn I t euppoS<!d to 
know about it and it is not going to have an impaot 
on him, 
Ml\, BAZZOLl: I think 
to tha jury foreman tt> gi va her a diagram and idea 
that that shouldn't hat;, been brought up in front 
of the other jurors. t<ind of give her an 
admonition and gi 119 her some guidance as well. 
MR. AATtr FF: I am mor11 interested in 
Mr, Lanoaatu, Judge. 
THE COURT, Very well. Mr, Ciccone, I note 
that you are shaking your head 1n agreement. 
THE DEFEIIDl\NTl 'fas, sir. Yes, sir. 
1'HE COURT, All right. Very well then, 
guess we will bring in Mr. Lancaster and he can be 
questioned. 
M!l.. AATLIFli': And I guess Det&ct.ive Wolfe can 
notify the prosecutor if it'$ not the aame guy. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
M!l.. 131\ZZOLI: He was sitting in juror seat 
number seven I think she told me. 
MR. RA'l'LI FF: Right. 
'!'HE COURT: Mr. Lancaster, we will put you 
under oath here. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
time? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
{illlror aworn.) 
Stace of ldaho v. Alber,t Cieeone 
Did you hear her say anything? 
I didn't. 
Okiily. Did you aven recognize her at the 
I didn • t at fi r$t -- and then --
And then the oh, God, comes up7 
Yes. 
Okay. So you didn't overhear anything? 
I didn't hear what they were talking 
about or anything. 
MR. AA'l'LlFF: Okay. I have no further 
questions. Thank you. 
THE CO!Jl1.T: '!'hank you, Mr. Ratliff. 
Mr. aazzol.i. 
BY MR. BAZZOLI: 
Q, Mr. !.ancaster, you didn't talk to 
Mr. Hawley or anybody after? 
A. No, r paid for: my tea and ! left. 
MR. BAZZOLI, All right. Thank you very 
much, s.l.,. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lanoa,s:t.er. 'fou 
can be el<cused. 
JUROR: Thank you. 
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THE COURT: Mr. Ra tJ.i! f, 
MIC AA'l'LI li'Ft Judge, at this time I would 
to dismiss juror numbE>r six which is 
21 
1 
2 
3 
5 
TH!! COURT: right. 6 
MR, BAZZOLI: State concurs. Hia juror 
number :ts 267. 
!',R. AATL!E'F: 267. 
THE COURT: think I should probably do that 
in open court but will dismiss him obviously, 
MR. AATLIF!i': l\J.l tight. And pref,nabl~• not 
in the presence of the other j 11rors. 
'.l'H& COURT: Not in the presence of the other 
jurors, 
MR. !lAZZOLI: May I also suggest just so that 
-- I tb.lnk Mr. Ratliff bas already made the m::,tion 
and the State concurs -- I think we have to make 
the motion again on the record so it appears that 
either side J.sn' t volatile or angry with the court 
with h.is dismissal. 
THE COURT: Okay. I will do that. 
MR. AATLIFE': Thank you, JUdge. 
THE COURT; Let's bring in the 11 juroi:s all 
but Mr. 'fruba, so that they can be questioned with 
Sta.ta of Idaho 1/. Albert ciooone 
23 
MR. RATLIFF: I p,:-efer not. I think we ought 
to just let him go, Judge. 
THE: COURT: Well, the Court will bring 
Mr. 1'ruba in and I will advise him that he has been 
excused from the jury. 
MR. OAZZOLI: !le is here. 
THE COURT: Mr. Truba, if you can come sit 
down. 
(Juror present.) 
TH£ COURT: Mr. Txuba, the court has bean 
advised that apparently you had some discussions 
with someone outside of the courtroom relating to 
the motor vehicle that was involved in this matter 
01: one si(llilar to it. And that you al$o received 
information from a third-party which you raised in 
the jury room this morning with regard to 
Mr. Ciccone; is that correct? 
JUROR: It was not -- it was witll the car. 
It wasn't with Ciccone, Mr. Ciccone. 
THE COURT: Okay, !!ut you had discussions 
outside of the jury room ,iith regard to the case 
with a third-party1 is that cor.i:ect? 
JUROR: I -- not directly> nb. I mean, I --
we ....... 
:rH!i: COURT: Did you bring up these 
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regard to thU exchange . 
HR. RATLH'F1 Should we do it the other way 
around, Jt1dge? 
MR. BAZZOLI ! Dismiss Mr. 'l':roba first. 
MR. AATI.I!'F: I prefer that. 
i/2 
MR. BAZZOLI, That way he is not sitting back 
there alone while people --
THE: COURT: All right. What ! Will do then, 
counsel, it this meats with your approval, is I 
will diamiss Hr. Truba now. I will state on the 
record after WI! go public that he has been 
dismissed. 
MR. RA'l'Lil!'F, That's fine, Judge. 
THE COURT; Okay. And that there has been 
Mr. Orew, juror number ·- okay. What's 
Mr. Drew's first name? 
MR. RATLIFF: Ra11.:Jall Drew, 
THE COURT: Randall Drew will be subatituted. 
so you oan advise Mr. Truba that he has been 
eacused and will be replac;ed with an alternate 
juror. 
MR. 13.'\iZOLl: Your Honor, do will want to do 
that in the courtroom or have the bailiff --
T!!l? COURT: Probably. Let.$ bring Mr. Truba 
in, 
State ot Idaho v, Albert Ciecon. 
discu11sions in the jury room? 
JUROR: I did. 
THE COURT: Okay. Ara there any questions 
that Counsel would like to have the juror placed 
under oath and ask questions? 
MR. BAZZOLI; No questions, Your !loner. 
/.JR. RATL!FF: No questions, Judge. 
THEl COURT: Thank you, Mr. 1'ruba. Al, you can 
appreciate, the issue with regard to anything 
coming into the jury room from outside of what was 
heard at trial can endanger the defendant's right 
to a fair trial. 
JUROR: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT, As a NSUlt, the Coui:t will 
exouse you from further service on this panel, and 
I will be replacing you with an alternate juror. 
So you may leave. 
JUROR: Sorry about that. Just was trying 
to get facts straight in my head. That's all I was 
trying to do. 
THE COURT: Very we.l.l. 
(Jw:-c»> excused f"°"' the jw.y PlllMll.) 
THE COURT, If there is anything to be gotten 
out of the jury room for Mi:-. Truba, you can get 1 t 
for him. Ha is not to go back J.n the jury room. 
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State of :rda.hc v, 
Counsel, while we that, 
I will go back and get that standard instruction so 
will have it in front of me. Can we bring in the 
jury mei~rs? 
(l'teoees.) 
(Ju:ry p,:esent.) 
THE COURT: Court will note that the 
defendant is present in the courtroom end that he 
has been present this morning for all discussions 
which have occurred outside the presence of the 
jury. 
Counsel, may we stipulate that the jury 
as currently constituted, with the exception of the 
substitute juror, are present in the cou,troom and 
properly seated? 
MR, BI\ZZOLI: Yee, Your Honor. 
Ml\. AATL!f'F: Yes, Judge. 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, 
it has come to our attention, through a note 
provided to the Cotirt by the jury foreman, that a 
discussion occurred in the courti:oorn or in the j ux:y 
room which all of you hed heard in which Mr. ·rruba 
apparently made cooo,,ents with regard to 
conversations which he had had outside of the 
courtroom (sic) relating to the defendant and the 
state o-£ Idaho v. Albort Ciaoone 
questions you would like to address to any merober 
of the panel? 
MR. MTLIF!!': No, Judge. 
THE COU!'\T, Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, 
I will instruct you that you are to disregard any 
com,.,,nte which you heard from Mr, Truba and that 
they are to have no place in your determination of 
guilt or innocence or in your consideration of any 
of the facts which you are con!.'idering in this 
case. 
Is there all)' furthar instruction that 
either Counsel wishes with regard to that matter to 
the panel? 
MR, !ll\ZZOt.r: No, 'four l!onor. 
MR, AATLlFF: No1 Judge. I think that's a 
sufficient instruotion. 
THE COURT: Very well then. we will bring in 
the alternate juror. 
(Alternate juror present.) 
MR. RA'l'LIFE': Judge, I believe he will 
probably -- ! think he needs to be sworn. am not 
sure he did that. 
THE COURT: lfe will be sure that he is, 
Better to be sworn than not sworn at all. 
Mr. Drew, could you coma forward and the 
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As a result of those co,wer$ati,:ms, 
Mr, 'l'ruba has been excused from this jury and an 
alternate juror be appointed ill his place. 
This Court• s conCiilrn is is there any 
poss.ibili ty that anything that you haard from 
26 
Mr. Trvba with rega.rd to those conver:$at.lons and 
what he said is so lodged ii'.> your mind that you do 
not feel you coul.d be fair and impartial J.n 
t·eaching a decision with regard to the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant in this case as to any 
of the charged offenses? 
If there are any of you that feel that 
that is the case, please r:aise your hand now and 
!et us know, so that we can fUrthar explore that 
issue with you. 
Are there any of you who feel you have 
been compromised in any way and cannot be a fair 
and impartial juror in this matter? 
The Court >iill nota at this time that no 
juror has raised his or her hand. 
Mr. Bazzoli, do you have any questione 
you wish to address to any member of the panel? 
MR. BI\ZZOLl: tlo, 'four Honor. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Ratliff, do you have any 
28 
clerk will swear you once mo,:-e to be sure that ycu 
have been sworn as juror in this matter. 
(Ju,;y panel re-awom, ) 
THE CODRT: Wa swore them at the beginning of 
the trial. But, as I said, better twice than not 
at all. 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, one of 
your number has been excused and replaced with an 
alternate juror. State and the defendant each have 
a right to verdict reach only after full 
participation of the 12 jurou who ultimately 
return the verdict. This right may be assured in 
this case only if the jury begins its c!el.l.berationa 
again from the beginning, 
You are therefore instructed to set 
aside and diSregard all past deliberations and 
given deliberating anew. Thill means that each 
remaining oi:ig.i.nal j 1.1ror must set aside and 
disregard the earlier deliberations as if they had 
not taken place. You shall now retire for your 
deliberations in accordance ,vith all the 
instruction.s previously given. 
And I want to say that r am Very proUd 
of the 11 members of the panel who brought the 
earlier matter to the Court• s attention. You may 
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(JUl:',li' panel e!XOUS8d to del.i.beioate,) 
THE COURT, The courtroom may be open to the 
public. CouJWt will ll<lt<!l for purposes ot the record 
this matter is now ()1i'eil to the public. '!'hat 
the Court has replaced juror n\ll!lb<!t si:< with 
alternate jttror Randall Drew. 
The jury has been re-sworn and they have 
been instructed to begin their deliberations anew 
with the panel aa reconstituted "!ith the alternate 
juror. 
ts there any comment which ai thar 
counsel wishes to rnake for purpoaes of the record 
on this matter? Mr. Bazzoli. 
MR. 8/.\ZZOL!: No, ~our Honor. Tl'\ank you. 
THS COURT: Mr, Ratliff. 
MR. RATL!ll'F: No, Judge. 
THE COOR'.!': Very well. Counsel, we will then 
be .\n recees until such time as we hear back from 
jury with regard to any verdict they may reach. 
Thank ycu, Counsel. 
(R&Oe.$8.) 
THE COURT: The parties have requested the 
court re-read in.struotion number 11 to the juity in 
light of the fact that a new juror -- pardon me --
whether it be for reces.s&e of the court during the 
day or wnen ycu leave the courtroom to go home at 
night. 
First, do not talk about thie case 
either am¢ng yourselves or with anyone else during 
the course of the trial. You should keep an open 
mind throughout the trial and not form or express 
an opinion about the oase. You should only reach 
your decision after you have heard all of the 
evidence and after you have heard my final 
instructions and after the final at'guments. You 
may diacuss this case with the other members of the 
jury only aftet· it i.s submitted to you fer your 
decision. All such discussions should take place 
in the jury room. 
second, do net let any parson talk about 
this case in your presence. If anyone does talk 
about it, tell them you are a juror on the case. 
It they won't stop talking report that to the 
bailiff as soon as you are able to do so. You 
should not tell any of your £allow jurors about 
what has happened. 
Thlrd, during this trial cto not talk 
with any of the parties, their lawyers or any 
witness. By this l mean not only do not talk about 
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an alternate juror has been placed on the jury. 
'l'he Court had forgot to do that. My apologies to 
the parties. Let's bring the jury back in eo I can 
read that in.struction to them. And the beginning 
del:l.berationa anew instruction will be numb<!tred 62. 
A copy should go to each attorney. 
(ill.1l:y panel. p_,...t,) 
THE COOR'!', court will note that the 
defendant. is present in the courtroom with Counsel, 
He has been present fo~ all discussions outside the 
presenca of the jury. 
Counsel, may we stipulate the jury is 
present and seated aa sworn? 
MR. BAZZOLI: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. AAl'LlFF: They haven't run off yet. 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, 
apologize, there was another instruction that I 
was to read to you and because of the repetitivey 
with which we had to do some things this morning, 
tbe court overlooked it. The parties have 
requested that r re-read instruction number 11, and 
think it is appropriate. 
It is important that as jurors and 
officers of this court you obey the following 
instructions at any time ycu leave the jury box 
32 
the case, but do not talk at all, even to pa11s the 
tilllE! of day. In no other way can all parties be 
;,ssured of the fairness they are entitled to expect 
from you as jurcre. 
Fourth, during this trial do not make 
any investigation of this case or inquiry outside 
of the courtroom on your own. !lo not go any place 
mentioned in the testimony without an explicit 
orde:,,, from me to do so. You must not consult with 
any books, dictionaries, encyclopedias or any 
source of information, unless I specifically 
authorize you to do so. 
Fifth, do not read about the caire in the 
newspapers. Do not listen to radio or television 
broadcasts about the trial. You must base your 
verdict solely on what is presented in court and 
not upon any newspaper, radio, television or other 
account of what rnay have happened. 
Thank you, Ladies and gentlemen, you 
are excused to begin ycur deliberations. 
(Ju,:y panel ilXOUSed.) 
MR. AATLI.ll'll'1 J\ldge, can I approach? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR, AATLIF!t: can wa approach? 
(Iliscussion off the reooz:d at tile bench 
I. 
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State of Idaho v. 
with Court one! Counsel..) 
THE cou~: Let•$ bring Mr. Drew in just for 
a moment. We need to ask him on& question. 
lit. Drew, it' you can come up and be 
"""t"d for a moment. We have one quutl.on we need 
to ask. 
(~o,;~ent.l 
THE COURT, liirat of ell, Mr. Drew, can you 
gilre your ful.l name for the record? 
JUROR: Randall Chester ~i:aw. 
'l'!ll;; COURT, And yQu ha1re been called back and 
sworn as an alternate juror in this matter, What< 
the Court wants to ask is that dudng that 24~h0ur 
period when you were an alternate, l:>1,it had not been 
called back, have you heard or seen anything that 
in any way impacts your ability to bs a fair and 
impartial juror in this matter? 
THS COURT: Okay, Mr,< Ratliff, any further 
questions? 
Ml\. R/\TL!Fl!': No, Judge, 
THil COURT: Ml:. Bazzoli? 
MR, !)/\ZWLI, No, Your Honor. Thank you. 
THE CO\JRT; Thank you very much, r,Jr. D,ew. I 
apologize for not asking that earlier. 
State 0£ Idaho v. Al.bart Ciooone 
And in thia court' a opinion this was a well 
presented case. You may bring in the ju:ry. 
(J'u,:y p:i:asant.) 
35 
THE COURT: court will note fOr the record 
that the defendant is present in the courtroom with 
Counsel. That he has been present for all 
discussions outside the presence of the jury. 
counsel, may we stipulate that the jury 
is present and seated as sworn? 
MR. BAZZOLI: For the last time, Your Honol.", 
they are. 
MR. RATLIFF: so agreed, Finally. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel • 
Madam Foreman, it is my understanding 
that the jury has reached its verdicts in this 
case; is that correct? 
JURORt 'tea, air. 
THE COURT: can you please hand the vardiota 
to the bailiff and she will deliver them to the 
Court? 
THE BAILIFF: !Complying.) 
THE COURT: Madam clerk. 'l'he defendant will 
stand. Madam clerk:, will you please read the 
vercilcU:? 
THE CLERK: rn the District court of the 
87 
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THE COO!\'!': Have we know gotten< all of the 
q\lutiorn, asked, Mr. Banol.i? 
MR. BAZZOl',I; I hope' so, Your Honor. 
TllE COURT: And Mr. Ratliff? 
34 
MR. AA'l'LU'F: The, day is. still young, Judge, 
but l think we are okay for now. 
THE CO!JI\T, very well then, counsel. r will 
be here for, the remaJ.nder of the day to answer any 
juror questions .that might arise. lie will be in 
.recesa. 
MR. BAZZOLI: Thank ycu, Your Honor. 
(Recesi,) 
Tl!t COURT i < Counsel, ~he Court has been 
advised that the jury has reached a verdict. The 
j1.1ry foreman is.< Mr.s. Allen as both counsel are 
ai,are. 
Prior to bringing in the jury, I would 
like to make one statement to bOth counsel. I 
would like to compl$1!lent them on a professionally 
and wall-presented case on both Qf thei,; pai:ta. 
'four objections were properly made with 
professionalism anc! courtesy to presex-ve the 
record. There was strong< advocacy< for ycur 
respacti ve position and on behalf of your clients. 
Stat. of idaho v. AlbeJ:<t Ci.aeon• 
36 
Fourth Judicial District of the state of Idaho in 
and for the county of Elmore, the State of Idaho, 
plaintiff versus /\ll:>ert A, Ciccone, defendant. 
Case No. CR-2003-4441. 
Verdict, Count one, we the jury for our 
verdict unanimously answer the queatiOl'ls submittl;d 
to us a$ follows: Question number one, on count 
one of the Information, we find the defendant, 
Albert A. Ciccone, guilty of murder of Kathleen 
Ciccone. Signed jury foreman Patricia Allen, 
Members of the jury --
THE COURT: You have to read the second 
portion, Madam Clerk. 
THS CLERK: Sorry. If ycu unanimously 
answered question number one not guilty you muat 
then answer question number four. lf you 
unanimously an&W$red question number one guilty, 
you must nGXt answer question n\llllbQr two. 
Question number two: On count one of 
the Infonnation, we find the defendant Albert A. 
Ciccone guilty of first degree of Kathleen Ciccone. 
Dated this 26th day of January, 2005. Patricia M. 
Allen, jury foreman. 
Members of the jury, is this your true 
verdict so say you all? 
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Stat& 0£ Idaho V 
JURORS; Ye:s • 
THE COURT: With regard to count OOil of the 
verdict, do the parties wish to have the jury 
polled? 
MR, AATLXli'li': Yes, Judge. 
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THE COURT: Very well, Th" Clerk will poll 
the jury with regard to their verdict on count one. 
(J'w:y polled by the Cleric.) 
THE COURT: Clarie will read count two, the 
verdict on count two. 
TliE CLERK: In the District Court of the 
l?ourth Judicial District of the State of !daho in 
and for the county of Elmore, the State of Idaho, 
plaintiff versus Albert A, Ciccone, defendant, case 
No. CR-2003-4441. 
Verdict, count two, we the jury for our 
verdict unanimously answer the quastlona submittAd 
to us as follows: Question number one, on count 
two of the Infoi:mation ,,e find the defendant, 
Albe.rt A, Ciccone, guilty of the murder of the 
wnbryo or fetus being carried by Kathleen Ciccone, 
If you unanimously answered question 
number one not guilty you must then answer question 
number four, If you unanimously answered question 
number four guilty, you muat next answer question 
$tntea o Idal'lo v. Alb&rt Ci.oaone 
39 
THE COURT: The defendant may be seated. 
Ladias and gentlemen of the jury, r want 
to say something to you at this point. I cannot 
recall when I have been so impressed by or proud of 
a group of my fe1l()l,1 citizen!! serving as jurors in 
this case who obviously took their oath and 
obligations aa jurors as seriously as you clid, And 
who immediately called to the Court's attention an 
incident which had 1t not been called to the 
Court's attention immediately upon J. ts occurrence 
could have resulted ln a mistrial which would have 
imposed upon the r.axpayers of this county the hUge 
additional cost of a second trial to assure a fair 
trial fox; the d&fendant. You are all to be 
commended for your service and your desire to 
s1ssure the deliberations of the jury were fairly 
conducted and in no way co111Promisect. If there is 
an error in this trial, J.t w.ill I am sure be fou11d 
in some ruling I have made or not made, and not 
because of any failure of this jury in its duties 
and obligations. 
i'ou have now coropleted your duties as 
jurorrS in this case and you are discharged with the 
sincere thanks of th1e court. 'l'he question may 
arise as to whether you may discuss this case with 
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number two. 
Question number two, on count two of 
the In£ormat:1.on, we find the defendant Albert A. 
Ciccone, not guilty cf first degree of the embryo 
or fetus being carried by Kathleen C,iocone, 
If you have answered question number two 
guilty, you need go no turthar as to e:ount two. 
Simply sign and date the verdict form and return it 
to the bailiff, It' you have questioned number two 
not guilty, you must na,-t answer question number 
three. 
Question number three: On count of the 
Information, we find the defendam:, Albert A. 
Cice:one, gl.lilty of second degree of tha embryo or 
fetus being carried by Kathleen Ciccone. liatad 
th1s 26th day of January, 2005, Patrio.ia H. Allen. 
MeirJ:iers of the jury, is this your tree 
verdict so say you all? 
JURORS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Does 1:he o .. fensf! wish to have the 
jury polled? 
~lR. AA'ILlIT, We do, Judge. 
THE COURT: Very well. The Clerk will call 
the roU cf the jury. 
(Jucy panel polled.) 
Sta.ta- of tdaho v 4 ber:t Ciccon 
40 
the attorneys or with anyone else. For your 
guidance, the Court instructs you that whether you 
talk to the attorneys or to anyone else is entirely 
your own decision. It is proper for you to dlscuss 
this case if you wish to but you are not required 
to do so and you may choose not to discuss the case 
with anyone at all. 
If you choose to you may tell them as 
much or as little as you like but you should be 
careful to respect the privacy and feelings of your 
fellow jurors. Remember that they understood their 
deliberations to ba confidential, Therefore, you 
should limit your comments to your own peroeptiona 
and feelings. 
If anyone persists in discussing the 
case over your objection or baoomea critical of 
your service either before or after any discussion 
has begun please report that to me. 
I will be happy to meet with any of tile 
jurors that wish to following taking care of a few 
matters here that I must take care of which should 
take a few moments. It's certa.tnly not a 
requirement that you meet with me. You have all 
been nere a long time and you have your li~es to 
lead. But t.hank you for your service, You are now 
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(.Jin:y -ed.) 
THE COURT: The Clerk will re<;:ord the 
judgments of conviction with regard to count one 
and count two as delivered by the jury. The court 
will order that a pre-sentence report be prepared 
be Ht for sentencing Mai:oh 
at 1:30. 
Are there any further mat.tars to come 
before the court from either Counsel? Mr. Bazzoli? 
MR. BAZZOLI, Your Honor, State requests that 
the defendant remain held without bond. 
THE COURT, The defendant will remain in 
custody and held without bond. 
Mr. Ratliff. 
MR. RATLIFF: Nothing further, Judge. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. Thank you 
for; well-presentad caces. 
MR. BAZZOLI: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Proceedings eoneludo!<;l 4:28 p.m.) 
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. COUNTY OF ELMORE ) 
I, NICOLE L. OMSBERG, Official Court 
Reporter of the County of Elmore, State of Idaho, 
hereby certify: 
That I attended the hearing in the 
above-entitled matter and reported in stenograph the 
proceedings had thereat: That I thereafter, from the 
shorthand record made by me at said hearing, prepared 
a typewritten transcript of said proceedings; that 
the foregoing 45 pages constitutes said transcript 
and that said transcript contains a full, true, 
complete and correct transcript of said proceedings. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto 
set my hand this 26th day of August, 2008. 
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(297 P.3d 11 51] Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Erik R. Lehtinen, Chief, Appellate Unit, Boise, for appellant. Erik R. Lehtinen argued. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General ; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Lori. A. Fleming argued. 
PERRY, Judge Pro Tern. 
Albert A. Ciccone appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered upon the jury verdict finding h im guilty of one count of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder. Ciccone presents three issues on appeal: (1) whether his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial were violated; (2) whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during his rebuttal closing arguments; and (3) whether his determinate life sentence is excessive. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
On October 16, 2003, Ciccone struck his pregnant wife with his car, killing her and the unborn fetus. Ciccone was charged with two counts of first degree murder- one count for his wife and one count for the unborn fetus. On January 27, 2004, the district court entered an order holding defendant to answer, and on the same day, the State filed its information. 
EXHIBIT j, 
--•. 
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Trial was initially set for July 2004; however, a week before triai the State flied a motion to continue. The State's --·•-- ______ _. •L-• --···--' ···'tnesses were military personnel assigned to temporary duty (TOY) outside the state and ine opposed the motion, arguing that the prosecutor negligently waited for the Air Force e attempting to contact witnesses. The district court granted the motion to continue and the was delayed until January 4, 2005. The jury ultimately found Ciccone guilty of first degree murder of his,wife and second degree murder of the unborn fetus. The district court entered judgment on the jury's verdict and imposed a determinate life sentence upon Ciccone's conviction for first degree murder and a concurrent determinate fifteen-year sentence upon his conviction for second degree murder. Ciccone appealed and after the case was briefed and argued before this Court and the Idaho Supreme Court, his appeal was dismissed because it was not timely. See State v. Ciccone, 1 SO Idaho 305, 246 P.3d 958 (2010). Pursuant to a stipulation and order entered in post-conviction proceedings, the district court vacated its original judgment and conviction and reentered it as of April 19, 2011. Ciccone timely appeals from that judgment of conviction. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Right to a Speedy Trial 
Ciccone argues on appeal that his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial were violated when the district court allowed him "to be tried almost fifteen months after his arrest and almost a full year after the filing of the Information .... " Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's right to a speedy tri~ presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000). We will defer to the trial court's findings of fact if supported by substantial and competent evidence; however, we will (297 P.3d 1152] exercise free review of the trial court's conclusions of law. Id. 
In Idaho, criminal defendants enjoy both constitutional and statutory entitlements to a speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 1 3 of the Idaho Constitution. These constitutional protections are supplemented by Idaho Code § 19-3501, which sets specific time limits within which a criminal defendant must be brought to trial. Idaho Code § 19-3501 provides as follows: 
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed, in the following cases: 
(2) If a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not brought to trial within six (6) months from the date that the information Is flied with the court. 
I.C. § 19-3501 (2). Under this statute, the State bears the burden to demonstrate good cause for a failure to bring a defendant to trial within t'1,e six-month limit. Clark, 135 Idaho at 258, 16 P.3d at 934;State v. Livas, 147 lda~o 547, 549,211 P.3d 792, 794 (Ct.App.2009). 
. 
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the United States Supreme Court addressed application of the speedy trial right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and chose a flexible approach for assessing whether a speedy trial has been unconstitutionally denied. The Court adopted a balancing test in which the conduct of the defendant and the prosecution are to be considered, and the Court identified four primary factors to be weighed in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-92, 33 L.Ed.2d at 116-17. This same balancing test was adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court for determining whether the speedy trial guarantee of the Idaho Constitution has been violated. See State v. Lindsay, 96 Idaho 474, 476, 531 P.2d 236, 238 (1975). 
In Clark, the Idaho Supreme Court reexamined "what 'good cause' means in the context of I.C. § 19-3501." Clark, 135 Idaho at 259, 16 P.3d at 935. The Court thereupon abandoned the previous approach of wholesale incorporation of the Barker balancing test when enforcing the speedy trial rights conferred by I.C. § 19-3501. The Court $tated that to evaluate the justification for bringing a defendant to trial after the statutory six-month time. limit, ~ 
[WJe believe that a thorough analysis of the reasons for the delay represents the soundest method for determining what constitutes good cause. We therefore conclude that good cause means that there is a substantial reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay. See State v. Johnson, 11 9 Idaho 56, , 58, 803 P.2d 557, S59 (Ct.App.1990); State v. Stuart, 1 i 3 Idaho 494, 496, 745 P.2d 1115, 1117 
4/25/1410:lOAM 
3 
3 of 12 
m/docView.aspx?Docld=1241572&Ind ... 
(Ct.App.1987). Because there is not a fixed rule for determining good cause for the delay of a trial, the matter 
•- •-•·•-"· • 
1
·"" ·- .... -'•-··:tion of the trial court. See Johnson, 119 Idaho at 58, 803 P.2d at 559;[State v. J at 13, 878 P.2d [184] at 187 [ (Ct.App.1994) ];see also People v. Johnson, 26 
_,tr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 746 (1980); Gallimore v. State, 944 P.2d 939,943 (Okla.Crim.App.1997). 
But as the Iowa Supreme Court noted in State v. Petersen, the reason for the delay "cannot be evaluated in a vacuum." 288 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Iowa 1980). The good cause determination may take into account·the factors listed in Barker. The Barkerfactors, however, "considered only as surrounding circumstances are important, if at all, only insofar as they bear on the sufficiency of the reason itself. The shortness of the period, the failure of the defendant to demand a speedy trial, and the absence of prejudice are legitimate considerations only insofar as they affect the strength of the reason for delay. This means that, to whatever extent the delay has been a short one, or the defendant has not demanded a speedy trial, or is not [297 P.3d 11 53) prejudiced, a weaker reason will constitute good cause. On the other hand, if the delay has been a long one, or if the defendant has demanded a speedy trial, or is prejudiced, a stronger reason is necessary to constitute good cause." Id. 
Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936. 
This Court recently commented in State v.Jacobson, 153 Idaho 377, 283 P.3d 124 (Ct.App.2012) that: 
• Our Supreme Court's non-application of the Barker factors, other than the reason for the delay, in Clark and Young is significant. We take this to mean that where the reason for the delay is well defined, and that reason on its face clearly does, or clearly does not, constitute good cause, there is no occasion to consider the other Barker factors in assessing a claimed violation of Idaho Code§ 19-3501. This comports with the Supreme Court's statement in Clark that "if the reason for the delay is sufficient the other [ Barker} factors are not needed. If the reason for the delay is insufficient the other factors will not avail to avoid dismissal." Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936 (quoting State v. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1999)). We conclude that resort to the other Barkerfactors will be appropriate primarily in close cases as where, for example, there are multiple reasons for the delay attributable to both the State and the defendant or the sufficiency of the reason to constitute "good cause" is genuinely subject to disagreement. 
Id. at 380, 283 P.3d at 127. 
1. Reason for the delay 
~· In evaluating the reason for the delay, different weights are assigned to different reasons. United States v. loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302,315,106 S.Ct. 648, 656, 88 L.Ed.2d 640, 654 (1986); State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 837, 118 P.3d 160, 169 (Ct.App.2005). Our speedy trial standards recognize that pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly justifiable. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 656, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2693, 120 L.Ed.2d 520, 531 (1992); Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 11 8 P.3d at 169. We attach great weight to considerations such as the State's need for time to collect witnesses, oppose pretrial motions, or locate the defendant in the event that he or she goes into hiding. Doggett, SOS U.S. at 656, 112 S.Ct. at 2693, 120 L.Ed.2d at 531 ;Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 118 P.3d at 169. A valid .reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. However, there is an enormous difference between being inconvenienced and being unavailable. Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P ;3d at 936;Davis, 141 Idaho at 83 7, 11 8 P.3d at 169. True unavailability suggests an unqualified inability to attend, while inconvenience merely implies that attendance at trial would be burdensome. Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936;Davis, 141 Idaho at 83 7, 118 P.3d at 169. 
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighed heavily against the State. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d at l 17;Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 118 P.3d at 169. A more neutral reason, such as negligence or overcrowded courts, should be weighed less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the State rather than with the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S., at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d at l l 7;Davis, 141 Idaho at 837; 118 P.3d at l 69;State v. Wavrick, 123 Idaho 83, 89, 844 P.2d 712, 718 (Ct.App.1992). While not compelling relief in every case where a 'bad-faith delay would make relief virtually automatic, neither is negligence automatically tolerable simply because the accused cannot · demonstrate exactly how it has prejudiced him or her. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657, 112 S.Ct. at 2693-94, 120 L.Ed.2d at S31-32;Davis, 141 Idaho at 837-38, 118 P.3d at 169-70. Although negligence is weighed more lightly than a deliberate intent to harm the accused's defense, it still falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657, 112 S.Ct. at 2693-94, 120 L.Ed.2d at S31-32;Davis, 141 Idaho at 837-38, 118 P.3d at 169-70. 
In its oral ruling granting the State's motion to continue, the district court identified what it believed to be the 
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causes of the delay: 
However, the court in reviewing the affidavits and statements of the State and with considering those matters which I must consider with regard to the granting of any continuance in this particular case the length of the delay would have to be until December. That is the first available date when two weeks would be available on the court's calendar. Pardon me, January, when two weeks would be available on the court's calendar, which the parties are advising me is the amount of time that they feel would be taken. 
The court had in fact advised both parties at the time that trial was set in this matter that it would not be able to be here the first week of August. As a result of that, other commitments have been made with the court's time. While a congested calendar is not enough for a continuance, the fact that other calendar items have been scheduled because of the fact that the parties felt the matter could be completed by July 30th and now do not feel that that is the case, I think is a little bit different matter. 
And the court feels that continuing a matter and having half your trial in July and the other half In August creates other problems that could potentially prejudice the defendant, as well. 
The reason for the request the court feels is in fact reasonable. The court notes that a jury trial for a murder case In Elmore County has not gone to trial for nearly twenty years. Somehow I seem to have had the luck of getting two of them in my first year and a half on the bench. 
And It appears that the prosecution in this case did make efforts to be in touch with the Ai.r Force with regard to these witnesses: that according to the affidavit the Information with regard to the witnes§es was not provided until June; that the prosecution was not advised that some of those witnesses were out of the country, out of reach of the subpoena power of this court until July a few days prior to trial. 
Certainly hindsight is always 20-20. And the fact of the matter Is that we must recognize that this is a military community and military do in fact have their own procedures and the United States is at the current time in a state of war in two countries. And that military personnel are being switched around, moved for training on a regular basis, which creates a problem for the prosecution. Probably even greater than those that are presented when the United States is not in that situation. 
Prosecution's representation is that It did not know that these witnesses would not be available until July. Intent is a key element in a first degree murder trial and certain of these witnesses directly relate to the issue of intent. Not only is the defendant required to-is entitled to a fair and speedy trial, but the people as well are entitled to a fair and speedy trial. And it would be extremely-an extreme hardship on the State to attempt to obtain these people on such short notice. ft is possible they could not be obtained at all. 
Finally, is there prejudice to the defendant? The court will note that yes there ls in fact prejudice to the defendant any time, in the court's opinion, when there is a delay. 
However, given the facts of this case, the court does not believe that this is an unreasonable delay, nor does it present an unreasonable prejudice to the defendant and will note that the State has cooperated in the taking of depositions voluntarily where the defendant discovered that one of the witnesses was going to be on temporary duty, as well. 
So, is there prejudice? Yes, there is some prejudice. Is that prejudice unreasonable given the circumstances? No. The court finds that it is not. And has the defendant demanded his rights? The defendant has in fact demanded and asserted his rights to speedy trial. However, the court will note that under the laws of this state and under the United States Supreme Court decision, the right to a trial within a specified period of time is not absolute. The court does have discretion to grant a continuance for reasonable cause shown. The court does believe that reasonable cause has been shown in this matter. 
(297 P.3d 1155) 
So, the court, despite Its concerns over the continuance and the inconvenience that is going to occur, will for all of those reasons grant the continuance requested. The court will reset this matter for trial for a period of two weeks to commence January 4th of 2005. 
As noted above, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay. Barker, 407. U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117. Moreover, in Doggettthe United States Supreme Court stated: "[t]he government may need time to collect witnesses .... We attach great weight to such considerations when balancing them against the costs of going forward with a trial whose probative accuracy the passage of time has begun by degrees to 
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throw into question." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656, 112 S.Ct. at 2693, 120 L.Ed.2d at 5 31. Ciccone argues that the witnesses '---- ···--- - -· ._ .. ,_ · .. _____ ,,_._,_ as contemplated by the Idaho appellate decisions of Clark and Davis and any !d by the State's negligence. In Clark, the Idaho Supreme Court dealt with a speedy trial 
_ _ 1ility or mere inconvenience. See Clark, 135 Idaho at 255, 16 P.3d at 931. There, the State requested a continuance to accommodate the complaining witness, French. Id. at 256, 16 P.3d at 932. The prosecutor Informed the magistrate that French lived in Montana and was scheduled to take board exams on September 8. Id. The prosecutor also stated that French could not travel to Boise for a trial between September 20 and October 6, 1997, because of teaching obligations. Id. The Court concluded: 
But the record in this case indicates that French was neither "missing" in any sense of the word, nor was she actually "unavailable." There is an enormous difference between being inconvenienced and being unavailable. True unavailability suggests an unqualified inability to attend, while inconvenience merely implies that as in a case such as this, attendance at trial would be burdensome. Here, French could have attended the September 22 trial, and in fact was compelled to do so by the magistrate's previous order. The State, however, not wishing to have French travel from out of state only to face postponement of the trial, requested that Clark's trial either be given top priority on September 22 or moved to a date in which the trial would have first priority. But the desire to accommodate French's schedule cannot be said to comprise a reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay. 
Id. at 260-61, 16 P.3d at 936-37. 
Our review of the record in this instance leads us to conclude that the State demonstrated good cause for the delay-the unavailability of witnesses. The State filed the information charging Ciccone with two counts of first degree murder on January 27, 2004. Ciccone's trial was originally set to commence on July 20, 2004-seven days prior to the statutory deadline of J.C. § 19-3501. On July 16, 2004, the State filed a motion to continue the trial, asserting that six of its witnesses were active duty military personnel assigned to TOY outside the state and were unavailable for trial. Of those six witnesses, three were in South Korea and another was in Texas preparing to be deployed to Iraq. 
Ciccone argues that the State has not demonstrated that the witnesses were truly unavailable. A witness being unavailable for trial due to active military service is a good reason for delay. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 287 Ga.App. 300, 6S 1 S.E.2d 218, 219-20 (2007) (reason for the delay was sufficient when witness was unavailable because she was on active duty as a member of the armed forces and was serving in Iraq); People v. Chardon, 83 A.D.3d 954, 922 N. Y.S.2d 127, 128-29 (2011) (holding that a "subsequent period between June 8, 2005, and July 7, 2005, were attributable to exceptional circumstances and, therefore, excludable [],since the complainant was deployed for military service in Korea"); Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 A.2d 11 75, 1190-92 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005) ("The Commonwealth cannot be held to be acting without due diligence when a witness becomes unavailable due to circumstances beyond its control. Certainly, [a witness's] deployment to the Middle East was a matter over which the Commonwealth had no control."); Kelley v. Commonwealth, 1 7 Va.App. 540, 439 S.E.2d 616, 619 (1994) ("the Commonwealth was justified in requesting a continuance for the period in which [ ], their (297 P.3d 11 56] primary witness, was called to military duty in the Persian Gulf"). 
Ciccone also argues that the State negligently waited for the Air Force to conclude its investigation, which caused the subpoenas to be sent in June. The Air Force investigation contained a witness list that the State used to prepare for trial. All of the witnesses in the report were Air Force members. Although waiting for the conclusion of the investigation pushed the State to the discovery deadline, the list was given to defense counsel before the deadline date. The State waiting for the conclusion of the Air Force investigation was reasonable, given the unique circumstances of the military co'!lmunity and military procedures. 
Although this Court concludes that the reason for the delay ultimately weighs in favor of finding that Ciccone's 
.e,edy trial rights were not violated, we further determine that it is sufficiently close to warrant a discussion of the other th lee Barker factors. 
2. Length of delay 
Barker's four-part speedy trial test creates no bright-line boundaries. Rather, the United States Supreme Court pointed out that because of the imprecision of the right to a speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke an inquiry into whether those rights have been violated is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-92, 33 L.Ed.2d at 116-17. The nature of the case is also of import in determining the period of delay that can be tolerated, for the period that is reasonable for prosecution of an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a complex conspiracy charge. Id. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d at 1 l 7;State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 353, 160 P.3d 1284, 1288 (Ct.App.2007);Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 118 P.3d at 169;State v. McNew, 131 Idaho 268, 272, 954 P.2d 686, 690 (Ct.App.1998). 
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As Ciccone points out, when his trial began on january 4, 2005, it was nearly twelve months from when the 
'-"'·---~•-- ..... "'"·-' ... '"'- -'·
11y is not as significant, given that the nature of the charges Ciccone was facing-two counts 
'airly characterized as complex. Compare Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 118 P.3d at 169 
_ 
_ trising out of a traffic stop could not be characterized as complex), and State v. Moore, 48 Idaho 887, 902, 231 P.3d 532, 547 (Ct.App.2010) (same), with Lopez, 144 Idaho at 353, 160 P.3d at 1288 (concluding a seventeen-month delay was unreasonable because "the record on appeal shows no difficulty with complexity of investigation, lost witnesses, trouble marshalling evidence, or any other mitigating circumstance justifying the delay"). Here, the severe nature of the alleged offenses required more time than that of a non-complex case. In addition, witnesses were unavailable, the defense did not provide an expert's curriculum vitae until after the State requested a continuance, and the Air Force procedures and protocol provided complications that all added to the length of the delay. 
3. Assertion of speedy trial rights 
In the context of a constitutional speedy trial analysis, the defendant's assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentlary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32, 92 S.Ct. at 2192-93, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117-18. At the hearing on the State's continuance motion, Ciccone clearly asserted his speedy trial rights. Thus, we conclude that Ciccone asserted his speedy trial rights as soon as he knew he would not be brought to trial within six months, and his assertion weighs in favor of dismissal on speedy trial grounds. 
4. Prejudice 
The fourth factor in the Barker analysis is prejudice to the accused caused by the delay. Prejudice is to be assessed in light of the interests that the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect. State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 118, 29 P.3d 949, 954 (2001 ). Those interests are: (l) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117-18; Young, 136 Idaho at 118, 29 P.3d at 9S4;Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354-55, 160 P.3d at 1289-90. The [297 P.3d 1157] third of these is the most significant because a hindrance to adequate preparation of the defense "skews the fairness of the entire system." Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118;Lopez, 144 Idaho at 355, 160 P.3d at 1290.See also State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 583, 990 P.2d 742, 749 (Ct.App.1 999). 
Relevant to this inquiry, the district court stated: 
Finally, is there prejudice to the defendant? The court will note that yes there is in fact prejudice to the defendant any time, in the court's opinion, when there is a delay. 
However, given the facts of this case, the court does not believe that this is an unreasonable delay, nor does it present an unreasonable prejudice to the defendant and will note that the State has cooperated in the taking of depositions voluntarily where the defendant discovered that one of the witnesses was going to be on temporary duty, as well. 
So, is there prejudice? Yes, there is some prejudice. Is that prejudice unreasonable given the circumstances? No. The court finds that it is not. 
As for the first two interests, it is unquestioned that Ciccone endured anxiety while he was facing charges from the State and remained incarcerated for the entirety of the time between his arrest and trial. As to the last interest, Ciccone asserts that the delay impaired his defense against the charges in this case. Ciccone specifically argues that one witness, Ms. Shaw, testified at trial that when Ciccone got out of his car and started talking on his cell phone, he said "I got the job done." When confronted with the fact that she had never revealed this information before, Shaw said that no one had ever asked her what Cia::one had said into his cell phone. However, Shaw had been asked that question before at Ciccone's preliminary hearing and had testified then to not being able to hear what Ciccone had said into his cell phone. Ciccone attributes that misstatement to the extended delay in bringing him to trial. Ciccone contends that one witness's memory "could have deteriorated so significantly by the time of Mr. Ciccone's trial, one must wonder how reliable any of the witness' (sic) trial testimony was so long after the fact." 
Ciccone's prejudice argument concerning possible witness memory loss is unavailing. First, the witness that , misstated her previous testimony was cross-examined and impeached by Ciccone's attorney. Furthermore, Ciccone;s attorney made specific reference to the inconsistent statements during closing argument. The impeachment removed any prejudice Ciccone could have faced by the witness's inconsistent testimony. Second, Ciccone's argument is based solely on speculation and does not demonstrate prejudice. See Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 31 5, 106 S.Ct. at 656, 88 L.Ed.2d at 654 (alleging only a "possibility of prejudice is not sufficient to support" a cialm of a speedy trial violation). Thus, Ciccone has 
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failed to demonstrate that the delay prejudiced his defense to the charges in any degree. 
Although the delay in this case went beyond the six-month statutory speedy trial date, the most important consideration is the reason for the delay and we conclude, from the record, the State demonstrated good cause in seeking a continuance. Likewise, the length of the delay was not significant in light of the charges Ciccone was facing-two counts of first degree murder-and the complexities of prosecuting an Air Force member in a military community. Further weighing against a speedy trial violation is that there is no perceptible prejudice from the delay apparent In the record. Accordingly, we conclude Ciccone has not shown a constitutional or statutory speedy trial violation. 
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Ciccone argues that during rebuttal closing argument the prosecutor made three improper statements. The first statement Ciccone alleges was improper because it infringed on his right to silence under the United States and Idaho Constitutions. The second statement Ciccone now argues contributed to the general tone that he did not testify at trial. The third statement Ciccone alleges was an improper plea to the jury to convict him not on the evidence, but on sympathy for the [297 P.3d 11 58] victims. Each statement will be taken up in turn. 
1. Defendant's silence 
Ciccone argues that the prosecutor referred to Ciccone's decision not to testify and the statement rose to the level of fundamental error because it resulted in him being denied due process of law and violated his right to remain silent under the United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution. During closing argument, the prosecutor stated "[t]here's only two people that know, and Kathleen Ciccone isn't here to tell us." Ciccone did not object to the statement at trial. 
In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), the Idaho 9upreme Court clarified the fundamental error doctrine that applies where a defendant asserts that an error occurred at trial-which it explicitly stated included allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. The Court summarized the standards applicable both when there was a contemporaneous objection and when there was not, the latter of which is applicable here: 
If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental error doctrine. Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. If the defendant persuades the appellate court that the complained of error satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court shall vacate and remand. 
Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. In regard to the harmless error analysis, a defendant bears the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 226, 245 P.3d .. at 978. 
Closing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal case. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583,587 (Ct.App.2007). its purpose is to enlighten the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence. Id.; State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 450, 816 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct.App.1991 ). Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003); Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. While our system of criminal justice is adversarial in nature, and the prosecutor is expected to be diligent and leave no stone ,, unturned, he or she is nevertheless expected and required to be fair. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 28S (2007). However, in reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct we must keep in mind the realities of trial. Id. A fair trial is not necessarily a perfect trial. Id. 
Ciccone claims that he has satisfied Perry's first prong because the prosecutor's statement violated his constitutional right to silence. According to Ciccone, the prosecutor's statement implied that Ciccone was invoking his right to silence because only he could have told the jury about his argument with the victim. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that a prosecutor's comments "must be evaluated in light of defense conduct and in the context of the entire trial." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 719, 215 P.3d 414, 439 (2009); see also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179, l 06 S.Ct. 2464, 2470-71, 91 L.Ed.2d 144, 156 (1986) (stating that when the State's closing follows the defense's, "[t]he prosecutors' comments must be evaluated in light of the defense argument that preceded it"). Indeed, "a 
4/25/14 10:10 AM 
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criminal conviction is not to be !!ght!y overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the 
-·-·----·- -- ___ ...... -··-·'--viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the prosecutor's f the trial." United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1044, 84 L.Ed.2d 1, 
The relevant portion of the prosecutor's rebuttal argument is as follows: 
[297 P.3d 1159] 
~et's talk about [defense counsel] talking about the scene on K & R Ranch Road. How this precious purse a woman would have carried, the bag of food she obviously had in her possession because that's what Albert said. 
So I guess she has got the purse in the car, the bag of food in the car, the medicine, the sweater tied around her and everything. And she decided to get out with all of that stuff on K & R Ranch Road ... and decided to walk however many feet-let's just say-it Is on the chart-walk up there with all the purse, sweatshirt tied around her waist, bottle of pills, and all the food bag, and had enough wherewithal to throw it all at him right-or left-handed. Maybe she sat the purse down to get the McDonalds bag or the Burger King to throw at him. Maybe she just left it there. I don't know. There's only two people that know, and Kathleen Ciccone isn't here to tell us. 
Did the defendant try and hide this evidence, as the defense has talked to Cathy Wolfe about? He knew she was going to find it. Well, he sure as heck didn't walk back towards the driveway after he had run down his wife. As a matter of fact, they found him about as far away as you could get in that time frame from the driveway. 
Did he ever tell Cathy Wolfe, "I didn't turn around here. You're wrong. I turned around at K & R Ranch Road. That's where we got to. That's where we stopped. That's where we had a fight. That's where I turned around"? 
He never once said, at least in my memory, that that's where he turned around. He bought on, "Oh, this is where I turned around. Why would I turn around here? It doesn't make sense. We just had a little tiff. We were just joking. She wanted to go see her friends. That was it." 
He didn't say, "Detective Wolfe, it has come back to me now. I turned around up here." 
As a matter of fact, he didn't even mention throwing the food or anything else until Cathy Wolfe said, "Look, we found all the food." Oh, well, excuse me. I had a bad day. Pardon me for my omission. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In this case, the prosecutor's statement did not infringe on Ciccone's right to silence. The statement was made in response to defense counsel's reference to Ciccone's interview with the police. At that interview, Ciccone discussed the purported evidence and claimed that he accidently hit his wife with the car. Rather than making the improper implication as Ciccone alleges, the prosecutor merely explained Ciccone's prior statement to the police. This result is further evidenced by the prosecutor's remarks "that's what Albert said" and "[d]id he ever tell Cathy Wolfe." Considering the entirety of the argument, the prosecutor's statement was not improper and, therefore, did not rise to the level of fundamental error. 
At oral argument, Ciccone's appellate counsel conceded that his second alleged error of prosecutorial misconduct could not be an independent claim of error because a defense objection was sustained and trial counsel failed to move for a mistrial. During rebuttal, the prosecutor also stated: 
There is no testimony that he was looking down at is [sic] watch, that the cigarette smoke had blown in his face, that he was changing the radio station, that a cassette dropped, a cigarette dropped in his pants, he had to try and put it out real quick. No testimony as to that. Absolutely none. He doesn't say anything about any-
In light of Ciccone's concession at oral argument, he now argues that although this statement is not an individual claim of error, it contributed to the "general tone" that Ciccone failed to testify. 
When Ciccone's trial attorney objected to this statement, the district court sustained the objection and admonished the jury: 
ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the jur1 will disregard any argument based upon what the defendant did not say. As stated earlier in instruction 55, a defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be 
99 
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compe!!ed to testif'I. 
The decision of whether to testify is left to the defendant acting with the advice and assistance of the defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact the defendant did not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any way. 
We conclude that the prosecutor's statement did not contribute to any_ "general tone" that Ciccone did not testify. The second statement was objected to and the objection was sustained, stopping any further improper comments. Furthermore, a curative instruction was given to the Jury to ensure that no weight was given to Ciccone invoking his right to silence. In light of our determination that the first alleged prosecutorial misconduct statement was a reference to a custodial interview, this second statement was not a part of a general tone created by the prosecutor to illustrate that Ciccone refused to testify at trial. 
2. Sympathy for the Victim 
Ciccone also argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he allegedly asked the jury to convict Ciccone based on sympathy for the victim. Ciccone did not object to the prosecutor's statement at trial. As noted above, where prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to during trial, this Court may only reverse when that misconduct constitutes a fundamental error. Perry, 1 50 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979. Under Perry's first prong, an alieged error must violate one of the accused's unwaived constitutional rights. Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. A defendant's right to a fair trial, under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, is violated where a prosecutor attempts to "secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence." Id. at 227, 245 P.3d at 979. 
Ciccone relies on the following rebuttal statement to support his argument: 
When you kill somebody, you take away everything they have and everything they ever will have. Kathleen was twenty-two years old. Her death is a tragedy. Give her life meaning and give her death the sense of justice that it requires. Hold the defendant accountable for the purposeful, willful, deliberate, premeditated actions that he took that night. 
We are not persuaded that Ciccone has shown fundamental error in the prosecutor's arguments. Even if we assume that the prosecutor's statement strayed into the realm of emotional appeal, it did not approach the level of egregiousness necessary to constitute fundamental error. Prior to making the statement cited above, the prosecutor said, "[tJhis case is about Kathleen Ciccone's death, not the mother's pains, not about Albert Ciccone's being in the hands of [defense counsel]. It is about how and why she died. " (Emphasis added.) Moreover, after the statement Ciccone alleges is improper, the prosecutor clearly asks the jury to "[h]old the defendant accountable for the purposeful, willful, deliberate, premeditated actions that he took that night." The prosecutor stated twice that Ciccone should be found guilty based on his criminal actions. We conclude this statement does not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct and thus Ciccone has failed to demonstrate fundamental error. 
Lastly, Ciccone in passing asserts that "[t]aken together, these instances of misconduct rendered it impossible for Mr. Ciccone to receive a truly fair trial." Although not cited as such, Ciccone appears to argue that when taken together the three statements constitute cumulative error. The cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant's right to due process. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998). A necessary predicate to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error. Severson, 147 Idaho at 723, 215 P.3d at 443;State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 407, 958 P.2d 22, 33 (Ct.App.1998). Because this Court determined that there was no error, Ciccone has failed to show errors sufficient to invoke the doctrine of cumulative error. 
[297 P.3d 1161] C. Excessive Sentence 
Ciccone argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a determinate life sentence for first degree 
murder. [l] Specifically, Ciccone asserts that "while his actions are reprehensible and tragic (as any murder is), the murder in this case is devoid of aggravating circumstances and, therefore, is relatively non-egregious." Ciccone further contends that the district court did not properly consider other mitigating factors, including his: (1) mental health; (2) rehabilitation potential; (3) service in the Air Force; and (4) lack of prior felony convictions. 
An appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 
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276, 1 P.ld 299, 304 (Ct.App.2000). Where a sentence is not iliegai, the appeilant has the burden to show that it is ··--------'-'- ---' 4 '-··- - -•--- abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482,490 (1992). A n abuse of discretion if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. State v. P.2d 323, 324 (1982). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is necessary "to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case." State v. Toohi/1, 1 03 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct.App.1982). Where an appellant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, we conduct an independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offe,nse, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P .2d, 11 83, 11 84 (Ct.App.1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 
Imposing a life sentence requires a high degree of certainty that the defendant cannot be released safely back into society or that the nature of the offense requires the defendant to spend the rest of his or her life in prison. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 149, 191 P.3d 217, 227 (2008). The Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed a sentencing court's ability to consider the nature of the offense when imposing a determinate life sentence in State v. Windom, 1 50 Idaho 873, 253 P.3d 31 O (2011). There, the Idaho Supreme Court reiterated that a sentencing court may consider the heinous and cruel nature of the crime when determining whether a defendant should spend the rest of his or her life in prison. Id. at 876, 253 P.3d at 313.See also State v. Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 73, 44 P.3d 1122, 1128 (2002); State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294, 939 P.2d 1372, 1373 (1997). The Windom Court went on to hold that the sentencing considerations of societal retribution and general deterrence are decided based upon the unique characteristics of the offense. Windom, 150 Idaho at 880, 884, 253 P.3d at 317, 321. 
Regarding the calculated and callous method in which the victim was killed, the district court determined that Ciccone's crime of first degree murder mandated life in prison, stating: 
The report of the accident reconstruction specialist from the Idaho State Police, who reviewed the scene shortly after the events happened, was as follows: "Albert Ciccone drove his vehicle to the right side of the road in a straight-ahead motion. The speed of his vehicle would have been about fifty miles-per-hour when he struck Kathleen Ciccone, the pedestrian. 
"The lack of any action on the driver's part until he saw that he was going to hit the mailbox indicates that he had no reaction to the pedestrian that was walking on the right side of the road." 
"The marks at the scene indicate a deliberate running over of the pedestrian and then a reaction to attempt to miss the mailbox. The driver could not have seen the mailbox until his vehicle struck the pedestrian." 
The district court also noted: 
There had been prior acts witnessed by others of verbal abuse; prior acts, the [297 P.3d 1162) effects of which were seen by others, of battery by the defendant upon the decedent, Kathleen Ciccone. And perhaps most telling, although not revealed to the jury at the time of trial, a prior attempt to hit Kathleen Ciccone with a motor vehicle when she left the hospital on one occasion at the Air Force base when the defendant was angry with her. 
Ciccone contends that his determinate life sentence cannot be reasonable "based on a finding that the murder in this case was particularly egregious. To do so would be to find that first degree murder, in and of itself, is so egregious that it demands the harshest possible sentence short of death, but that clearly is not the case." We cannot agree with Ciccone that this was a relatively non-egregious murder. The district court had before it facts that proved Ciccone intentionally struck his wife with his car traveling at speeds of almost fifty miles per hour. Furthermore, Ciccone only applied his brakes to avoid hitting a mailbox, not in a reaction to striking his wife. Ciccone completed his atrocious act by callously walking away from his injured wife without providing aid or calling for help. Ciccone's argument that this was a relatively non-egregious murder is based entirely on his belief that the incident was a tragic accident. This belief was not supported by the jury finding him guilty of first degree murder, and thus was not a factor in sentencing. 
Clccone further argues that the district court did not properly consider other mitigating factors, including his mental health, potential for rehabilitation, service in the Air Force, and lack of prior felony convictions. As our Supreme Court stated in Windom: 
Sentencing is less a science than an art. Judges face a different uncertainty principle than physicists: they must make a factual finding of the probability of future criminal behavior based upon limited data. In so doing, they draw upon their accumulated experience. It is precisely because of the difficulty of fashioning an objectively appropriate sentence that this Court has adopted a deferential standard of review of sentencing decisions. 
l 
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,es not require (nor indeed, does it permit) us to conduct our own evaluation of the wergnt to oe given eacn of the sentencing considerations (societal protection, general and specific deterrence, defendant's prospects for rehabilitation and societal retribution) ln order to determine whether we agree with the district court's conclusion. 
In short, our task is not to determine whether we agree with the sentence imposed; rather, our duty is to determine whether Windom has demonstrated that the district court's imposition of sentence constituted an abuse of discretion under the well-established standards of review governing such decisions. 
Id. See also State v. Thurlow, 152 Idaho 256, 260, 269 P.3d 813, 817 (Ct.App.2011 ). 
In this case, the district court recognized its discretion in sentencing. The district court articulated the goals of sentencing. The district court also properly: (1) considered the egregious nature of the crime; (2) acknowledged Ciccone's mental health issues, his background and character, and lack of a criminal record; (3) applied the correct legal standard; and (4) arrived at the determinate life sentence through an exercise of reason. The district court even noted: "I must base my decision on the facts and the law and not upon the emotions or the pain of either party when I declare sentence." In essence, Ciccone requests that this Court reweigh the evidence presented before the district court and arrive at a different conclusion. However, to do so would be contrary to our established standards of review. Thus, we hold Ciccone has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him to a determinate life sentence for first degree murder. 
Ill •. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the district court did not err in finding good cause existed for the State's delay in bringing Ciccone to trial. Thus, Ciccone has failed to show that his constitutional or statutory speedy trial rights were violated. Ciccone alleged two instances of prosecutorial misconduct and has failed to show that the unobjected-to errors rose to the level of fundamental [297 P.3d 1163) error. Lastly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a life sentence for his conviction of first degree murder. Therefore, the judgment of conviction and sentence for one count of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder is affirmed. 
Judge LANSING and Judge GUTIERREZ concur. 
Notes: 
[1] Ciccone does not challenge the sentence he received upon his conviction for second degree murder for the unborn fetus. 
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I certify that a true 
following: 
correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the 
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
INTER DEPT MAIL 
JohnKormanik 
KORMANIK, HALLAM & SNEED, LLP 
206 W. Jefferson Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
U.S.MAIL 
Dated this 22°d day of August, 2014. 
Jl2 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
B~d Deputy lerk .. ' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-2014-59 
SECOND AMENDED SCHEDULING 
ORDER 
John Kormanik appeared as appointed counsel at the status conference on August 4, 2014, having substituted for previous counsel. 
Amended Petition: At a status conference on August 4, 2014, Mr. Kormanik requested 
an additional 30 days to supplement the record or amend the petition. The Petitioner had until September 3, 2014 to supplement the record or amend the petition. No supplement or 
amendment has been filed. 
Answer: The State of Idaho, through the Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, 
answered on January 31, 2014. 
The parties had until October 3, 2014 to file any motions for summary dismissal. No 
motions for summary dismissal were filed. 
This court had set a hearing on summary dismissal or evidentiary hearing on November 17, 2014 at 1:30 p.m. By e-mail on October 31, 2014, Mr. Kormanikrequested 
clarification on whether it was an evidentiary hearing or hearing on summary dismissal because of an error in this court Amended Scheduling Order. To clarify, no motions for 
summary dismissal have been filed. The November 17, 2014 hearing would therefore be an 
SECOND AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER 
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evidentiary hearing. Giving the error in the Amended Scheduling Order that would have led the parties to belief a motion for summary dismissal had been filed. The court will use November 17, 2014 at 1:30 p.m. as a scheduling conference to set the evidentlary hearing in this matter. 
Lyn~ 
District Judge 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the following: 
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
INTER DEPT MAIL 
John Kormanik 
KORMANIK, HALLAM & SNEED, LLP 
206 W. Jefferson Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
U.S. l\1AIL 
Dated this ~ day of ~ 
15 
, 2014. 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
B:910jfJ1 .Jr 
DeptityCierk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Case No. CV-2014-59 Petitioner, 
vs. AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Res ondent. 
An evidentiary hearing was held on December 12, 2014 with the parties requesting to present 
closing arguments in writing. 
The Petitioner must file his closing argument, if any, by close of business at the Elmore 
County Courthouse on January 9, 2015. 
The State of Idaho, through the Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, must file 
any responsive closing argument by January 30, 2015. 
The Petitioner's reply, if any, must be filed by February 6, 2015. 
This matter will be fully submitted for the court's consideration on February 9, 2015. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED and dated this lib day of December, 2014. 
~-Lynn G. Norton 
District Judge 
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following: 
a true and correct copy 
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
INTER DEPT MAIL 
John R. Kormanik 
KORMANIK HALLAM & SNEED LLP 
206 W. Jefferson Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
U.S.MAIL 
Dated this 16th day of December, 2014. 
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foregoing document was sent to 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
By~~~~~~~~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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JohnR. Kormanik, I8B #58SO 
KORMANIK BALLAM & SNEED LLP 
206 W.Jeffc,rson St 
Boise ID 83702 
Telephone: 208.288 .. 1888 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN nm DISTRICT COUR.T OF THE FOURTI:J JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO~ IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
ALBERTA. CICCONE, 
Plaintift 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO,, 
Defendant. 
Case No. C.'V-2014-0059 
_.. ... t-11JJ6 
ORDER V~"PREPARATIONOF 
TRANSCRIPT AT COUNTY EXPENSE 
THE COURT having reviewed and considered Plaintifrs Motion for Preparation cf 
Transcript at Caunty Expense filed herein_. 
11-+ECOt.AlT(x;;N\€$ · payment for the transcript ftom the evidentiary hearing 
conducted on Friday, December 12, 2014 shall be made at County expense;.~ SUCVI · 
~\A-s&vr.<pr ,s. Yl.o+ ~~ct'\,\~...-; ~,~~Ov\ .. oC.. clc.i$.\~:), ·av~u~-s Slh<:.Q._ . C<..U"'SC'.\ .. -~ ..~.· ~ rt~Se(1.~ ~.. '{)e11n(}Y\;Qr'"~+~ €\A~'-"'~ N;>av.,i.-c.. • Dated this~ of December, 2014. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY That I have on this~ day of December, 2014, served a copy of 
the within and foregoing ORDER~ - ~REPARATION OF TRANSCRIPT AT COUNTY 
EXPENSE to: 
'&'J · 
Kristina Schindele 
By: 
-i"1- Hand Delivery 
_
_
 Federal Express 
_
_
 U.S.Mail 
Elmore County Prosecutor 190 South 4th East 
Mountain Home ID 83647 Fax No. (208)587-2147 
John R. Kormanik 
KORMANIK HALLA.\ 1 & Sl'..'EED LLP 206 W Jefferson Street Boise ID 83702 
Fax No. (866) 821-9543 
By: 
Facsimile Transmission ---
_
_
 Hand Delivery 
_
_
 Federal Express 
, Certified Mail 
'lJ U.S.Mail 
Facsimile Transmission --
BARBARA STEELE Clerk of the District Court .. · 
' By~ .····· eputyClerk of Court 
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John R. Kormanik, ISB #5850 
KORMANIK HALLAM & SNEED LLP 
W Jefferson St 
Boise ID 83702 
Telephone: 208.288.1888 
Facsimile: 866.821.9543 
jrk@khsidaholaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2014-0059 
PLAINTIFF'S WRITTEN CLOSING 
ARGUMENT FOLLOWING 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS 
VERIFIED SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Albert Ciccone, by and through his counsel of record John R. 
Kormanik, of the law firm KORMANIK HALLAM & SNEED LLP, and hereby submits this 
Plaintiff's Written Closing Argument Following Evidentiary Hearing on His Verified Successive 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief For the reasons set forth below, and based on the matters on 
file and of record with this honorable Court, Mr. Ciccone' s Verified Successive Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief should be granted. 1 
Ill 
1 As with the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Ciccone will focus his arguments on only two of the issues raised in his Verified Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief He is not, however, waiving any issues set forth in his Successive Petition, and relies on the record before the Court in support of all grounds for relief stated therein. 
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a 
BACKGROUND 
was involuntarily admitted to Intermountain Hospital in Boise, Idaho, on or about 
2003 following a suicide attempt.2 Albert had tried to hang himself, and that 
did not work, he drank Y:z bottle of nail polish remover which was also ineffective.3 His admitting 
physician was Dr. Silsby; Dr. Graf performed a consultation and examination. 4 Albert was 
diagnosed with "Major Depressive Disorder Single Episode Moderate" and "Severe; problems 
with primary support, Adjustment to a life-cycle transition."5 He was prescribed the following 
medications at the time of his admission: Effexor XR, Venlafaxine 37.5 mg PO qD; 0.5 mg PO 
qid PRN Axiety. 6 It was originally believed he would receive inpatient services for seven (7) 
days. 7 
Albert exceeded his projected length of stay; instead of being hospitalized for seven (7) 
days, he was an inpatient at Intermountain Hospital for a total of eleven (11) days, having been 
discharged on or about October 3, 2003. 8 He was prescribed medications on his discharge,9 
which were supported by his original admitting diagnosis. 10 
On or about October 16, 2003, a mere thirteen (13) days after his discharge from 
Intermountain Hospital, Albert struck his pregnant wife with his car, killing her and the unborn 
fetus; he was charged with two counts of first degree murder - one count for the death of his 
wife; one count for the death of the unborn fetus. 11 
2 Exhibit 15 to the Evidentiary Hearing, p. 6. 3 Id at p. 3. 
4 Id 
5 Id at p. 8. 
6 Id 
7 Id at p. 9. 
8 Id at p. l. 
9 Id at p. 2. 
IOidatp.l. 
11 Exhibit I, p. 1. 
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Originally, Mr. Frachiseur, Elmore County Public Defender, was appointed to represent 
Because potential for a death penalty allegation the State, Mr. Ratliff was 
assigned as co-counsel. Eventually, Mr. Frachiseur was relieved appointment, only 
Mr. Ratliff as Albert's defense counsel. The State did not seek the death penalty. 
On or about November 26, 2003, a hearing was held to reset Albert's preliminary 
hearing. 12 During that hearing, Mr. Ratliff stated as follows: "I think, as we mentioned, judge, 
we'll probably need a ... probably two half mornings because of his [Albert's] medication. He's 
not, for lack of a better term, he gets a little indiscernible in the afternoon when he's .... 13" Mr. 
Ratliff testified during the evidentiary hearing he was aware of Albert's medications and the 
effects they had on him during the entirety of his representation. 14 
A jury trial was held beginning on January 4, 2005. On January 26, 2005, during the 
jury's deliberations, Mr. Ratliff was informed of an issue regarding juror misconduct - one of the 
jurors had done independent research on the vehicle Albert was driving at the time of the 
accident; that juror then shared the results of that independent investigation, as well as a 
comment about Albert's character, with the other members of the jury. At the same time, an 
additional issue potentially effecting the jury's deliberation was brought to Mr. Ratliff's 
attention, namely: a detective who had testified at the trial made comments about how the trial 
was proceeding in the presence of a different juror. 15 A hearing was held on these two issues. 
12 Exhibit A. 
13 Id 
14 Because the Court denied Mr. Ciccone's Motion/or Preparation a/Transcript at County Expense, which requested the transcript from the evidentiary hearing "because such transcript is not necessary for the preparation of closing arguments since counsel attended and represented the petition at the evidentiary hearing," any testimony from said hearing referenced in this pleading are based on counsel's best recollection and notes. 15 Exhibit 12. 
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The jury foreperson, Ms. Allen, was questioned under oath. She identified the offending 
as Mr. Truba, and testified as follows: 16 
Okay. We were discussing the case and he said he was up at 5:00 this 
morning and had gone down to work, which he has been doing during this time, and he was discussing the car with someone that he works with that knew the car. And was asking him specific questions about how the car handled and this person informed him - he said that he knew Al and that Al - his were his [sic] way out there is a little wacko. 
(Emphasis added.) Ms. Allen also testified Mr. Truba told the jury Albert's car "was a very high-
powered car and that it would be hard to control" and he "went on to talk about his experience 
about driving on dirt roads."17 These statements were made in front of the entire jury panel, 18 and 
were loud enough for all to hear. 19 Two jurors brought the impropriety of Mr. Truba's conduct to 
Ms. Allen's attention. 20 The remainder of the panel was questioned as a whole and did not 
respond to the trial court's question: "Are there any of you who feel you have been compromised 
in any way and cannot be a fair and impartial juror in this matter?"21 The trial court offered Mr. 
Ratliff the opportunity to further question the panel, he did not. 22 The reconstituted jury 
ultimately found Albert guilty of first degree murder of his wife and second degree murder of the 
unborn fetus. 23 
At trial, Mr. Ratliff's position was the juror who conducted independent research - Mr. 
Truba - should be dismissed "outright."24 Mr. Ratliff testified at the evidentiary hearing his 
decision to not seek a mistrial based on juror misconduct was tactical. Albert testified he did not 
recall Mr. Ratliff discussing the possibility of a mistrial with him as he was medicated at the 
16 Exhibit 12 at Exhibit pp. 8 - 9, tr. p. 8, l. 25 - p. 9, I. 8. 17 Exhibit 12 at Exhibit p. 9; tr. p. 9, IL 16 - 17, 20 - 21. 18 Exhibit 12. at Exhibit p. 9, tr. p. I 0, II. 6 - 9. 19 Exhibit 12 at Exhibit p. 9, tr. p. 11, II. 5 - 9. 20 Exhibit 12 at Exhibit p. 9, tr. p. I 0, II. 11 - 15. 21 Exhibit 12 at Exhibit p. 13, tr. p. 26, 11. 17 - 21. 22 Exhibit 12 at Exhibit p. 13, tr. p. 26, l. 25 -p. 27, l. 3. 23 Exhibit 1, p. 1. 
24 Exhibit 12 at Exhibit p. 7, tr. p. 4, II. 9 - 10. 
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He did recall at the time the issue arose he had been incarcerated in the Elmore County Jail 
more than five hundred (500) days and would simply have to wait even longer custody for 
during the 
discussions regarding the juror misconduct issue. 
Following the jury's verdict, Mr. Ratliff moved for, and on March 31, 2005, the trial 
court ordered, Dr. Craig Beaver to conduct an evaluation for use at sentencing.25 Mr. Ratliff sent 
the Order to Dr. Beaver, who received it on or about April 6, 2005.26 On or about May 3, 2005, a 
member of Dr. Beaver's staff visited Albert at the Elmore County jail to conduct neuro-
psychometric and other testing to enable Dr. Beaver to create the court-ordered evaluation.27 Dr. 
Beaver personally interviewed Albert at the Elmore County Jail; he also telephonically 
interviewed Albert's parents in order to assist him in performing the evaluation.28 No formal 
written evaluation was created and, based on his practice, Dr. Beaver would have created one 
unless Mr. Ratliff requested he not do so.29 Dr. Beaver also averred as follows30: 
9. Based on my review of my file in this matter, the following opinions and 
conclusions, which I hold to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, would have been included in a formal evaluation if one had been created in this case: 
a. Mr. Ciccone's MMPI testing results showed a markedly elevated profile indicating significant emotional and/or psychiatric issues; 
b. Mr. Ciccone's psychiatric history revealed significant mood instability; 
c. Mr. Ciccone's family history revealed a significant history of bipolar disorders; 
d. There was a significant mental-health component related to the events 
surrounding the death of Mr. Ciccone's wife and unborn child. 
Dr. Beaver also averred31 : 
25 Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Craig W. Beaver PhD, which was Exhibit B to the Evidentiary Hearing. 26 Id 
21 Id 
2& Id 
29 Id 
Jo Id 
31 Id. 
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11. Based on my conclusions above, a report to the Court, had one been 
created, would have assisted the Court in determining Mr. Ciccone' s sentence 
and, in fact, may very well have led the Court to a sentence other than fixed-life. 
Albert's sentencing hearing, the following colloquy took place between the Court and 
Mr. Ratliff concerning the court-ordered evaluation: 
THE COURT: The other issue that the court has before proceeding to 
sentencing today is that this matter was continued from a sentencing for a psychological evaluation. And the court ordered a psychological evaluation pursuant to the agreement of the parties on March 31, 2005. 
Mr. Ratliff, can you tell me where the psychological evaluation is, or was it determined that the defendant did not want to obtain or take part in a psychological evaluation prior to sentencing? 
MR. RATLIFF: Judge, an evaluation was conducted. But after due 
consideration and conference with the evaluator and my client, it was elected not 
to have the report prepared for sentencing. 
The order does not require us to prepare a report or to bring forth the 
evaluator for purposes of testimony. Essentially that order was for purposes of 
securing the evaluation at county expense, but I was not required, under Rule 702 
or otherwise, to disclose the contents or the findings of that evaluation, and no 
written report has been prepared. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Ratliff testified his decision to not have Dr. Beaver create 
a formal evaluation was a tactical one. He stated if he had obtained a formal written evaluation 
and submitted it to the Court for consideration at sentencing, the State would have been able to 
have its own expert evaluate Albert and submit a similar report to the Court for use at sentencing. 
Mr. Ratliff had done some independent research into "Borderline Personality Disorder,"32 
which he testified was also one of Dr. Beaver's diagnoses at the time of sentencing. Mr. Ratliff 
could not recall from where he obtained the research. Mr. Ratliff testified he was "concerned" 
because Dr. Beaver could not offer an opinion on the issue of Albert's potential future 
32 Exhibit 13, pp. 3 - 8. 
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dangerousness.33 When cross-examined on this issue, however, Mr. Ratliff admitted he has never 
obtained an opinion on whether a defendant will "kill again." 
Albert testified he wanted a final report obtained Dr. Beaver Mr. Ratliff had 
informed him of the need for such a report for use at sentencing and that such a report might be 
helpful in mitigation for sentencing. After he performed the testing for Dr. Beaver and was 
interviewed by him, Albert questioned M...r. Ratliff several times regarding Dr. Beaver's report. 
Although Mr. Ratliff testified his relationship with Albert was a good one, Albert stated 
otherwise. Albert described his relationship as tumultuous. Mr. Ratliff was condescending and 
short with Albert. According to Albert, at one point, he informed Mr. Ratliff he wanted to fire 
him and obtain new legal counsel. Mr. Ratliff's response was: "You cannot fire me." Albert also 
testified to being wholly unfamiliar with the legal system and reliant on Mr. Ratliff for true, 
honest and correct evaluation of tactical decisions. 
ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has 
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the 
individual states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). Idaho law also guarantees a 
criminal defendant's right to counsel. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; Idaho Code§ 19-825. 
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon state or 
federal constitutional principles, is analyzed under the familiar and well-established standards set 
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See also, State v. Matthews, 133 Idaho 
33 See also, Exhibit 13, p. I. 
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300,306, 986 P.2d 323,329 (1999). In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 
counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional. 
performance; and this deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland, at 
689. The prejudice prong of Strickland is satisfied if there is a reasonable probability a different 
result would have been obtained had the attorney acted properly. Id 
B. ANALYSIS 
1. Trial Counsel Was Constitutionally Ineffective For Failing To Move For A Mistrial Based On Juror Misconduct And, Thus, Mr. Ciccone Is Entitled To Relief In The Form Of A New Trial. 
Upon learning a juror performed independent investigation and shared extra-judicial 
information with the jury during deliberations, Mr. Ratliff failed to move for a mistrial. It is well 
settled: a jury's verdict must be based on admissible evidence, presented in court. One of the 
exceptions to inquiring into the validity of jury deliberations is whether "prejudicial information 
was improperly brought to the jury's attention." IDAHO R. Evm. 606(b). A specific ground for 
mistrial on motion of a defendant is "when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in 
the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant 
and deprives the defendant of a fair trial." IDAHO CRIM. RULE 29 .1. 
During the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Ratliff indicated his decision to not move for a 
mistrial due to juror misconduct was based on the fact some of the evidence provided by Mr. 
Truba was helpful to the defense case. Specifically, Mr. Ratliff believed Mr. Truba's extra-
judicial inquiry concerning how Albert's car handled was helpful. As Ms. Allen, the jury 
foreperson, testified, Mr. Truba told the other jurors Albert's car "was a very high-powered car 
and that it would be hard to control." What Mr. Ratliff ignored, and what was extremely 
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prejudicial to Albert was Mr. Truba's statement "that Al - his words were his [sic] way out there 
is a little wacko. 
Critical to 
is how the extra-judicial prejudicial information may have affected the remaining juror's 
deliberations. 
Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts 
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices 
made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In 
other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make 
a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In 
any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly 
assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 -22 (2003) (emphasis added). 
The jury foreperson, Ms. Allen, and at least two other jurors heard Mr. Truba' s 
statements. Ms. Allen testified Mr. Truba spoke loudly enough for the entire jury panel to hear. 
Although he individually questioned Ms. Allen concerning whether Mr. Truba' s extra-judicial 
statements affected her ability to render a just decision, Mr. Ratliff failed to voir dire the jurors 
individually for information concerning how, if at all, Mr. Truba's statements effected the 
deliberations despite the trial court's invitation to do so. 
Although the entire panel was questioned, as a whole, concerning the effect of Mr. 
Truba' s statements, Mr. Ratliff simply did not conduct a reasonable investigation into whether 
any individual juror's deliberations were adversely affected by Mr. Truba's referring to Albert as 
"way out there" and a "little wacko." 
The trial court's general inquiry of the panel was simply not enough to ensure Albert's 
constitutional right to a fair trial, based on admissible evidence subject to cross-examination was, 
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to the jury concerning Albert's psychological history, such a failure constitutes constitutionally 
assistance of counsel. this because of the passage time 
deliberations and in light of the fact no psychological evidence was presented to the jury, 
prejudice should be presumed. See, e.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (prejudice 
presumed where passage oftime precluded a post-hoc determination of competence). 
2. Trial Counsel Was Constitutionally Ineffective For Failing To Submit A Full And Complete Psychological Evaluation To The Court For Use In Fashioning Mr. Ciccone's Sentence And, Thus, Mr. Ciccone Is Entitled To Relief In the Form Of A New Sentencing Hearing. 
Following trial Mr. Ratliff successfully moved the trial court for an order for a 
psychological evaluation at county expense. Mr. Ratliff was aware Albert could potentially 
receive a sentence of life imprisonment. "The sentencing stage of any case, regardless of the 
potential punishment, is 'the time at which for many defendants the most important services of 
the entire proceeding can be performed."' Vela v. Estelle, 708 F.2d 954, 964 (5th Cir. 1983). 
Where the potential punishment is life imprisonment, as in the instant matter, the sentencing 
proceeding takes on added importance. See id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has taken a similar view of the potential of a sentence of life 
imprisonment: 
a fixed sentence should not be regarded as a judicial hedge against uncertainty. To 
the contrary, a fixed life term, with its rigid preclusion of parole or good time, 
should be regarded as a sentence requiring a high degree of certainty - certainty 
that the nature of the crime demands incarceration until the perpetrator dies in prison, or certainty that the perpetrator never, at any time in his life, could be 
safely released. 
State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294-95, 939 P.2d 1327, 1328-29 (1997) citing with approval 
State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635,638, 759 P.2d 926, 929 (Ct.App.1988). 
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In Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 163 PJd 220 (Ct. App. 2007), the Court of Appeals 
addressed the summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief. One allegation the 
concerned a neuropsychological evaluation required vacation of the sentence. at 
440, 163 PJd at 229. In such a context, the Knutsen Court held: "An applicant must present 
evidence of facts that existed at the time of sentencing that would have been relevant to the 
sentencing process and that indicate the information available to the parties or the trial court at 
the time of sentencing was false, incomplete, or otherwise materially misleading." Id, 163 PJd 
at 229 (emphasis added). 
Knutsen also raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure to present 
mitigating evidence at Knutsen's probation revocation hearing. The Court found ineffective 
assistance of counsel for the failure to present evidence from a neuropsychological evaluation. 
Id at 443, 163 P .3d at 232. 
Here, the unrebutted evidence before the Court is Dr. Beaver's preliminary diagnoses and 
opinion: "There was a significant mental-health component related to the events surrounding the 
death of Mr. Ciccone's wife and unborn child." Dr. Beaver's further opinion: "[b]ased on my 
conclusions above, a report to the Court, had one been created, would have assisted the Court in 
determining Mr. Ciccone's sentence and, in fact, may very well have led the Court to a sentence 
other than fixed life," is similarly un-challenged. Mr. Ratliff did not present this evidence, or, for 
that matter, any argument based on Dr. Beaver's preliminary findings, to the trial court at the 
time of sentencing. Such a decision cannot be deemed tactical under the facts and circumstances 
here. 
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Given the unique nature of a fixed-life sentence, Mr. Ratliff was constitutionally 
ineffective for not presenting a formal psychological evaluation report, authored by Dr. Beaver, 
trial court for use at sentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
It is well settled that "even the best attorney may render ineffective assistance" on 
occasion. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 n. 21 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States 
v. Winsor, 675 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1073 (D. Or. 2009). That is what occurred here. For the reasons 
set forth above, Mr. Ciccone's Verified Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief should be 
granted, his conviction vacated and a new trial ordered. In the alternative, Mr. Ciccone's Verified 
Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief should be granted, his sentence vacated and a new 
sentencing ordered. 
DATED this gth day of January, 2015. 
KORMANIK HALLAM & SNEED LLP 
R. Kormanik, of the Firm 
sel for Albert A. Ciccone 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, ) Case No. CV-2014-0000059 Petitioner, ) 
) 
vs. ) CLOSING ARGUMENT ) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT Resgondent. ) 
COMES NOW, The State ofldaho, by and through the Kristina M. Schindele, Prosecuting 
Attorney, and hereby files its written closing argument following the evidentiary hearing held in the 
above-entitled matter. 
BACKGROUND 
The facts in the underlying criminal case were set forth by the Idaho Court of Appeals in 
State v. Ciccone, 154 Idaho 330,297 P.3d 1147 (Ct. App. 2012). The facts are summarized as: "On 
October 16, 2003, Ciccone struck his pregnant wife with his car, killing her and the unborn fetus. 
Ciccone was charged with two counts of first degree murder-one count for his wife and one count 
for the unborn fetus." Ciccone, 154 Idaho at _, 297 P .3d at 1151. The trial court also described 
the evidence at sentencing: 
The report of the accident reconstruction specialist from the Idaho State Police, who reviewed the scene shortly after the events happened, was as follows: 
"Albert Ciccone drove his vehicle to the right side of the road in a straight-ahead 
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motion. The speed of his vehicle would have been about fifty miles-per-hour when he struck Kathleen Ciccone, the pedestrian." 
"The lack of any action on the driver's part until he saw that he was going to hit the mailbox indicates that he had no reaction to the pedestrian that was walking on the right side of the road." 
"The marks at the scene indicate a deliberate running over of the pedestrian and then a reaction to attempt to miss the mailbox. The driver could not have seen the mailbox until his vehicle struck the pedestrian." 
The district court also noted: 
There had been prior acts witnessed by others of verbal abuse; prior acts, the effects of which were seen by others, of battery by the defendant upon the decedent, Kathleen Ciccone. And perhaps most telling, although not revealed to the jury at the time of trial, a prior attempt to hit Kathleen Ciccone with a motor vehicle when she left the hospital on one occasion at the Air Force base when the defendant was angry with her. 
Ciccone, 154 Idaho at _, 297 P.3d at 1161-1162. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed 
Petitioner's conviction. Ciccone, 154 Idaho at_, 297 P .3d at 1163. Petitioner then filed a timely 
petition for post-conviction relief on or about January 17, 2014. 
Counsel was appointed. Petitioner proceeded to hearing on the original petition. Petitioner 
. 
raises the following claims for post-conviction relief: 1) ineffective assistance of counsel based on 
trial counsel's failure to object to prosecutor's use of words "crime scene" during trial or file a pre-
trial motion in limine to prohibit the use of such words; 2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for 
failing to object to the number and nature of victim impact statements; 3) ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel for failing to move for a mistrial based onjurormisconduct1; 4) ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel based on failure to object to the prosecutor's closing argument comments regarding 
1 The Petition names two jurors related to potential misconduct. Evidence was only presented regarding Juror Paul Trueba. The State is limiting its argument as to Juror Paul Trueba. 
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Petitioner's decision to not testify; 5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to request an 
""""'""''"'·u• instruction; 6) the trial court denied Petitioner due process for not instructing the 
regarding misfortune/accident; 7) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to obtain a 
comprehensive psychological evaluation prior to sentencing and/or providing such evaluation to the 
Court during sentencing; 8) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to challenge the 
constitutionality ofldaho' s statutory provision that permits a homicide conviction for the unlawful 
killing of a human embryo or fetus; 9) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise 
an issue regarding a reference to the term "child" in the juror questionnaire2• The petition proceeded 
to hearing on December 12, 2014. Following the hearing, the Court established a briefing schedule, 
which was amended by stipulation of the parties. 
FACTS 
Petitioner testified at the evidentiary hearing. He provided limited testimonial support for his 
claims that trial counsel should have moved for a mistrial based on juror misconduct and had a 
psychological evaluation prepared and submitted to the Court prior to sentencing. Petitioner 
contended he and trial counsel had a "contentious" relationship and during representation, counsel 
dictated to him. Petitioner asserted trial counsel advised him he could not fire trial counsel. 
With respect to the mistrial issue, Petitioner testified they discussed whether to request a 
mistrial, but trial counsel told him a mistrial would not benefit him. Specifically, trial counsel told 
him that Juror Trueba' s investigation into the make and model of the vehicle Petitioner used to kill 
2 The claim makes mention of another reference by the prosecutor, but the Petition is not clear regarding what comment was made or when. 
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his wife reinforced Petitioner's theory at trial - that he did not intend to strike and kill Kathleen but 
lost control of the car. 
As for the issue regarding the psychological evaluation, Petitioner stated he was taking anti-
depressants and anti-anxiety medications during trial. Petitioner claimed he zoned out several times 
during trial.due to his medications. Petitioner testified trial counsel advised Petitioner he did not 
plan to have Dr. Beaver publish an evaluation. Petitioner contended trial counsel never told him why 
counsel made that decision. Petitioner stated he trusted trial counsel and agreed with counsel's 
assessment that the evaluation would be unfavorable. Trial counsel specifically told Petitioner that if 
the evaluation was published, it would have to be disclosed to the Court and counsel for the State. 
Trial counsel reiterated he did not want the Court to review Petitioner's psychological evaluation. 
Terry Ratliff, Petitioner's trial counsel, also testified at the evidentiary hearing. Trial counsel 
limited his testimony to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised by Petitioner during this 
proceeding. Trial counsel stated his relationship with Petitioner and Petitioner's family was, at 
times, trying. He said overall he felt they worked well together. Trial counsel specifically denied 
ever telling Petitioner he could not fire him. Trial counsel explained that he had been appointed by 
the Court, so Petitioner would have to address his dissatisfaction with the Court and request 
substitute counsel. While trial counsel could not recall Petitioner ever telling him Petitioner wanted 
to fire him, trial counsel confirmed that if Petitioner had told him that, counsel would have told 
Petitioner he could only be removed by the Court and would have directed Petitioner to address the 
issue with the trial court. 
Trial counsel testified at length regarding the mistrial issue. Specifically, trial counsel stated 
the issue arose when it became known that a juror conducted an investigation outside the jury room. 
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Juror Trueba had heard that the car Petitioner was driving was a high performance vehicle that 
accelerated quickly, which could cause the driver to lose controL Trial counsel noted that while this 
outside investigation was not appropriate and correctly resulted in dismissal Trueba, the fact 
regarding the performance of the car was integral to the Petitioner's trial defense. Trial counsel was 
satisfied with the inquiry made by the trial court regarding Juror Trueba's actions. Trial counsel 
discussed the matter with Petitioner and made a strategic and tactical decision to not request a 
mistrial. In his own words, trial counsel decided to "leave it be." 
Trial counsel further discussed Petitioner's mental health issues. Trial counsel recalled 
observing changes in Petitioner's demeanor - inability to focus or pay attention - early in the case. 
He requested abbreviated hours for the preliminary hearing to assist Petitioner stay engaged in the 
process. However, trial counsel recalled Petitioner's mental health medications were corrected 
during the pendency of the case. Trial counsel did not remember observing Petitioner having any 
issues during trial. Petitioner was getting tired in the afternoons, but trial counsel noted that the trial 
process itself was high anxiety producing and lengthy. He attributed Petitioner's fatigue to the 
circumstances of trial. 
In addition to the testimony referenced above, the Court admitted certain documents for its 
consideration at the evidentiary hearing. The State directs the Court to the following hearing 
exhibits: Petitioner Exhibit A - preliminary hearing transcript; Petitioner Exhibit B - Affidavit of 
Craig Beaver, Ph.D. and certain exhibits; Respondent Exhibit 1- State v. Ciccone 154 Idaho 330, 
297 P.3d 1147 (Ct. App. 2012); RespondentExhibit2- Victim Impact Letters; Respondent Exhibit 
3 - Defendant's character letters; Respondent Exhibit 4- Sentencing Hearing transcript; Respondent 
Exhibit 5 - Closing Arguments; Respondent Exhibit 6- Transcript References to the words "crime 
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scene"; Respondent Exhibit 7 - Minutes from Sentencing; Respondent Exhibit 8 - Excerpt from trial 
,.,,,, ......... ,., confirming members of petit jury; Respondent Exhibit 9 - Motion for New Trial based on 
misconduct; Respondent Exhibit 10 - Transcript from hearing on motion for new trial; 
Respondent Exhibit 11 - Memorandum Decision on motion for new trial; Respondent Exhibit 12 -
Trial Transcript regarding inquiry into juror misconduct; Respondent Exhibit 13 -Notes from Terry 
Ratliffs file related to his discussion with Dr. Craig Beaver and his research related to borderline 
personality disorder; Respondent Exhibit 14 - Petitioner's military records appended to the PSI; and 
Respondent Exhibit 15 - Petitioner's Intermountain Hospital Records appended to the PSI. The 
State will cite to various exhibits as required by the discussion irifra. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the Court Should Deny Petitioner's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Where the Evidence Establishes Trial Counsel Made a Strategic and Tactical Decision to Not Move for Mistrial Based on Juror Misconduct. 
2. Whether the Court Should Deny Petitioner's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Where the Evidence Establishes Trial Counsel Made a Strategic and Tactical Decision to Not Have a Psychological Evaluation Prepared and Submitted at Sentencing and Where Petitioner Has Failed to Establish Prejudice Resulting from Counsel's Decision. 
3. Whether the Court Should Deny Petitioner's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Due Process Violation Claims Where the Court Properly Instructed the Jury and the Jury Clearly Found that Petitioner Intentionally Killed Kathleen Ciccone and Killed the Fetus With Malice Aforethought. 
4. Whether the Court Should Deny the Remainder of Petitioner's Claims Where Petitioner Failed to Present Any Evidence or Argument in Support of Said Claims and the Evidence From the Underlying Trial Disproves the Allegations. 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
A. General Standards Applicable to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims. 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. State 
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v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676,678,662 P.2d 548,550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827,830,452 
54, 57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,921,828 P.2d l 1326 App.1992). Like 
a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations 
upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. LC. § 19-4907; Russell v. State, 118 
Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654,656 (Ct. App. 1990). -
Idaho's appellate courts have iterated the general standards applicable to the Court's inquiry 
following this evidentiary hearing. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be 
brought under the post-conviction procedure act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 
1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 1992). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 
defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was 
prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Hassett v. 
State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). To establish a deficiency, the 
applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective 
standard ofreasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To 
establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's 
deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id. at 761, 760 P.2d at 
1177. The appellate courts have long-adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of 
trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. 
Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231,233,880 P.2d 261,263 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The trial court should make findings of fact. Hoffman v. State, 125 Idaho 188,192,868 P.2d 
516, 520 (Ct. App. 1994). The Court's findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly 
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erroneous. Reeves v. State, 105 Idaho 844, 673 P.2d 444 (Ct. App. 1983). The Court's ultimate 
decision will be affirmed so long as competent and substantial evidence supports the decision. 
Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312,658 P.2d 983 (Ct. App. 1983). 
B. The Court Should Deny Petitioner's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Where the Evidence Establishes Trial Counsel Made a Strategic and Tactical Decision to Not Request a Mistrial Based on Juror Misconduct. 
With respect to an ineffective assistance of counsel related to the failure to file a motion, a 
conclusion that the motion, if filed, would have been unsuccessful, is determinative of both prongs of 
the claim. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,562, 199 P.3d 123, 137 (2008) (citation omitted). Under 
Idaho Criminal Rule 29 .1, a motion for mistrial is proper "when there occurs during the trial an error 
or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to 
the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial." Where the allegation giving rise to the 
mistrial request concerns juror misconduct, the defendant must establish that the misconduct 
prejudiced him at trial. Campbell v. State, 130 Idaho 546,549,944 P.2d 143,146 (Ct. App. 1997). 
In the present case, Petitioner did not recall the inquiry into Juror Trueba' s misconduct. Trial 
counsel recalled the inquiry and testified that he relied upon the inquiry in determining that the 
misconduct did not prejudice Petitioner. In fact, trial counsel opined that the information Juror 
Trueba heard outside the courtroom and may have briefly mentioned to other jurors, was beneficial 
to the Petitioner's defense theory. Trial counsel clearly recognized the possibility of seeking a 
mistrial.3 Counsel made a strategic decision to forego the motion. Based on the nature of the 
3 According to the motion for new trial based on juror misconduct, the defense deliberately took a "wait and see" approach to the issue, knowing that if the Petitioner was not satisfied with the jury's decision, he could pursue a motion within 14 days. This appears to have been a calculated risk. Respondent's Exhibit IO, Motion Tr., p.65, L.16 - p.66, L.8. 
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information received by Juror Trueba, Petitioner has not and cannot establish prejudice. As such, the 
Court should deny Petitioner's claim. 
The Court Should Deny Petitioner's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Where the Evidence Establishes Trial Counsel Made a Strategic and Tactical Decision to Not Have a Psychological Evaluation Prepared and Submitted at Sentencing and Where Petitioner Has Failed to Establish Prejudice Resulting from Counsel's Decision. 
Trial counsel testified at length that he obtained an order and funding for a psychological 
evaluation. Counsel stated Dr. Beaver told him three diagnoses for Petitioner - major depression, 
recurrent depression and borderline personality disorder.4 Counsel further testified that Dr .. Beaver 
stated Petitioner was in deep denial of his mental health condition. Finally, Dr. Beaver made it clear 
that he could not determine the risk Petitioner posed to reoffend given Petitioner's BPD diagnosis. 
While trial counsel admitted it is common for an evaluator to refuse to make any assurances against 
future wrong-doing, that Dr. Beaver appeared even more hesitant under these circumstances. 
Counsel then investigated BPD, as documented by the information saved in his file and produced as 
Respondent's Exhibit 13. Trial counsel determined the psychological evaluation would present very 
harmful information to the Court - given the fact that individuals with BPD pose a significantly 
difficult treatment prognosis. 
Trial counsel also testified that he had concerns that Dr. Beaver's report would likely have 
resulted in the State's request for its own evaluation. Trial counsel stated the evaluator he believed 
the State would request would by Dr. Estess - who was known to the defense bar as "Dr. Death" as 
4 Interestingly enough, in his affidavit, submitted to the Court at the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Beaver opines Petitioner "showed a markedly elevated profile indicating significant emotional and/or psychiatric issues" and "significant mood instability." However, Dr. Beaver does not identify borderline personality disorder as the significant issue posed by Petitioner. Trial counsel could not say why Dr. Beaver would say he did not recall discussing whether to produce the evaluation prior to sentencing. However, trial counsel did advise the Court that he and Dr. Beaver's professional relationship has recently sourced given trial counsel's employment and subsequent termination ofDr. Beaver's son. The relationship became more strained after the adult son died of an overdose. 
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he often testified on the State's behalf in murder cases and sentencings, highlighting the on-going 
associated with murderers. Based on Dr. Beaver's diagnoses, counsel's research regarding BPD 
and the State's likely request to have Petitioner evaluated by its own expert, trial counsel testified he 
talked to Petitioner, told Petitioner he did not intend to have an evaluation produced, and decided to 
proceed to sentencing without an evaluation. 
Rather, trial counsel relied upon the mental health records included in the PSI. According to 
Respondent's Exhibit 15, the trial court was aware of Petitioner's prior suicide attempt on September 
23, 2003. Petitioner drank acetone after Kathleen left him. He stayed in the hospital secondary to a 
major depressive episode until October 3, 2003. The Court had the information that Petitioner 
suffered from depression, but did not have the diagnosis of borderline personality disorder along 
with all of its negative, unfavorable circumstances. 
The Court should defer to trial counsel's strategic and tactical decision. Additionally, 
Petitioner cannot establish prejudice as the submission of the psychological evaluation would have 
resulted in highly unfavorable information being presented to the Court. See State v. Wood, 132 
Idaho 88, 967 P .2d 702 ( 1998) (trial counsel was ineffective for, among other things, not objecting to 
the Court's consideration of a psychological evaluation that contained opinions significantly 
unfavorable to the defendant); Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 174, 254 P.3d 69, 75 (Ct. App. 
2011) ( discussing Wood and identifying the issue as whether counsel is ineffective for not objecting 
to an evaluation with potentially damaging information); Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, 463-469, 
224 P .3d 515, 530-536 (Ct. App. 2009) (in the context of unwarned participation in a psychosexual 
evaluation, whether the evaluation contained unfavorable information relied upon by the sentencing 
court was integral to the prejudice determination). Based on trial counsel's strategic and tactical 
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decision and Petitioner's failure to demonstrate prejudice in counsel's failure to submit a 
devastatingly unfavorable psychological evaluation at sentencing, the Court should deny Petitioner's 
D. The Court Should Deny Petitioner's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Due Process Claims Where the Jury Was Properly Instructed and Clearly Found Petitioner Intentionally Killed Kathleen Ciccone and Killed the Fetus With Malice Aforethought. 
Idaho's homicide statutes require, at a minimum, negligence or other culpable behavior. 
State v. McNair, 141 Idaho 263, 266, 108 P.3d 410, 413 (Ct. App. 2005). However, "a trial court is 
not required to give a requested instruction, even one that is a correct statement of the law, if the 
subject matter is sufficiently covered by instructions actually given to the jury." State v. Macias, 142 
Idaho 509,511, 129 P.3d 1258, 1260 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 400,402, 17 
P.3d 901, 903 (Ct. App.2001); State v. Patterson, 126 Idaho 227, 230, 880 P.2d 257, 260 (Ct. 
App.1994); State v. Koho, 91 Idaho 450, 454, 423 P.2d 1004, 1008 (1967)). Where the jury 
instructions properly instructed the jury as to the elements necessary to establish the crime charged, 
including the requisite intent, the instructions as given would cure any failure to provide the 
misfortune or accident defense instruction. McNair, 141 at 269, 108 P.3d at 416; see also Macias, 
142 Idaho at 511, 129 P .3d at 1260 ( determining misfortune or accident defense jury instruction 
proper but not required in a battery prosecution where the jury was already instructed on the requisite 
state of mind element). 
In this case, by finding Petitioner guilty of first degree murder, the jury clearly found that 
Petitioner willfully and deliberately, with premeditation, killed Kathleen Ciccone. In finding 
Petitioner guilty of second degree murder, the jury also found that Petitioner killed the fetus with 
malice aforethought. Malice aforethought is express where the evidence demonstrates a "deliberate 
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intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied when no considerable 
provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and 
malignant heart." LC. § 18-4002. 
At trial, counsel told the jury, even under Petitioner's version of events, Petitioner operated 
the vehicle in a reckless manner. Respondent Exhibit 5, Tr. p.1842, Ls.5-8. Petitioner was not 
entitled to a separate instruction for the misfortune/accident defense. Petitioner revved his engine, 
traveled at a high rate of speed on a dirt road, following a heated argument with his wife that caused 
her to get out of the car and walk away, and struck her, killing her and the fetus inside her. The 
evidence did not give rise to the misfortune/accident defense. Because the evidence did not require 
the instruction, and the instructions given properly instructed the jury, the Court should deny 
Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel and due process claims related to the 
misfortune/accident defense. 
D. The Court Should Deny the Remainder of Petitioner's Claims Where the Petitioner Failed to Present Evidence or Argument to Support the Claims and the Trial Exhibits Disprove the Allegations. 
Petitioner raises a variety of ineffective assistance of trial claims in his petition for post-
conviction relief for which he failed to present any evidence at the hearing held herein. In addition, 
the Respondent admitted certain trial exhibits that disprove his allegations. Finally, Petitioner has 
failed to provide legal authority for some of the claims. 
Among these claims, Petitioner contends trial counsel should have objected to references to 
the words "crime scene", the number and nature of the victim impact statements, and to the 
prosecutor's comments on Petitioner's election to not testify during closing argument. Petitioner 
also claims appellate counsel should have challenged the constitutionality of Idaho's homicide 
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statute that permits conviction for killing a human embryo or fetus and challenged the use of the 
"child" in the juror questionnaire. 
As for the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, Petitioner has failed to present any 
factual or legal support for any of the claims. First, Petitioner contends trial counsel should have 
objected to the repeated use of the words "crime scene" by the prosecution's witnesses. The 
Respondent introduced the trial transcript excerpts it could locate containing those references. See 
Respondent's Exhibit 6, Trial Tr., p.463, Ls.11-12; p.694, Ls.23-24; p.1002, Ls.5-6). The 
Respondent found one discussion of"crime scene" versus "crash scene, Exhibit 6, Trial Tr. p,779, 
L.15-p. 780, L.8), and one reference to "crash scene", Exhibit 6, Trial Tr., p.696, L.22). Upon review 
of the excerpts, it becomes clear that the state's witnesses were trying to use references other than 
"crime scene" when discussing the site where Kathleen and her baby were killed. However, the 
references to the words "crime scene" were few. They do not appear to be deliberate attempts to 
appeal to the jury's sympathy or arouse the passions of the jury. In addition, Petitioner has not 
provided a single legal authority for the proposition that the words "crime scene" are inflammatory 
or violate due process. If the words are not objectionable, then trial counsel's failure to object is not 
deficient. In addition, Petitioner has not alleged, and certainly cannot establish, resulting prejudice. 
Given the sparse use of these words, over days of testimony, and clear evidence of Petitioner's guilt, 
the trier of fact was not unduly affected by the words "crime scene". The jury found Petitioner guilty 
of murder because the evidence demonstrated Petitioner intentionally, deliberately and with 
premeditation mowed his wife down with a high-powered car, killing her and their unborn child. 
Concerning the victim impact statements, trial counsel did proffer an objection to Kathleen's 
mother's statement. The trial court overruled the objection. The trial court cited appropriate case 
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law detennining that victims in other-than-death cases have a right to recommend a sentence. The 
victim impact statements, while powerful, were not undue. Considering Respondent's exhibit 3 and 
exhibit 4, it is clear that Petitioner filed 11 character letters in support leniency while the State 
filed 6 victim impact statements from Kathleen's next of kin. As the Court knowns, under state law, 
victims have a constitutional right to address the Court. Unless the statements violate a criminal 
defendant's due process rights, they are permitted. Petitioner has not identified any factual or legal 
support for a due process violation. Therefore, trial counsel acted appropriately with his limited 
argument concerning the impact statements. 
Finally, with respect to trial counsel's lack of objection to the prosecutor's closing argument, 
the Respondent recognizes that the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision is not res judicata. However, 
the Court of Appeals clearly found that one of the comments was not error as the comment did not 
reference Petitioner's invocation of his right to not testify. Ciccone, 154 Idaho at_, 297 P.3d at 
1159. In addition, the Court of Appeals noted that a second comment, to which trial counsel 
contemporaneously objected, resulted in the trial court's sustaining of an objection and giving of a 
curative instruction. Id. at_; 297 P.3d at 1160. Where Petitioner has failed to identify any other 
"comments" on his election, the Respondent respectfully submits Petitioner has failed to provide 
factual or legal support for this claim. 
With respect to the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims, Petitioner has not 
presented any legal authority to support his claim that Idaho's statutory scheme is in fact 
unconstitutional. Given the lack oflegal authority, appellate counsel clearly made a strategic and 
tactical decision to not pursue this claim. Petitioner failed to submit the juror questionnaire at the 
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evidentiary hearing. Petitioner did not identify any admissible evidence concerning this claim. In 
absence of evidentiary support, the Court should deny this claim. 
Based on the Petitioner's failure to provide factual evidence or legal authority for these 
claims and the fact that the Respondent admitted evidence that contradicts many of the claims, the 
Court should deny the remainder of Petitioner's claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court deny the petition for post-
conviction relief in its entirety. 
DATED This V~ day of February 2015. 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby that on today's date, I served a copy of the attached document to the following parties by the following means: 
John Kormanik 
Kormanik, Hallam & Sneed, LLP 
206 West Jefferson 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Email: jrk@khsidaholaw.com 
The Honorable Lynn G. Norton 
Chambers Copy 
Email: lnorton@adaweb.net 
DATED this (.R-+--day of February 2015. 
~ Facsimile to 866-821-9543 
,._-· E-mail 
~E-mail 
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KO~fANIK HALLAM & SNEED LLP 206 W Jetforson St 
Boise ID 83702 
Telephone: 208.288.1888 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ruDICL'\L DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2014-0059 
PLAINTIFF'S \VRITTEN REPLY ARGUMENT FOLLOWING 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS VERIFIED SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION REIJEF 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Albert Ciccone, by and through his counsel of record John R. 
Kom1anik, of the law fum KORMANIK HALLAM & SNEED LLP, and hereby submits this 
Plaintiff's Written Reply A,·gument Foll01A,·ing Evide11tia1y Hea1'ing on His Ve,.ified Successive 
Petition/01· Post-Conviclion Relief For the reasons set forth below, and based on the matters on 
file and of record with this honorable Court, l\fr. Ciccone's Verified Successive Pelilionfor Posl-
Convichon Relief should be granted.1 
1 Mr. Ciccone continues to rely upon the arguments and evidence set forth in Plaintiff's Written Closing Argument Following Evidentiary Hearing on Hts Verified Successive Petitwnfor Post-Conviction Relief, filed with the Court on or about January 8, 2015, as well as the documents, pleadings and other papers on file with the Court. PLAINTIFF'S WRITTEN REPLY ARGUN!ENT FOLLOWING EVIDENTL'\RY HEARING ON HIS VERIFIED SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION REI.JEF- Page 1 
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Suffice it to say: :Mr. Ciccone disagrees with the State's arguments, which are set forth in 
Closing Argument and Memorandum of Points and Autho1·ities in Support, filed \Vith the 
Court on or about February 7, 2015. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
A. Trial Counsel "\Vas Constitutionally Ineffec..-tive For Failing To Move For A l\Ustrlal Based On Juror Misconduct And, Thus, l\fi,. Occone Is Entitled To Relief In The Fonn Of A New Trial. 
Upon leaming a juror performed independent investigation and shared extra-judicial 
information with the jury during deliberations, 11r. Ratliff failed to move for a mistrial. He also 
failed to request the Court conduct individual voir dire or take the trial court up on its invitation 
to do so himself. This performance fell below the objectively reasonable standard applicable. 
Recall the jury foreperson, Ms. Allen, was questioned under oath. She identified the 
offending juror as Mr. Truba, and testified as follows: 2 
Okay. We were, discussing the case and he said he was up at 5:00 this morning and had gone down to work, which he has been doing during this time, and he was discussing the car with someone that he works with that knew the car. And was asking him specific questions about how the car handled and this person inf01med him - he said that he knew Al and that Al - his words were his [sic] way out there is a little wacko. 
{Emphasis added.) These statements were made in front of the entire jury panel,3 and were loud 
enough for all to hear. 4 Two jurors brought the in1propriety of Mr. Truba's conduct to Ms. 
Allen's attention. 5 The remainder of the panel was questioned as a whole and did not respond to 
the trial court's question: "Are there any of you 1vho foel you have been compromised in any 
2 Exhibit 12 at Exhibit pp. 8 - 9, tr. p. 8, l. 25 - p. 9, I. 8. 3 Exhibit 12 at Exhibit p. 9, tr. p. 10, 11. 6- 9. 4 Exhibit 12 at Exhibit p. 9, tr. p. 11, 11. 5 - 9. 5 Exhibit 12 at Exhibit p. 9, tr. p. 10, 11. 11- 15. 
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way and cannot be a fair and impartial juror in this matterT6 The trial court offered Mr. Ratliff 
opportunity to further question the panel, did not.7 
During the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Ratliff indicated his decision to not move for a 
mistrial due to juror misconduct was based on the fact some of the evidence provided by Mr. 
Truba was helpful to the defense case. Specifically, Mr. Ratliff believed Mr. Trnba's extra .. 
judicial inquiiy concerning how Albert's car handled was helpful. As Ms. Allen, the jwy 
foreperson, testified, Mr. Trnba told the other jurors Albert's car "was a very high-powered car 
and that it would be hard to control." What :Nfr. Ratliff ignored, and what was extremely 
prejudicial to Albert was Mr. Truba's statement "that Al -his words were his [sic] way out there 
is a little wacko." 
Critical to the underpinning ofl\fr. Ratliff's "tactical" decision to not move for a mistrial 
is how the e~1:ra-judicial prejudicial infotmation may have affected the remaining jw·or's 
deliberations. 
Strategic choices made after thorough investigation uf law and tacts 
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices 
made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In 
other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or tu make a l'easonable decision that makes pa11lcula1· investigations unnecessa1-y. In 
any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly 
assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances. applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. 
Wiggins v. Smilh, 539 U.S. 510, 521 - 22 (2003) (emphasis added). 
Although the entire panel was questioned, as a whole, concerning the effect of l\1r. 
Truba's statements, l\fr. Ratliff did not conduct a reasonable investigation into whether any 
6 Exhibit 12 at Exhibit p. 13, tr. p. 26, 11. 17 - 21. 7 Exhibit 12 at Exhibit p. 13, tr. p. 26, 1. 25 -p. 27, 1. 3. 
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individual juror's deliberations were adversely affected by :Mr. Truba's referring to Albert as 
"way out there" and a "little wacko." Nor did he request the trial court do so. 
The jury foreperson, Ms. Allen, and at least two other jtu·ors heard Mr. Truba's 
statements. Ms. Allen testified Mr. Truba spoke loudly enough for the entire jury panel to hear. 
Although he individually questioned Ms. Allen concerning whether l\.fr. Truba's extra-judicial 
statements affected her ability to render a just decision, Mr. Ratliff failed to voir dire the jurors 
i11dividually for information concerning how, if at all, Mr. Tmba's statements may have affected 
the deliberations despite the trial court's invitation to do so. Further, Mr. Ratliff failed to request 
the Court individually voir dire the jurors to ensure the extra-judicial statements did not affect 
Albert's right to a trial by an impartial jury based on admissible evidence under U.S. CONST. 
A . .1\1END. VI and Idaho Const. Art. I, § 7. 
It is as true today as it was at the time of Albert's trial: "collective voir dire is not 
ordinarily the instmment of choice for discerning the impartiality of jurors." United States v. 
Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See also, Cummings v. Dugger, 862 F.2d 1504, 
1508 (11 1h Cir. 1989) (preferred approach for dete1mining "Whether pre-trial publicity has affected 
the venire is to conduct individual voir dire); United States v. Small, 891 F.2d 53, 56 (3rd Cir. 
1989) ("This cotui has stated individual voir dire is the pref eiTed method to deteimine what 
extra-record information was conveyed to the jury and the manner of its conveyance.") As 
cogently noted by the D.C. Circuit in Coppedge v. United States: "It is too much to e:>.."}Ject from 
human nature that a juror would volunteer, in open court., before his follow jurors, that he would 
be intluenced by" extra judicial information. 272 F.2d 504, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Such is the 
case here. 
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The trial court's general inquiry of the panel to ensure Albert's constitutional right to a 
trial, based on admissible evidence subject to cross-examination was, simply put, patiently 
insufficient for ~fr. Ratliff to rely upon. Given the fact there was no evidence presented to the 
jury concerning .. Albert's psychological history, such a failure constitutes constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counseL Indeed, the info1mation shared with the jury by Mr. Tmba is of 
the kind which poses a "substantial threat to the faimess of the criminal proceeding because 
extraneous information completely evades the safeguards of the judicial process." See United 
States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 690 (3rd Cir. 1993). 
In Resko, the trial court was infonned the jwy was talking about the merits of the case 
prior to the submission of the case to it. Instead of inquiring of the jurors via individual voir dire, 
which was requested by trial counsel, the trial court gave the jurors a 2-question que~tionnaire. 
The two questions were: (1) whether the juror had participated in premature deliberations; and 
(2) whether the juror fom1ed an opinion of the guilt or non-guilt of the defendant. Each jurnr 
answered the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative. Id at 668. 
The appellate cowi determined further inquiry was required due to the juror's respective answers 
and, yet, none was conducted. The Resko Cowi held: "because the district court failed to engage 
in any investigation ... there is no evidence one way or the other regarding prejudice" ru1d the 
district court's failure to investigate "creates a highly problematic situation." Id at 690. 
Here, of particular note, Mr. Ratliff raised the issue of juror misconduct in his request for 
a new trial pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-2406.8 At the hearing on the ~Motion for New Trial, Mr. 
Ratliff stated: "'We think it [Mr. Truba's extra-judicial investigation and statements to the jury] 
8 Exhibit 10 at tr. p. 65, i. i6 -p. 66, 1. 21. 
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was prejudicial."9 If Mr. Ratliff felt the juror misconduct was a sufficient basis for a new trial, he 
should have moved a mistrial at the time or, at a minimum, requested the trial court conduct 
individual voir dire. Because :Mr. Ratliff's performance fell below the standards applicable to 
competent trial counsel at the time, this Court m~st presume prejudice with regard to this issue. 
See Resko, 3 F.3d at 666 ("[W]here the jwy misconduct w.is discovered mid-trial but there is no 
way for us to determine whether the defendants were or were not prejudiced, we will vacate the 
convictions and remand for a new trial even though the defendants have not established 
prejudice.") 
B. TI1al Counsel \Vas Constitutionally Ineffective For Failing To Submit A Full And Complete Psychological Evaluation To The Court For Use In Fashioning Mr. Occone's Sentence And, Thus, Mr. Ciccone Is Entitled To Relief In the Fonn Of A New Sentencing Heating. 
Following trial Mr. Ratliff successfully moved the trial cow1 for an order for a 
psychological evaluation at county expense. r..fr. Ratliff w.is aware Albei1 could potentially 
receive a sentence of life imprisonment. "The sentencing stage of any case, regardless of the 
potential punishment, is ·the time at which for many defendants the most important services of 
the entire proceeding can be performed.'" Vela v. Estelle, 708 F.2d 954, 964 (5th Cir. 1983). 
Where the potential punisl:unent is lifo imprisonment, as in the instant matter, the sentencing 
proceeding takes on added importance. See id See also, State v. Jackson, 130 Idal10 293, 294-95, 
939 P.2d 1327, 1328-29 (1997) citing with approval State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 638, 759 
P.2d 926, 929 (Ct.App.1988). 
Here, the State points to the fact Dr. Beaver's Affidavit does not include diagnoses which 
are included in Mr. Ratliff's notes. 10 Dr. Beaver's Affidavit, however, says what it says and was 
9 Id. at tr. p. 66, 11. 19-21. 
1° Closing Argument and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support, p. 9 n. 4. 
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based on his review of his file. Regardless of Dr. Beaver's and ~ir. Ratliff's professional 
relationship today, :Mr. Ratliff testified he did not believe that relationship would have affected 
Dr. Beaver's ability to provide a truthful and accurate affidavit. 11 
Further, the State appears to ignore the unrebutted evidence before the Court is Dr. 
Beaver's preliminary diagnoses and opinion: "There was a significant mental-health component 
related to the events sul1'oundi11g the death of ~fr. Ciccone's wife and w1bom child." Dr. 
Beaver's fuither opini011: "[b]ased 011 my conclusions above, a rep01i to the Cowi, had one been 
created, would have assisted the Court in deteimining :Mt·. Ciccone' s sentei1ce and, in fact, may 
very well have led the Cow·t to a sentence other than fixed life," is similarly wi-challenged. ~fr. 
Ratliff did not present this evidence, or, for that matter, any argument based on Dr. Beaver's 
preliminary findings, to the trial court at the time of sentencing. Such a decision cannot be 
deemed tactical wider the facts and circumstances here. 
Given the wiique natw·e of a fixed-life sentence, Mr. Ratliff was constitutionally 
ineffective for not presenting a fot.n1al psychological evaluation report, authored by Dr. Beaver, 
to the trial cowi for use at sentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, as well as those set forth in :Mt·. Ciccone's Plaintiff's 
Writ/en Closing Argumenl Following Evidenliary Hearing 011 his Verified Successive Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief., Mr. Cicc011e's Verified Successive Petition for PosJ-Conviction Relief 
should be granted, his conviction vacated and a new trial ordered. In the alternative, Mr. 
11 Because the Court denied Mr. Ciccone' s Motion for Preparation of Transcript at County Expense, which requested the transcript from the evidentiary hearing "because such transcript is not necessary for the preparation of closing arguments since counsel attended and represented the petition at the evidentiary hearing," any testimony from said hearing referenced in this pleading is based on cow1Sel's best recollection and notes. 
PLAINTIFF'S WRITTEN REPLY ARGUMENT FOLLOWING EVIDENTLi\.RY HEARING 
ON HIS VERIFIED SUCl:ESSJVE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION REllEF- Page 7 
157 
Ciccone's Verified Successive Petition Jo,· Post-Conviction Relief should be granted, his sentence 
vacated and a new sentencing ordered. 
DA TED this 13th day of February, 2015. 
KORMANIK HALLAM & SNEED LLP 
o R. Konnanik, of the Firm 
ounsel for Albert A. Ciccone 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify I caused to be served a true and correct copy the foregoing document 
by the method indicated below to the following: 
Kristina M. Schindele 
Elmore County Prosecutor 
l90S4thE 
Mountain Home ID 83647 
DATED this 13th day of February, 2015. 
US Mail 
---
--- Overnight Mail 
___ Hand Delivery 
• 
;( Facsimile No. (208) 587-2147 
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5 EELE 
THE i.oo,~u.RT .. _IL UTYf*C'~· 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-2014-59 
ORDER DISMISSING AFTER 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
This matter is before the Court following Petitioner's filing of a Successive Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-490 l, et seq. (Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
(UPCPA)), filed January 17, 2014. The Respondent filed State's Answer to Successive Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief on January 21, 2014. 
This matter came before the court for an evidentiary hearing held December 12, 2014 as 
required by Idaho Code I9-4907(a) on the claims in the Successive Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief filed on January 17, 2014. The parties requested additional time to file written closing 
arguments. The court also considered the Plaintiffs Written Closing Argument filed January 8, 
2015; Respondent's Closing Argument and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
filed on February 6, 2015; and Plaintiff reply filed February 13, 2015. 
Appearances: 
John Kormanik, counsel for the Petitioner, and the Petitioner was personally present. Kristina Schindele, counsel for the Respondent. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
On October 16, 2003, Albert Ciccone struck his pregnant wife with his car, killing her 
and the unborn fetus. 1 Petitioner, Albert A. Ciccone, was convicted by jury verdict to Count I, 
First Degree Murder, of his wife, and Count II, Second Degree Murder, of their unborn child. 
He was sentenced on June 7, 2005 to life without parole on Count I and fifteen years fixed, 
concurrent, on Count II. This occurred in Elmore County. The evidence at trial was that Mr. 
Ciccone's vehicle reached a speed of about fifty miles per hour when he struck his wife carrying 
their unborn child and that there was a lack of action on Mr. Ciccone's part to brake or swerve 
before the impact. The Petitioner appealed and the District Court's decision was affirmed in 
State v. Ciccone, 154 Idaho 330 (Ct.App. 2012). 
Mr. Ciccone subsequently filed a pro se Verified Successive Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief on January 17, 2014. Counsel was appointed and represented the Petitioner at the hearing, 
with the Petitioner personally present. The Petition contains two causes of action. The First 
Cause of Action alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel by A. failing to object to "multiple 
instances" of prosecutorial misconduct - individually or cumulatively; B. failing to request a jury 
instruction that they could not convict on either count if any one of them concluded that the 
death of Mrs. Ciccone was the result of an accident; and C. failing to request a psychological 
evaluation for sentencing hearing. The Second Cause of Action alleges ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel by D. failing to review the record of trial on Count II and failing to appeal 
Count II; E. failing to brief on appeal Number 50 of the special venire jury questionnaire; and F. 
"additional facts." 
State v. Ciccone, 154 Idaho 330 (Ct.App. 2012). The issues on appeal were whether the constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial were violated; whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during rebuttal closing arguments; and whether the determinate life sentence was excessive. 
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II. LEGAL ST AND ARDS 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, I.C. §§ 19-4901 through 19-4911, allows 
individuals convicted and/or sentenced for a crime to petition the Court for relief in the following 
situations:. (1) the sentence is in violation of the constitution; (2) the Court lacks jurisdiction; (3) 
the sentence exceeds the maximum provided by law; (3) there is evidence of material fact, not 
previously presented and heard, requiring vacation of the sentence in the interest of justice; (5) 
the sentence has expired; (6) the petitioner is innocent, subject to the provisions for DNA testing 
in the statute; (7) or the sentence is subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error. 
LC. § 19-4901(a). 
A petition for post-conviction relief is an entirely new proceeding and is civil in nature. 
It is distinct from the criminal action which led to conviction. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 
494, 36 P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001); Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454,456, 808 P.2d 373, 375 (1991). 
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief must bear the burden 
of proving the allegations upon which the petition for post-conviction relief is based by a 
preponderance of the evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27,995 P.2d 794, 797 
(2000). 
It is the Petitioner's responsibility to present admissible evidence at an evidentiary 
hearing. Unless introduced into evidence at the hearing, verified petitions and affidavits do not 
constitute evidence. Lovelandv. State, 141 Idaho 933,936, 120 PJd 751, 754 (Ct. App. 2005). 
A Petitioner is required to prove his allegations at the hearing by a preponderance of the evidence 
and the standard for avoiding summary dismissal, in which the district court is required to accept the 
petitioner's allegations as true, is not applicable at an evidentiary hearing. Id; see also Willie v. State, 
149 Idaho 647,649,239 P.3d 445,447 (Ct. App. 2010). 
ORDER DISMISSING AFTER EVIDENTIARY HEARING 3 
162 
Related to ineffective assistance of counsel, the applicant must show, first, that the 
attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 
(1988). Second, the applicant must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his or her attorney's 
deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington at 691-692; Aragon v. State at 760-761. 
"Strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed or serve as basis for post-conviction 
relief under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless that decision is shown to have 
resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings 
capable of objective review." State v. Osborne, 130 Idaho 365, 372-373, 941 P.2d 337, 344-345 
(citing Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921,924,877 P.2d 365,368 (1994)). When faced with a tactical 
decision, the court utilizes the "strong presumption" that the decision fell within the acceptable 
range of choices available to trial counsel. Hairston v. State, 133 Idaho 496, 511, 988 P.2d 1170, 
1185 (1999). To prove that such deficiency prejudiced Petitioner's case requires a showing of a 
"reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial 
would have been different." Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. 
The district court is vested with the discretion of making factual findings, and must rely 
on substantial evidence in the record, although the evidence may be conflicting. Martinez, 125 
Idaho at 846,875 P.2d at 943; Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312,314,658 P.2d 983,985 (Ct. App. 
1983). "[A]n applicant's conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence, 
need not be accepted as true." Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
III. EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE HEARING 
In the opening statement, counsel for the Petitioner noted he would not present evidence 
on all allegations in the V erfied Petition, but rather focus on the mistrial issue in paragraph 17 of 
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the Verified Petition and trial counsel's failure to get a psychological evaluation alleged in 
paragraphs 21 through 25 of the Petition. 
A. First Cause of Action, A. failing to object to "multiple instances" of prosecutorial misconduct - individually or cumulatively 
Paragraph 17 of the Verified Petition alleges trial defense counsel was ineffective 
because he failed: 
to move for a mistrial; or, at the very least to query the entire jury pan.el regarding the influence thatjuror(s) #168 Andrea Ross and #267 Paul Treuba had upon the balance of the remaining jurors, when they violated the Court's repeated instructions "not to discuss this case among yourselves, nor with anyone else, nor to form any opinion with regard to the merits of this case until it has been fully 
submitted to you for your determination." (Tr., p. 427, Ls. 9-15); and where juror #267 Mr. Trueba brought evidence into the jury deliberation room that had not been introduced at trial. 
The court reviewed the Court of Appeals decision State v. Ciccone, 154 Idaho 330 
(Ct.App. 2012) (Ex. l); excerpt from minutes confirming members of petitjury (Ex. 8); Motion 
for New Trial filed (Ex. 9); transcript of hearing on motion for new trial (Ex. 10); Memorandum 
Decision on motion for new trial (Ex. 11); and the transcript of the court's inquiry into juror 
misconduct (Ex. 12) offered as exhibits at the evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner testified he 
was originally represented by Ed Frachiseur and that Terry Ratliff was appointed to represent the 
Petitioner after preliminary hearing. Petitioner testified he did not feel his relationship with Mr. 
Ratliff was very collaborative. The Petitioner testified regarding his perception of juror 
misconduct. He stated that during trial, one of the jurors looked into the performance 
specifications of a vehicle like the one driven by the Defendant when the Defendant hit is wife 
with that vehicle. The Petitioner also testified that he thought the juror had made a comment that 
the Defendant "was wacko or something." The Petitioner said he spoke with Mr. Ratliff about 
the incident and that Mr. Ratliff told the Petitioner that a mistrial would not benefit the Petitioner 
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because the Petitioner would sit in jail longer than the more than 500 days in jail he had already 
served before the trial. Petitioner stated Mr. Ratliff did not elaborate on why a mistrial was not 
favorable but told the Petitioner that the juror's input was not negative or positive to the outcome 
of the trial. Mr. Ciccone testified that he did not remember anything in particular in the 
discussion with Mr. Ratliff about the juror's ''wacko" comment. 
Mr. Ratliff also testified at the hearing. He has currently been a licensed attorney for 29 
years and represented Mr. Ciccone. The evidence presented at the hearing showed Mr. Ratliff at 
least represented Mr. Ciccone by November 2003. Mr. Ratliff thought he got along well with 
Mr. Cicccone and was surprised when Mr. Ciccone testified the relationship was tumultuous. 
Mr. Ratliff testified related to the juror misconduct claim. Mr. Ratliffs recollection of what had 
occurred was that one juror worked at an autobody shop and had contacted someone with a car 
similar to the Petitioner's. That juror heard the car was hard to handle at high speeds and did not 
handle well on dirt roads. That juror then conveyed that information to other jurors. Mr. Ratliff 
testified that the additional information the juror interjected was consistent with the defense in 
the case-the information that the car handled poorly on dirt roads was actually favorable to the 
defense. Mr. Ratliff also recalled that the juror made some derogatory comment relayed to other 
jurors. Mr. Ratliff recalled the jury foreman had sent two notes to the judge during the trial. 
This was the subject of the Motion for New Trial (Ex. 9) filed by Mr. Ratliff. Mr. Ratliff 
testified this motion was filed at the Petitioner's request. A hearing was held on this motion (Ex. 
10) and the court entered a memorandum decision and order denying the motion for new trial 
(Ex. 11 ). In this decision and order, the Court discusses that the members of the jury 
immediately brought it to the court's attention when this juror introduced information from 
outside the trial, that the juror was called into court and both parties were given an opportunity to 
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examine the juror, and that juror was excused. The alternate juror was then queried, placed on 
panel, and re-sworn. Also, the remaining panel was questioned as to whether any juror felt 
he or she could not set aside this information and be fair and impartial. And the jury was 
further instructed they could not in any way consider what they had been told by the errant juror. 
The Court's conclusion at that time was 
that based upon these facts, the defendant was not denied a fair trial. Indeed, the actions of the jury made clear they were committed to giving the defendant the fair trial he sought to the point of calling to· the attention of the court and the parties the actions of one of their members, which they considered inappropriate. Given these facts, the court finds that the defendant's rights to a fair trial and fair and impartial jury were not compromised and denies his motion for a new trial. 
(Ex. 11 at page numbered 326). 
On January 26, 2005, the court discussed on the record a note from the jury foreman and 
a transcript of the subsequent questioning of the jurors that occurred during the deliberations was 
admitted as an exhibit at the evidentiary hearing. (Ex. 12). The foreman relayed this juror stated 
he was discussing the car with someone that he works with that knew this car. And was asking him specific questions about how the car handled and this person informed him -he said that he knew Al and Al - his words were his way out there 
. is a little wacko. And at that point is when I said -
Q. Did he say any specifics about how the car handled or, you know, my friend said the car does this or does that? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay, what did he say about that? Do you recall? 
A. He said that it was a very high-powered car that it would be hard to control. And-
Q. And did he talk about driving it on dirt roads or -
A. And then he went on to talk about his experience about driving on dirt roads. 
(Ex. 12, pp. 9-10). That juror relayed under oath at that hearing that this information was said in 
front of the entire jury panel and when asked at what point that happened, the foreman testified 
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"A. I said we shouldn't be talking about this. And several jurors said I agree. And then 
someone wrote me a note and brought it to my attention. And then we took a break and someone 
brought it to my attention." Id. at 10. The notes were given to the Bailiff and when asked, "Q. 
Was anything else said by Paul after that? About his conversation or outside information that 
took place outside this courtroom? A. No." Id. Later, the court asked the follow up question of 
the foreman, "Q. Was there anything there that you had not considered as a juror in terms of the 
testimony that you heard in the courtroom? A. No." After further inquiry, excusal of the juror 
who made the comments, calling the alternate, and reconstituting the jury, the entire jury was 
then reinstructed using Jury Instruction 11. Id at pp. 30-32. 
Mr. Ratliff testified at the evidentiary hearing there was an opportunity for him to 
question the jurors about these issues but that Mr. Ratliff did not move for a mistrial. Mr. Ratliff 
testified the judge had eliminated the juror, brought in an alternate, then brought other jurors 
back in and asked if they could all still be impartial. All of the jurors on the record agreed they 
could be fair. Mr. Ratliff testified that he did not have concerns about an unfair jury Vvith the 
questioning, removal of the juror, and limiting instruction given by the judge. Given these 
measures, Mr. Ratliff testified he did not believe the situation warranted a motion for a mistrial. 
B. First Cause of Action, failing to request a psychological evaluation for sentencing hearing. 
Paragraph 25 of the Verified Petition alleges trial defense counsel was ineffective 
because he neglected to inform the Petitioner that trial defense counsel elected to forego 
preparation of Dr. Beaver's psychological assessment, or by not submitting extensive mental 
health records documenting the Petitioner's involuntary psychiatric commitment to 
Intermountain Hospital in September 2003. 
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In Petitioner's Exhibit A, Mr. Ratliff stated on November 26, 2003 " ... because of his 
medication. He's [the Petitioner's] not, for lack of a better term, he gets a little indiscernible in 
the afternoons when he's .... " This statement was made as the court was resetting the preliminary 
hearing at the request of the parties. The trial was held about thirteen months after this comment, 
beginning January 4, 2005. At the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner testified he was on medication 
at the time of Mr. Ratliff's representation including Effexor, an anti-depressant, and Klonipin for 
anxiety. Petitioner testified that at times during the representation the Petitioner felt detached 
and had difficulty understanding. He testified he had a conversation with Mr. Ratliff regarding a 
psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Beaver for mitigation at the sentencing hearing. Dr. 
Beaver relayed to Mr. Ratliff three diagnoses; major depression, recurrent depression, and 
borderline personality disorder. This is captured in Mr. Ratliffs notes taken contemporaneously 
with the conversation with Dr. Beaver on May 20, 2005 (Ex. 13). The Petitioner knew that tests 
were conducted, stated it was not by Dr. Beaver, and then testified the Petitioner never saw a 
report. Petitioner testified that Mr. Ratliff felt the evaluation did not go well so Mr. Ratliff 
would not publish the official report. The Petitioner testified he never understood the problem 
but trusted that Mr. Ratliff was acting in the best faith as his attorney although the Petitioner 
never saw the report. The Petitioner reiterated on cross examination that, although the 
relationship with Mr. Ratliff was contentious, the Petitioner still trusted Mr. Ratliff's judgment 
because law was his profession. The Petitioner testified that he had requested the report from 
Mr. Ratliff because the Petitioner wanted the evaluation for himself, but Mr. Ratliff brushed off 
the request and never gave him a copy of the report. 
Mr. Ratliff testified that he did not have enough medical proof for a psychological 
evaluation in pretrial proceedings because the theory was that the charged conduct was an 
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accident. Since intent was not an element of the crime, a psychological evaluation would not 
mattered before the trial because communication with counsel or ability to understand the 
proceedings was never an issue. He did not recall psychological issues experienced by Mr. 
Ciccone during afternoons at trial although he testified sometimes he does request defendants be 
provided snacks during trials to help with medical or medication issues. Mr. Ratliff testified he 
received Dr. Beaver's verbal report of his psychological evaluation of the Defendant. Mr. Ratliff 
made handwritten notes of the conversation which were admitted into evidence by the 
Respondent. Mr. Ratliff testified he told Dr. Beaver not to produce a written report. 
Portions of Petitioner's Exhibit B were admitted including an affidavit of Craig Beaver 
with a curriculum vitae, letters, and a court order requesting Dr. Beaver's evaluation. This 
affidavit signed on December 10, 2014 acknowledges Dr. Beaver had a member of his staff visit 
Mr. Ciccone for neuro-psychometric and other testing on May 3, 2005 for a court-ordered 
evaluation. Dr. Beaver also personally interviewed Mr. Ciccone on May 4, 2005 and 
telephonically on May 13, 2005. Dr. Beaver also telephonically intereviewed Mr. Ciccone's 
parents. No formal written evaluation was ever created. Dr. Beaver had no independent 
recollection why no written evaluation was ever produced but presumed it was not produced at 
the direction of the trial defense counsel, Mr. Ratliff. Dr. Beaver's opinions and conclusions 
from the testing, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, was that Mr. Ciccone's testing 
showed a "markedly elevated profile indicating significant emotional and/or psychiatric 
issues; ... significant mood instability; ... a significant [family] history of bipolar disorders; ... [ and] 
a significant mental-health component related to ... the death of Mr. Ciccone's wife and unborn 
 .... " Dr. Beaver believed he would have informed Mr. Ratliff of these opinions; that Dr. 
Beaver's report "would have" assisted the court at sentencing and, "in fact, may very well have 
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led the Court to a sentence othe~ than fixed-life." Additionally, Dr. Beaver opines that the 
outcome of the trial may have been different if he had performed this testing prior to trial and 
testified at trial. 
In Respondent's Exhibit 4, in response to the court's inquiry about the previously ordered 
mental health evaluation, Mr. Ratliff responded to the trial court, 
Judge, an evaluation was conducted. But after due consideration and conference with the evaluator and my client, it was elected not to have the report prepared for sentencing. 
The order does not require us to prepare a report or to bring forth the evaluator for purposes of testimony. Essentially that order was for purposes of securing the evaluation at county expense, but I was not required, under Rule 702 or otherwise, to disclose the contents or the fmdings of that evaluation, and no written report has been prepared. 
(Ex. 4, pp. 1880-82). The State acknowledged Mr. Ratliff advised he would not submit the 
report and the court acknowledged the defense had ch~sen not to make use of such evaluation. 
When Mr. Ciccone was asked if there was anything in the presentence report that may be 
inaccurate, Mr. Ciccone replied, ''No, sir." Id. 
Mr. Ratliff testified he asked that Dr. Beaver not produce a written report because Dr. 
Beaver's diagnosis was major depression, recurrent depression, and borderline personality 
disorder. Dr. Beaver had concluded the defendant had a deep denial of his culpability. Mr. 
Ratliff also felt Dr. Beaver could not satisfactorily answer the question of whether the Defendant 
would kill again in a manner that would lessen a sentence for the Petitioner since one factor was 
the safety of the community. Mr. Ratliff testified he was concerned that if a written report was 
produced, the State could then have moved for a separate evaluation for the Defendant. Mr. 
Ratliff was concerned that the State would have requested Dr. Estess be appointed for the 
evaluation and, in Mr. Ratliff's experiences, Dr. Estess' evaluations had not been favorable to 
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defendants in other similar cases. Mr. Ratlifrs notes of the conference with Dr. Beaver were 
admitted into evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 13. This included a printout regarding 
borderline personality disorder which Mr. Ratliff testified was research he did following his 
conversation with Dr. Beaver. 
The court reviewed victim impact letters from sentencing (Ex. 2); the sentencing hearing 
transcript (Ex. 4); the State's closing argument transcript (Ex. 5); transcript extracts of 
descriptions of the crash scene (Ex. 6); minutes from sentencing hearing (Ex. 7); Petitioner's 
military records (Ex. 14); and Petitioner's Intermountain Hospital records from an admission 
between September 23, 2003 and discharge of October 3, 2003 for a suicide attempt where he 
unsuccessfully tried to hang himself and then drank acetone (Ex. 15). Dr. Silby noted the mental 
status examination at discharge was that the Defendant ''was not felt to be a threat to himself or 
others and had no suicidal or homicidal ideation." Id The Petitioner testified that he did not 
recall whether the Intermountain Hospital records were appended to the presentence report and 
that only his Enlisted Performance Reports from his military records were appended to the 
presentence report. 
The court also reviewed character letters offered by defense counsel at sentencing (Ex. 
3). Two of these letters from the Petitioner's father and mother detail the father's history with 
mental illness and hospitalizations, the struggles of Petitioner's marriage to the victim, and the 
Petitioner's suicide attempt and hospitalization at Intermountain Hospital. Other letters of family 
members, family friends, and former teachers/counselors also commend Mr. Ciccone, although 
many were also aware of the Defendant's struggles with mental health. 
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C. All Other Allegations 
Unless introduced into evidence at the hearing, verified petitions and affidavits do not 
constitute evidence. Lovelandv. State, 141 Idaho 933,936, 120 P.3d 1, 754 (Ct. App. 2005). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals specifically declined to overrule or extend Loveland in Willie v. 
State, 149 Idaho 647,239 P.3d 445 (Ct. App. 2010). Since verified petitions and affidavits do 
not automatically become evidence at the evidentiary hearing, and the Petitioner did not admit 
such documents into evidence, the Court is not to consider the allegations or affidavit just 
because it is a filed pleading. At the evidentiary hearing, the Petitioner did not present any 
evidence on the allegations in the Second Cause of Action of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel through testimony or other admitted evidence. Also, the Petitioner did not present any 
evidence on other allegations in the First Cause of Action such as ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel by failing to object to "multiple instances" of prosecutorial misconduct - individually or 
cumulatively. In fact, the Petitioner did not present any evidence that there were "multiple 
instances" ofprosecutorial misconduct, much less that trial defense counsel failed to object. The 
Petitioner also did not present any evidence that trial defense counsel failed to request a jury 
instruction that the jury could not convict on either count if any one of them concluded that the 
death of Mrs. Ciccone was the result of an accident. Related to jury instructions, Mr. Ratliff 
testified that he did not request these instructions given the evidence admitted at trial. Although 
the Petitioner alleges he's not waived any of these issues and "relies on the record before the 
Court,"2 there is no record before the court other than the Petitioner's testimony, Mr. Ratliff's 
testimony, and the admitted exhibits referenced above. Prejudice is not presumed regarding these 
allegations. The court reviewed victim impact letters from sentencing (Ex. 2); the sentencing 
2 Plaintiffs Written Closing Argument Following Evidentiary Hearing on His Verified Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, fu. 1. 
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hearing transcript (Ex. 4); the State's closing argument transcript (Ex. 5); transcript extracts of 
descriptions of the crash scene (Ex. 6); and minutes from sentencing hearing (Ex. 7). The 
Petitioner has not met his first burden by a preponderance of the evidence showing ineffective 
assistance of counsel on any of these issues. He has not shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness 
under Strickland v. Washington. Having not met the burden of proof at the evidentiary hearing, 
the Petitioner has shown no right to relief on these additional allegations. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. First Cause of Action, A. failing to object to "multiple instances" of prosecutorial misconduct - individually or cumulatively 
Paragraph 17 of the petition alleges trial defense counsel was ineffective because he 
failed to move for a mistrial or query the entire jury panel regarding the influence that juror( s) 
#168 Andrea Ross and #267 Paul Treuba. No evidence was presented by the Petitioner related to 
juror# 168 Andrea Ross. Therefore, the Petitioner has not met his burden of proof as to this 
allegation. The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing was related to #267 Paul Treuba. 
First, the Petitioner acknowledges the entire panel was questioned, as a whole, concerning the 
effect of Mr. Treuba's statements. However, the Petitioner argues that Mr. Ratliff did not 
conduct a reasonable investigation into whether any individual juror's deliberations were 
adversely affected by Mr. Treuba's comments. Petitioner supports this argument using Wiggins 
v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521-22 (2003). However, Wiggins discusses "a particular decision (by 
trial defense counsel] not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the 
circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgment." Id. The court 
disagrees that trial defense counsel did not investigate the juror misconduct at the time it 
occurred. When the conduct was made aware to both counsel by the judge, the judge 
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immediately conducted a hearing into any statements and its effect on the jurors. Counsel for 
both parties was present for those questions. It is true that Mr. Ratliff did not ask follow up 
questions following the State's questions and the court's questions, but considering all of the 
circumstances of the proactive role in questioning taken by the State and the Court, trial defense 
counsel's not asking additional questions after the entire panel had responded to the judge's 
questions was reasonable. The trial defense counsel was present for and a part of the 
investigation of the conduct. This court disagrees that the trial court's inquiry of the foreman, 
excusal of the juror who made the statements, follow up questions of the reconstituted jury, and 
re-instruction of the reconstituted jury was simply not a reasonable investigation into the effect 
of any comments Mr. Treuba had on the jury. Although the investigation and questioning was 
not conducted personally by the defense counsel, he was present, heard the responses, had the 
opportunity to examine, and made a strategic decision after a reasonable investigation not to 
continue highlighting a comment to the effect that his client may be way out there or a little 
wasko by asking this in question format to each individual juror for that juror to affirm they 
could remain fair and impartial. In fact, this court finds that strategy would have increased the 
opportunity for prejudice since each juror had already affirmed, under oath, to the court that they 
could disregard any statements and remain fair and impartial in considering the case. 
Additionally, the Petitioner claims trial defense counsel should have moved for a mistrial 
following the court's inquiry of the jurors. The Petitioner testified he discussed moving for a 
mistrial with Mr. Ratliff at the time of the court's inquiry. Mr. Ratliff testified that the 
information about the car's performance was not unfavorable to the defense theory of the case, 
that the court had properly excused the juror and remedied the issue with the other jurors, and 
that a motion for mistrial would not have been granted. With respect to failure to file a motion as 
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a basis for ineffective assistance of counsel, a conclusion that the motion, if filed, would have 
been unsuccessful, is determinative of both prongs of the claim. State v. Payne, I 46 Idaho 548, 
562, 199 PJd 123, 137 (2008)(citations. omitted). The co~ finds that given the record at the 
evidentiary hearing, that the court would not have granted a motion for mistrial if it had been 
made because the Defendant could not have established prejudice of the jury given the thorough 
record in this case; Campbell v. State, 130 Idaho 546, 549, 944 P.2d 143, 146 (Ct. App. 1997). 
In fact, even the court said as much in denying the motion for new trial which was much closer 
in time to the verdict. The Court's specific conclusion was that "Given these facts, the court finds 
that the defendant's rights to a fair trial and fair and impartial jury were not compromised .... " 
(Ex. 11 at page numbered 326); This court finds that Judge Wetherell would not have granted a 
motion for mistrial pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1, even given the lack of additional 
questioning of each juror by trial defense counsel of whether they heard of believed the 
Defendant was ''way out there is a little wacko" as relayed by the foreman. Additionally, the 
judge presiding at the evidentiary hearing would also not have granted a motion for mistrial 
given these facts and based upon the record. Therefore, the Petitioner has not met his first 
burden related to ineffective assistance of counsel and has not shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
under Strickland v. Washington. 
B. First Cause of Action, failing to request a psychological evaluation for sentencing hearing. 
Paragraph 25 of the Verified Petition alleges trial defense counsel was ineffective 
because he neglected to inform the Petitioner that trial defense counsel elected to forego 
preparation of Dr. Beaver's psychological assessment, or by not submitting extensive mental 
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health records documenting the Petitioner's involuntary psychiatric commitment to 
Intennountain Hospital in September 2003. 
The court will address the second part of the allegation first. While the Petitioner testifed 
he did not recall whether the Intermountain Hospital records were attached to the presentence 
report, the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing is that· the Intermountain Hospital 
records from September 2003 were submitted in full to the court for the court's consideration at 
sentencing. The examining psychologist at discharge opined that at discharge (less that two 
weeks before the death of Mr. Ciccone's wife) that the Defendant ''was not felt to be a threat to 
himself or others and had no. suicidal or homicidal ideation." (Ex. 15). Therefore, as to this 
allegation, the Petitioner has not met his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence of 
showing the court did not have or consider the mental health records from Intermountain 
Hospital. In fact, the evidence is that the court had those records and considered the presentence 
report in fashioning the sentence. 
Related to the portion of the allegation that trial defense counsel was ineffective because 
he neglected to inform the Petitioner that trial defense counsel elected to forego preparation of 
Dr. Beaver's psychological assessment, the Petitioner actually testified at the hearing that trial 
defense counsel informed the Petitioner that the trial defense counsel elected to forego 
preparation of Dr. Beaver's psychological assessment. His testimony at the evidentiary hearing 
was that he just didn't get a satisfactory explanation of why. However, Petitioner, from his 
conversation in 2005 with Mr. Ratliff, understood it was the defense counsel's assessment that 
the evaluation "did not go well." 
In Respondent's Exhibit 4, in response to the court's inquiry about the previously ordered 
mental health evaluation, Mr. Ratliff responded to the trial court, 
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Judge, an evaluation was conducted. But after due consideration and conference 
with the evaluator and my client, it was elected not to have the report prepared for sentencing. 
Therefore, counsel's indication to the judge at the time of sentencing was that counsel 
had discussed the matter with his client. The evidence at hearing has established that Petitioner's 
counsel made a strategic and tactical decision not to have a written psychological evaluation 
prepared and submitted at sentencing. At sentencing, in addition to the mental health records 
indicating that the Petitioner was not a danger to himself or others approximately ten days before 
the Petitioner ran over his wife, the court also had Petitioner's military records showing above 
average military performance of the Defendant with exemplary on and off duty conduct as 
recently as January 20, 2003 (Ex. 14). Defense counsel had presented letters of the family 
describing a family history of mental illness and many character letters describing the 
Petitioner's good character. Trial defense counsel testified he was aware of the results of Dr. 
Beaver's evaluation and had even done research about Dr. Beaver's conclusions. Trial defense 
counsel described his rationale for his decision, including the strategy of not presenting a new 
written psychological evaluation to preclude the State from requesting an additional evaluation 
of the Defendant-which counsel, based on his experience and expertise, did not feel would be 
favorable toward the Defendant. 
Dr. Beaver opined nine years later that he felt his diagnosis and findings related to mood 
instability and a markedly elevated profile indicating significant emotional and/or psychiatric 
issues would have assisted the Court in determining Mr. Ciccone's sentence, and in fact, may 
very well have lessened the sentence the court gave. But the trial defense counsel explained his 
assessment of the evaluation nine years ago, had notes made contemporaneously supporting that 
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assessment, and described a reasonable strategy related to the assessment of why, in his training 
and experience, Judge Wetherell would have differed from Dr. Beaver's opinion. 
To meet the first prong of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, the 
Petitioner must show that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 
758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). In reviewing all of the evidence, this court does not fmd 
the Petitioner has shown that trial defense counsel's request of Dr. Beaver precluding the 
introduction of the report at sentencing fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Trial 
defense counsel had the evidence of the Defendant's diagnosis with depression and mental.health 
issues before the court, along with a favorable psychologist's determination that he was not a 
danger to himself or others, with favorable character information chronicling his behavior during 
this period. Dr. Beaver's conclusions of signifcant mood instability and significant emotional 
and/or psychiatric issues would have undermined the positive information before the court. Not 
having this information before the court was a reasonable strategic or tactical decision of this 
defense counsel. Failing to produce the report was not due to inadequate preparation, ignorance 
of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. This decision fell within 
the acceptable range of choices available to trial counsel required by Hairston, especially given 
the strength and quantity of evidence presenting the same information more favorably to the 
Defendant 
Having failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the attorney's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under Strickland, the Petitioner 
has failed to show his counsel's assistance was ineffective. Therefore, the court is not required 
to move to the second prong of whether the attorney's conduct prejudiced the Defendant. 
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However, here, too, in an objective review of the complete record before the court at sentencing, 
the attorney's conduct did not prejudice the Defendant at sentencing, would not have changed 
outcome of the sentence, and in fact, presented a more favorable defense for the Defendant 
even without the risk of a countervailing report by a psychologist for the State. 
Having not met the burden of proof at the evidentiary hearing, the Petitioner has shown 
no right to relief. 
C. All Other Allegations 
The court's analysis of the lack of evidence supporting all other claims are included with 
the court's findings of fact in the section above. Again, the Petitioner has not met his burden of 
proof on any of the remaining allegations and shown no right to relief. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is DISMISSED. 
SO ORDERED AND DATED this 1Jlt:f February, 2015. 
L~ 
District Judge 
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Kristina M. Schindele 
Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney 
Interdepartmental Mail 
John Kormanik 
Kormanik Hallam & Sneed, LLP 
206 W. Jefferson St. 
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Albert A. Ciccone 
Inmate No. 77377, Hl07B 
Idaho Correctional Center 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83 707 
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l!\ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELAfci~d 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Case No. CV-2014-59 Petitioner, 
vs. FINAL JUDGMENT 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
The Petition for Post Conviction Relief is dismissed with prejudice. 
,/1--' 
Dated thisZ1day of February, 2015. 
L~ 
-
District Judge 
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John Kormanik 
Kormanik Hallam & Sneed, LLP 
206 W. Jefferson St. 
Boise ID 83702 
Albert A. Ciccone· 
Inmate No. 77377, HI 07B 
Idaho Correctional Center 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83 707 
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John R. Kormanik, ISB #5850 
KORMANIK HALLAM & SNEED LLP 
206 W Jefferson St 
Boise ID 83702 
Telephone: 208.288.1888 
Facsimile: 866.821.9543 
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Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-2014-0059 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
16 
AJ:U1, )TEt::LE 
Of THE COURT DEPUTf\,/\ 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND ITS ATTORNEYS, KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE; LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATEHOUSE, BOISE, IDAHO, 83720 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-EN'PITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Petitioner, ALBERT A. CICCONE, appeals against the above-named 
Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final Judgment, entered on or about February 
27, 2015, by the Honorable Lynn G. Norton, District Judge, presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment 
described in Paragraph 1 above is an appealable Order and Judgment under and pursuant to 
I.A.R. l l(a)(l). 
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3. Petitioner-Appellant Albert A. Ciccone provides the following list of the issues on appeal 
which he intends to assert in the appeal. This list is not exhaustive and the providing of such list 
not prevent Petitioner-Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal: 
a. The trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing Mr. Ciccone's Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief with prejudice following an evidentiary hearing. 
4. a. Is reporter's standard transcript requested? Yes. 
b. The Petitioner-Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript as defined in I.A.R. 25(b): 
1. Evidentiary hearing, February 12, 2015, reported by Fran Casey. 
Estimated length of transcript, one hundred twenty five (125) pages. 
5. The Petitioner-Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's 
Record, in addition to those automatically included pursuant to I.A.R. 28. 
a. All briefs, memoranda and exhibits submitted, lodged and filed in the District 
Court. 
6. I hereby certify: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Fran Casey, Court Reporter, Elmore County Courthouse, 150 S 4th E, Mountain 
Home, ID 83647. 
b. (1) __ That either the reporter of the clerk of the district court or 
administrative agency has been paid the estimated fee for the preparation of the 
transcript. 
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(2) _X_ That Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee 
because he is indigent. 
c. __ That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record 
has been paid. 
(2) _X_ That Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because his is indigent. 
d. (I) __ That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(2) That Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because 
he is indigent. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
I.A.R. 20, and the Attorney General of the State of Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 67-1401(1). 
DATED this /b c- day of March, 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
the method indicated below to following: 
Kristina M. Schindele 
Elmore County Prosecutor 
190 S 4th E 
Mountain Home ID 83647 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General 
Statehouse 
Boise ID 83720 
Fran Casey, Court Reporter 
Elmore County Courthouse 
150 S 4th E 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
US Mail 
---
--- Overnight Mail 
--»- Hand Delivery 
__ Facsimile No. (208) 587-2147 
_.,..,,>o,___ US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
___ Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 
---
US Mail 
---
--- Overnight Mail 
__ )o"""-- Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 
---
DATED this ~day of March, 2015. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 4 
II 
! 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-2014-0059 
ORDER APPOINTING STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
THE COURT had previously appointed the Elmore County Public Defender, or conflict 
counsel, to represent Petitioner in all proceedings involving the Successive Post-Conviction 
Petition. An appeal has been filed in this matter. Conflict counsel for the Elmore County Public 
Defender's Office moved for appointment of the State Appellate Public Defender pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 19-867, et seq. 
Having already determined Petitioner-Appellant is "needy" pursuant to the statute, the 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender is appointed as counsel in this matter. 
Dated this ~March, 2015. 
L~ 
District Judge 
ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER- Page 1 
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0 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thisd,~Y of March, 2015, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following: 
Kristina Schindele 
Elmore County Prosecutor 
190 South 4th East 
Mountain Home ID 8364 7 
John R. Kormanik 
Kormanik Hallam & Sneed LLP 
206 W Jefferson St 
Boise ID 830702 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3050 Lake Harbor Ln, Ste 100 
Boise ID 83703 
Albert A Ciccone 
Offender Number 773 77 
Idaho Correctional Center, Unit G 
PO Box 70010 
Boise ID 83707 
US Mail 
---
--- OvernightMail )6 Hand Delivery 
__ Facsimile No. (208) 345-0365 
)() US Mail 
___ Overnight Mail 
___ Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 
---
)0 US Mail 
___ Overnight Mail 
___ Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 
---
L USMail 
___ Overnight Mail 
___ Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 
---
BARBARA STEELE1. , ~\~~~~ .. 
ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER- Page 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
Supreme Court 
Case No. 43075 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Barbara Steele, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Elmore, do hereby certify that the foregoing Record in this cause 
was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete record of the 
pleadings and documents requested by Appellate Rule 28. 
I further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above entitled cause, see Clerk's 
Certificate of Exhibits, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the 
Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record. 
I further certify that the following will be submitted as exhibits to the Record on Appeal: 
1. Transcript ofEvidentiary Hearing held on December 12, 2014 
2. Exhibit's from the Evidentiary Hearing held on December 12, 2014 
3. Presentence Investigation (CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBIT) 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this \.zfday 2015. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT THE 
OF IDAHO, AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
PlaintiftlRespondent, 
vs. 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Supreme Court 
Case No. 43075 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF 
EXHIBITS 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
I, BARBARA STEELE, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State ofidaho, in and for the County of Elmore, do hereby certify: 
That the following is a list of exhibits which were offered or admitted into evidence during 
the Evidentiary Hearing in this case: 
No.A 
No.B 
No. I 
No.2 
No.3 
No.4 
No.5 
No.6 
No. 7 
No.8 
No.9 
No.10 
No. 11 
No.12 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS: 
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing 
Affidavit of Craig W. Beaver with attachments 
RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS: 
State v. Ciccone Decision 
Victim Impact Letters 
Defendant's character letters 
Sentencing Hearing transcript 
Closing Arguments transcript 
References to "crime scene" transcript 
Minutes :from Sentencing Hearing on 6/712005 
Excerpt from trial minutes confirming jury members 
Motion for New Trial 
Transcript of Motion for New Trial Hearing 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
Transcript regarding inquiry into juror misconduct 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS-Page 1 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
No. 13 
No. 
Notes from Terry Ratliff 
Military Records 
Admitted 
Admitted 
AND I FURTHER CERTIFY that the following will submitted as exhibits to this 
Record: 
Presentence Report (Confidential Exhibit) 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS -Page 2 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
By 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffi'Respondent, 
vs. 
ALBERT A. CICCONE, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court 
Case No. 43075 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, BARBARA STEELE, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Elmore, do hereby certify that I have personally served or 
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT and CLERK'S 
RECORD to each of the attorneys ofrecord in this cause as follows: 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Statehouse Mail 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Sara Thomas 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
P.O. Bo2816 
Boise, ID 83701 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
By 
De 
